In Search of Work

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IN SEARCH OF WORK

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Abstract

Ever since 1800 more and more Europeans became wage labourers, even though the trend was neither unilinear nor irreversible.

In the first section of this article I discuss shifts between wage labour on the one hand, and the entrepreneurial status as well as non-labour (children and old-aged persons) on the other; between the reproductive and the productive status; and between free and unfree labour (including conscripts, prisoners, inmates of concentration camps). I take my examples not only from Northwestern Europe, but also from Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

The second section outlines the history of mobility and migration, including changes of residence (emigration), temporary migration and commuting, and job rotation. A crucial element in this story is the tension between the growing technical possibilities to travel from the early nineteenth century on and the restrictions imposed on the free movement of workers by governments.

In the third section I discuss different modes of job mediation within their historical context: personal mediation, professional networks (including the guilds and the professions), and impersonal mediation (including the trade unions and employers organizations, labour exchanges, employment agencies, and job fairs).

The fourth and last section deals with the pretensions of labour market policies. Starting from the traditional interpretation of unemployment as part of the local poverty problem, in the Interbellum and particularly during the Great Depression most governments came to accept the primacy of politics over economics in order to attack labour market problems. The apotheosis of this approach was the post-war Welfare State, which was thoroughly reconsidered in the last quarter of the century.

Author’s Note

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Amsterdam, July 2000
Jan Lucassen
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Introduction

Who is in search of work – occasionally, regularly or continuously? In order to answer this question it is first necessary to know what we mean by work in the framework of Europe during the last two centuries.

Some people are looking for workers. We call them employers, persons who have capital and want to make a profit by organizing production. Other people are looking for paid work. They do not have enough capital to organize production on their own. The only thing they possess are their muscles and their brains. Logically, there is a third type of people who are neither searching for workers nor for an employer to offer them work. Such persons have some capital, enough to set up a business on their own, but not enough to employ other persons. A fourth category are those persons who work without direct monetary remuneration, within a voluntary agreement with persons of the three groups mentioned above. These persons, traditionally said to be “reproductive”, as against the first three “productive” groups, consist as a rule of housewives and sometimes of other dependent and living-in relatives. A last category embraces people who do not work. The vast majority of those that depend on others for their living are children, too small to work or prevented from doing so by attending school. Others possess enough capital to live off or are entitled to pensions or benefits. Only as receivers of rents, interests or pensions and as consumers do they participate in economic life.

In such a simplified model of society, only the second category, those called “workers” or “labourers”, are in search of work. For many reasons this model is simplified indeed. Here I do not just mean that the foregoing distinctions are implicitly based on production for the market and leave out, for instance, domestic service. Even more important simplifications have to be addressed first.

First, the model suggests that a particular person falls into only one of these four categories. This does not hold for the vast majority of the population. From birth to death, most people pass through different stages – they may proceed from childhood and apprenticeship via wage labour as a journeyman to the status of a small master, to end as a rentier; or from childhood, via school and university, they may go into business, suffer bankruptcy, turn into a wage labourer, and die as an inmate of a poor house. Many other examples could be added.

Second, the model suggests that a person acts independently as a sovereign individual. However, most persons most of the time are part of a household, i.e. a social unit which pools income and consumption. By implication, decisions about their career, and so about whether or not they become wage labourers, are typically taken not by the individual alone, but within the household framework. Very often, households develop a thoughtful strategy about which member is going to do what kind of outside work for which part of the time. As a rule, households at any given moment comprise persons in many of the above-mentioned categories, labourers among them. Besides, any household greatly needs work done in order to assure its very existence, so-called “reproductive work”. In most cases this task is delegated chiefly to the housewife and the elder children, especially the girls. In fact, the reproductive workers constitute

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1. I would like to thank all colleagues who commented upon earlier versions of this essay, most particular my colleagues in the International Institute of Social History. Lex Heerma van Voss, Jaap Kloosterman, Marco van Leeuwen and Marcel van der Linden, as well as Geoffrey Crossick (University of Essex). I am also most grateful to Marjan van der Klein (IISH) and Piet Lourens for their assistance.
Introduction

a category – the single largest – that stands outside all categories of economic production while at the same time being most intimately connected to every one.

Third, most labourers are part of a wider unit not only at home, but also on the work floor. They will identify to a certain extent with their colleagues, or more widely with people in the same trade or profession, or even with their fellow-proletarians in general. Such coalitions are important with regard to the labour market. United in guilds, journeymen’s associations, mutual benefit societies, trade unions or political parties, certain groups may try to control access to parts of the labour market.

Fourth, our model is ahistorical, since it presupposes a free labour market. As we shall see, throughout history countless labourers have been employed not just because of economic coercion (as was implicitly taken for granted above) but also for non-economic coercive reasons: they were slaves, indentured labourers, serfs, draftees, convicts or prisoners. Those searching for labourers can use economic and non-economic coercion depending on the actual organization of society. Those searching for work will respond first of all to economic coercion but may also “sell” themselves as indentured labourers or debt-slaves, or have to surrender their freedom as a result of violence.

Fifth, even if we exclude all those who employ or sell, and concentrate on those who work for others, we are left with a broad and heterogeneous category very much in need of differentiation. Many subdivisions have been proposed, mostly based on the ranking of waged and salaried individuals or groups according to status, which is usually taken to be reflected in their consumption patterns and power. Three subdivisions stand out: between “white collar” and “blue collar” workers, between the “skilled” and the “unskilled”, and between “profit” and “non-profit sector” employees. Such systems may be refined by distinguishing semi-skilled workers or employees of public utilities (like municipal electricity works or state-owned mines). Most commonly singled out, however, is the “classical proletarian”, the unskilled or semi-skilled blue-collar worker in the profit-sector, normally engaged life-long in large-scale industrial enterprises. Blue-collar workers with high technical skills derived from old traditions of craftmanship are sometimes dubbed the “aristocracy of labour”. White collar workers are mainly employed in clerical work of all sorts, including highly skilled technical, supervisory and executive jobs. Alternatively, one can distinguish between learned professions and other forms of labour: where the ability to read and write was rare, a university professor, priest, high state official, waged physician or solicitor was not considered to work nor to be a labourer. Yet useful such distinctions may be, and however important the proletariat in this overview, a restriction to the latter category would overly blanch an answer to the question who were in search of work in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe.

In Diagram 1 we sum up the divisions discussed so far and indicate the members of society looking for paid work.
Diagram 1 In search of paid work in modern European society

Whether we take the broad (all employees) or the narrow (classical proletarians) definition of wage labourer, the concept is not just objectively derived from an economic analysis of society – the values attributed to it are heavily loaded with divergent meanings.

The significance attributed to employment, labour and labour markets in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe has undergone important changes. At the beginning of our period wage labour, today seen as quite valuable, was still frowned upon in the public opinion of most countries. “European feudalism especially built up an ideology according to which only the idle life of the aristocrat was noble; the peasant, “the coarse fellow” and the city worker, the Philistine and the petty trader, were all treated with contempt. Thus a feudal system based upon the labour of others leads to an ideology which scorns all labour and so furnishes a moral justification for its own existence”.

Such ideas had a very long life in countries like Russia, where up to 1917 the nobility was almighty, but had virtually disappeared from, say, the Dutch Republic by the early modern period. The variations in esteem for wage labourers seem to be related to the simultaneous existence of free and unfree labour. The more unfree labour is accepted at home (or in the colonies), the lower the esteem for free wage labour.

The value attributed to work or labour in general has grown over time. Adam Smith’s *An Inquiry into the Causes and the Wealth of Nations* (1776) starts with an eulogy: “The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes [...]”. At the beginning of our period, however,

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this idea was far from universal. Inasmuch as labour was attributed a place in society the emphasis fell on agriculture. Even Adam Smith still believed that “the labour of farmers and country labourers is certainly more productive than that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers”, although he refuted the prevailing physiocrat idea in the next sentence: “The superior produce of the one class, however, does not render the other class barren or unproductive.” In the nineteenth century the emancipation of industrial versus agricultural labour was quickly achieved, though moral objections against mechanization, deskillling and urbanization survive until this very day.

From Adam Smith and Ricardo on, labour was preeminently considered as the source of productivity, and since Marx as the sole source of value, its surplus appropriated by the capitalists. Communism, national-socialism and fascism took this line of thought to its final consequences or even to its perversion. At the same time, a new distinction emerged. Because of the growing role of education the esteem for white collar work grew at the expense of blue collar work, increasingly considered as manual and therefore menial. Yet this development was far more striking in Europe than in the United States or Australia, with their traditional labour shortages.

Nevertheless, over the last century and all along the political spectrum, labour has come to be accepted as the foundation of society – if not out of conviction then as a necessary result of the fact that universal suffrage has made the working class – conceived of as both important producers and consumers – an important political force for the first time in history.

The concept of labour power as a commodity, common since Marx’ Capital, implies the existence of labour markets – local, regional, national or international. It is therefore important briefly to look at the extent to which Europe can be seen as a collection of labour markets set apart from the rest of the world.

Obviously, nineteenth and twentieth century Europe was not an island, with regard goods nor to labour. Forced emigration from Europe (as in the extended convict system up to the middle of the nineteenth century), free emigration to the white settler and tropical colonies, and forced and free immigration from outside Europe always happened.

Existing alternative investment opportunities outside Europe had consequences for employment in Europe – sometimes negative, when production shifted to low-wage countries, sometimes positive, when raw products from the colonies were finished in Europe. And such investments created employment opportunities for Europeans in colonial or overseas production and transport.

In this essay we will first have to consider (chapter 1) which Europeans actually were wage labourers, because only wage labourers can search for work. Which variations took place in the labour force as a result of proletarianization and deproletarianization? To what extent was the intensity of the search for work determined by modes of wage labour? And what was the overall result of all individual acts of supply and demand of work: employment or unemployment?

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After sketching the background we will discuss (chapter 2) one of the major determinants of success in searching for work: geographical, or horizontal, mobility. We will review different types of mobility as well as the development of favourable and restrictive factors.

If we know which Europeans were in search for work and to what degree they were mobile, we can move on (chapter 3) to the history of actual job-mediation in all its various forms, personal, professional and impersonal.

Since we will reach the firm conclusion that the state is a very important determinant of the labour market we will have a closer look (chapter 4) at this institution, especially in its twentieth-century form of the Welfare State, with its pretension to full employment.
1 The Increase and Decrease of Wage Labour in Europe

1.1 Proletarianization and Deproletarianization

Let us start with some simple and broad definitions. We shall say that the proletariat equals all people receiving wages as their main income; and, consequently, that *proletarianization* is the development from alternative forms of existence to one based on wage labour, irrespective of whether wages are high or low, or whether or not they are related to long periods of professional training. We will also disregard whether proletarianization implies upward or downward social mobility. What is common to all proletarians is that they are potentially searching for work.¹

Historically, this proletariat is by no means a fixed or stable part of society. As will be seen, labourers can become unfree and so no longer able to search for work. In such cases they are searched after by others instead, to do compulsory labour. But people can also try to make a living not from wage labour, but rather by setting up their own business. Men and women may follow different trajectories to and from free labour, to and from wage labour. If we follow the path of any given individual during his or her lifetime to free wage labour and back, four major alternatives seem to offer themselves:

- a. the trajectory between the entrepreneurial (mostly independent, but not an employer’s) status and wage labour;
- b. the trajectory between non-labour and wage labour;
- c. the trajectory between the reproductive and the productive status;
- d. the trajectory between unfree and free labour.

We will try to indicate the main trends in the processes of proletarianization in Europe between 1800 and 2000. Overall, they will show an absolute and relative (in proportion of the population) increase of proletarians, and therefore of Europeans looking for work. And this not just because of a population growth from less than 200 million around 1800 to 790,5 million two centuries later: within the population, a clear shift to wage labour can be seen, though the trend is by no means unilinear nor irreversible.

*The Trajectory Between the Entrepreneurial Status and Wage Labour*

The trajectory from entrepreneurial status to wage labour is best known from the predictions of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, though they were not alone in seeing Europe’s farmers and petty artisans move inescapably down the road to wage dependency and pauperization, or “Verelendung”, from which a socialist revolution would follow. They based their views on developments in England, where enclosures created a landless rural proletariat that partly found employment in early industry. With hindsight, their extrapolations proved to be wrong for many reasons.

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¹ This implies that in this chapter we are not dealing with the unemployed as a separate category. For unemployed, see para 1.3 and chapters 3 and 4.
Before going deeper into this classical process, it should be stressed that the reverse trajectory was by no means rare. Very common – indeed, long a rule or at least an ideal – was the career from journeyman to master. And not a few wage labourers turned into shopkeepers, or to artisanal production, or to certain kinds of subcontracting.

A uniform though inaccurate approximation of the levels of proletarianization can be reached by studying the ratio between agricultural and industrial employment. As we will see, wage labourers were certainly not absent from agriculture, and the other occupational categories contained many shopkeepers and artisans.

Those engaged in agriculture were already in a minority in certain parts of Western Europe at the beginning of our period, especially in England and in the Netherlands. During the nineteenth century, most Western European countries reached this stage as well. In 1910 the agricultural sector occupied 43 percent of the population in France, 34 in Germany, and a mere 12 in the United Kingdom. Half a century later, the figures were 21, 14 and 4 percent, respectively. Eastern and Southeastern Europe went the same way somewhat later. Russia forced the shift during the collectivization of the 1930s, and the agricultural population of countries like Spain, Hungary and Poland lost their majority between 1940 and 1960, with the same happening afterwards in Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia.2

From this very rough yardstick let us move to some refinements. Charles Tilly, who fundamentally addressed European proletarianization in 1984, noted that it did not fully respond to Marx’s predictions since the growth of the proletariat was more inter- than intra-generational: the sons of farmers left the farm to become proletarians, not the fathers themselves. At the same time, Tilly showed that the proletariat grew very rapidly following the predictions of that earlier social scientist, Malthus, and concludes: “the fragmentary observations point to the utility of a modified Marxist account of European proletarianization. The most important modification consists of the large significance attributed to natural increase within the existing proletariat. Marx implicitly made lifetime entries of non-proletarians – that is, social mobility – the major component of the proletariat’s increase.”

Aside the main process of inter-generational proletarianization it should not be overlooked that farmers temporarily turned to wage labour as well. Holmes and Quataert make a plea for the recognition of this fact: “Historians now acknowledge that rural populations were deeply involved in the manufacturing of goods in their homes prior to the onset of mechanized factory operations in continental Europe.” And: “Worker peasants followed an independent historical trajectory distinct from the paths of peasant groups as well as the working classes with whom they constantly intermingle.”

The inter-generational proletarianization took place predominantly in the countryside, rather than by the trek of impoverished farmers, cottagers or their sons to the cities. Proto-industry was an important motor, as well as the commercialization of agriculture. In Britain, commercialization of agriculture and its labour relations began very early on. Around 1800 more

than half, and around 1850 some 80 percent, of its agricultural population consisted of labourers. These figures had dropped to 54 percent by 1951, thus enhancing mechanization. Then the emigration from the countryside to the cities took off and deproletarianization of British agriculture went hand in hand with the proletarianization of the industrial labour force.

How quickly the latter process went on is hard to say on a European level because of the persistency of workers in the industrial sector outside the labour market. It has been observed for the German Empire, for example, that the number of “independent workers”, notably craftsmen, remained constant. The final proletarianization in the cities took place only after the First World War.

What figures – however rough – can we derive from all these observations for the general trends in European proletarianization during the last two centuries? If we were to follow Charles Tilly, around 1800 already two thirds of the European population were proletarians (of which ten million in cities and 90 million in the countryside), a percentage that had grown somewhat around 1900 (but more in cities: 75 million as against 125 in the countryside). Today probably nearly 90 percent of Europe’s occupational population are wage earners.

The conclusion that proletarianization rates of adult men went up only gradually during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as suggested by Tilly, is however only part of the story. In the following paragraphs this view will be challenged to a certain extent, as first, the participation rates of children, old aged persons and women in the occupational population have changed, and second, many of Tilly’s “proletarians” were not free and so did not participate in the labour market.

The Trajectory Between Non-Labour and Wage Labour

At a certain age people enter the labour market and, if they live long enough, leave it again. The ages at which this occurred have varied extensively over the last two centuries. The general trend has been to enter the market at an increasingly higher age and to leave it increasingly earlier.

As is well known, the most important reason for the postponement of work is school attendance. For the nineteenth century, our knowledge of how long people spent at school is mostly derived from the development of literacy rates. How much time the acquisition of that skill cost, and whether it kept parents from putting children to work has varied greatly. In the heyday of the British textile industry, for instance, half-time work (in the morning) and half-time school (in the afternoon) was common practice.

At the beginning of our period literacy rates were highest in Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Scotland, Prussia and the Netherlands, where a majority (70 per cent or over) of at least the men could as a minimum read. Ireland, England, Belgium and France, with more or
less half of the population mastering the art, were in the middle range. Eastern and Southern European countries showed much poorer results (less than 30 per cent). Whatever the literacy rate, in most cases it was achieved without general compulsory school attendance.

The second half of the nineteenth century brought an overall improvement, most spectacularly in countries where the starting position was poor. In Austria, the illiteracy rate dropped from three quarters to one quarter in the second half of the century, or within two generations. This trend was in places even more outspoken: among Slovenian speaking groups the rate dropped from 70 to 10 per cent. Yet only in the first half of the twentieth century literacy became the norm virtually all over Europe, at least for men. Improvement sometimes followed an unexpected path. In Spain literacy actually decreased in the first half of the nineteenth century, as it did in some Belgian towns.

To what extent did the spread of literacy entail postponing entrance to the labour market? For lack of money government regulations from the early modern period, as in Sweden and some German states, didn’t have much impact on the age children started working on a regular and full-time basis. This changed gradually with the simultaneous introduction of compulsory schooling and public funding of schools, as in Württemberg in 1810, in Denmark in 1814, in France in 1881. In some cases, as in the Netherlands in 1900, government regulated only when almost the whole population was already literate.

By 1900 most of Western Europe required compulsory school attendance until the age of twelve or fourteen. The spread of secondary education, voluntary or compulsory, received a boost after the Second World War, and nowadays most Europeans enter the labour market over eighteen years of age. In addition, although compulsory military service only briefly interrupted the career of many boys, for those still in school it could be another postponement of their entrance to the labour market.

Until the First World War, child labour was most common in the family enterprise, be it farming, crafts or petty trade and shopkeeping. It decreased mostly by the gradual decline of these sectors, especially in the countryside, as noted in the previous paragraph. In our century, too, child labour occurred in the family enterprise, before and after school, during school holidays (sometimes especially devised for this purpose, like during the potato harvest) and by illegal absenteeism.⁹ Recent examples of this type of absenteeism are found in illegal immigrant communities in some cities, where children are employed in sweated industries.

Child labour in industry also occurred originally within the framework of the family. Heads of families, engaged in textile mills and collieries, brought in their wives and children in order to increase their earnings based on piece rates. In this context the first legislation to banish children’s work came about. Small wonder that this movement started in Britain in the 1820s, leading to protective legislation that spread all over the continent in the century to come. The labour movement took an active part, if only to prevent dishonest competition and downward pressure on wages. Today, cyclical unemployment still tends to hit adolescents disproportionally.

For a long time, the age at which people retreat from work was hardly a matter of debate. People worked as long as they could and the average age at death was not high after all. With the growing number of ageing people in the nineteenth century, the mean age of the employed working class must originally have gone up rather than down.

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Only with the simultaneous increase of age and the standard of living, from the end of the
nineteenth century on new solutions were found, in particular in the form of pension schemes
on a voluntary basis, which enabled workers over seventy to retreat. Soon governments started
to stimulate the participation in such schemes in many ways, but for a long time self help was
the norm. Early examples of such legislation are to be found in Germany in 1889\(^\text{10}\) and in Italy
in 1898.

Governments began to interfere directly with the pension age in imposing compulsory
retirement for civil servants, mostly at sixty-five. By the 1930s some groups of French civil
servants even managed to win a retirement-age of 55. In this respect they were far ahead of the
private sector. Only after the Second World War general pension schemes were introduced as
an integral part of the welfare state, mostly paid for by the state, i.e. by means of income
transfers, sometimes in the form of income taxes. Only some groups, like university professors
and the judiciary, were sometimes exempted from compulsory retreat at 65. In the last quarter
of this century the age was somewhat reduced in many countries. Recognition as a work-disabled
person became easier. Now, however, these ages would seem to be at an all-time low, because
of the heavy costs of pension schemes. We even see them being tightened in several countries
in Western Europe.

The Trajectory Between the Reproductive and the Productive Status

Here, the participation of (especially married) women in the labour market stands at the heart
of the matter. If we look at national statistics, which for over a century offer reasonably
comparable data, we note that the number of employed women between the ages of 15 and 60
has stayed fairly stable in North-Western Europe until recently.\(^\text{11}\) Over half of them were
employed, compared to nine-tenths of the men. Women thus made up about one-third of the
labour force.

This situation resulted from a shift that was coming to an end in that part of the continent
already a hundred years ago: the shift from self-employment within the family context (farming,
cottage industry and family business, especially in the countryside) to work obtained through
the labour market, as sketched above. Family business typically involved participation of the
housewife in productive work. So a shift by the husband from self-employment to wage labour
had consequences for the productive tasks of his wife.

This development on the supply side affected married rather than single women, also in the
southern and eastern parts of twentieth-century Europe. On the demand side, again spreading
from the northwest to other parts, from the turn of the century on married women, too, were
given a chance of employment outside the home as the employment potential of single women
had been exhausted.

Both developments coincided with a very important third one, affecting the supply side of
married women of wage labourers. Because of the rapidly declining fertility rate (going down
from c. 1900 to half the traditional level) more of the time needed for reproduction became
available for outdoor work. Postponement of the first pregnancy enabled a growing number

\(^{10}\) Christoph Conrad, *Vom Greis zum Rentner. Der Strukturwandel des Alters in Deutschland zwischen 1830 und
1930* (Göttingen, 1994).

\(^{11}\) For Germany: Pierenkemper, “Labour Market”, 49-51.
of women to continue work after marriage, with the highest participation rate just after the wedding. The rate drops in the shrinking period when children are born and reared. A relatively recent development is the propensity for women to return to the labour market when their children grow older.

Retarding this development was the tenacity of homework, especially for married urban women. In France, for instance, a contemporary study estimates the number of female home workers in 1936 at over a million, many more than suggested by census data, where most declared themselves “jobless”. Irregular occupation patterns, often seasonally determined (e.g. in the Parisian clothes industry), are characteristic for this group.12

Brief, the participation of women in the labour market generally depends on the impact of the family economy and, secondly, on the composition of the households. In the growing number of countries where more than half of all families today consist of two or only one person, female participation in the labour force continues to increase. Variations within countries clearly depend mainly on the wage level of the husband and the educational level of the married woman. In industrial societies the exception to the rule comes with certain political situations in which the state heavily influenced female labour participation. The two World Wars are a case in point, as is state-induced female labour mobilization in the communist states of central and eastern Europe. However, the former had substantially less impact than the latter.

In the German Democratic Republic, for example, the female participation rate grew from 64 to 80 percent between 1960 and 1971, whereas in the German Federal Republic it dropped from 40.9 to 37.6 over the same decade. Compare this to the mere 17 percent increase of the female labour force in Germany during the First World War, which hardly differed from the rate in the foregoing years as indicated by data available since 1889.13

State interference could also have an opposite effect. During the Great Depression employment opportunities for women, especially married ones, were curtailed in many countries. Female participation was widely blamed for male unemployment. An Austrian law stipulated that in the case of personnel reductions the wife was the one to be let go. In Germany the Nazis introduced government “marriage loans” to women who agreed to leave the labour force. Such state inducements were sometimes supported by private industry. The Hamburg-based Reemtsma cigarette company paid its female employees a reward of 600 Reichsmark (equal to a half year’s unskilled wages) if they gave up their jobs on marriage.14 In 1934 the Italian industrial employers’ organization and the trade unions agreed that women, teenagers and retired people should leave their jobs to adult males whenever possible.15 However, a counter

current has been observed in London where unemployment of the male household head in the 1930s was likely to push wives into employment, a so-called “added worker effect”.  

**The Trajectory Between Unfree and Free Labour**

Unfree labour in Europe took many forms in our period. Virtually inexistent was chattel slavery as practised by the European colonial powers elsewhere in the world until well into the third quarter of the nineteenth century and informally at least half a century longer in the Portuguese case. The main – mostly just formal – exceptions to the rule were some Mediterranean countries, and – in more real terms – parts of the Caucasus before the Russian conquest and especially those parts of the Balkans under Ottoman rule. Some Mediterranean states had not formally abolished slavery, as Charles Verlinden has shown, but it hardly occurred after the seventeenth century.

Only in Portugal did slavery play an important role in the eighteenth century and maybe even longer. In 1761 the entry of black slaves from America, Asia or Africa was forbidden – not for humanitarian reasons, but in order to prevent drainage of slaves from Brazil and explicitly excluding black slaves who were already in Portugal. How numerous they were is uncertain, but we do know that in the preceding one and a half century between one and two thousand slaves disembarked yearly in the ports of Portugal. In 1767 the decree was extended to mulatto slaves, and in 1773 freedom was granted to children born from slaves in Portugal and to slaves with grandchildren in the country; all others remained slaves for life.

Traditionally, the Caucasus was a source for white slaves, especially Circassians, who were exported to the Ottoman Empire. After the defeat of the Circassians by Russia this “international trade” came to an end, though not the existence of Circassian slaves in the Ottoman Empire as the latter ensured their entry, along with their masters, during their exodus from the Caucasus peaking in 1864-5. From the middle of the nineteenth century on, slavery gradually became less important in the Ottoman Empire, including its European parts. After the Crimean War the Ottomans did no longer enslave prisoners of war or enemy subjects. In 1857 the black slave trade was forbidden and after the immigration of the Circassians their slave trade was increasingly frustrated. Still in 1909, however, when the Young Turks officially abolished the white slave trade, they had to concede that slavery was recognised by the holy law of the Empire.

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19. The information on Portugal was kindly provided by Prof. Robert Rowland (Lisbon), unless stated otherwise; cf. also Charles R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825* (London, 1969), 265-266.


More persistent than slavery was servitude of the peasants in major parts of Central and Eastern Europe.\(^{22}\) Although many countries emulated the abolishment of serfdom by the French Revolution shortly afterwards, as in Prussia and Poland in 1807, in the Baltic provinces of Russia in 1816-19, in Wurttemberg in 1817 and in Bavaria the following year, other parts of Europe still had to wait for half a century or longer. In Austria emancipation took place in 1848, in Hungary in 1853, and the serfs under the Russian Tsar were not liberated until 1861. Rumania followed suit in 1864. The Ottoman Empire did not know the system of serfdom under the sharia, though the state enforced its subjects to do sometimes quite extensive corvee work.\(^{23}\) At the time of the emancipation of the Russian serfs, more than 11 million serfs, i.e. nearly one in two male peasants and 40 per cent of the total male population in Russia, entered the labour market, at least in theory.

In reality, long before serfs were set free from the estate where they belonged, they could buy licenses from their masters to work elsewhere, even in far-away towns. The practice of receiving a pass to work for a set time period away from one’s estate, known as “otkhodnichestvo”, became extremely widespread in the course of the nineteenth century. Millions of male slaves seized the opportunity, thus enriching not only themselves, but also their masters. It was even known for a serf to hire other serfs in his turn. By 1840, some 136,000 “otkhodniki” were working in Moscow and 228,847 in St. Petersburg.\(^{24}\)

On the other hand, after the Emancipation of 1861, many ex-serfs were still not free to move wherever they wanted. The “mir”, or communal peasant village, being collectively responsible for the generous compensation payments to be made to its former master, bound large numbers of ex-serfs.

After the emancipation of tens of millions of serfs and slaves in its eastern and south-eastern parts during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, one is tempted to think that Europe from then on had a completely free labour market at last. Had it not left hereditary unfreedom behind, as presupposed by its classical economists from Adam Smith on? However, quite a few objections could and have been raised against this supposition, though these are generally not discussed in textbooks on the socio-economic history of Europe.

First, Robert Steinfeld has convincingly argued that labour is only free if the individual labour contract is enforced no longer by penal sanctions based on criminal law, but by civil law instead. Yet this happened in England only in 1875-7.\(^{25}\) The old situation lasted much longer for certain occupations, especially for sailors in many countries. Only with the Seamen’s Act of 1937, for example, desertion was decriminalized in the Netherlands.\(^{26}\) Professional military personnel and employees of secret services and secret state industries are the only exceptions since; but in some countries, as Russia until recently, this is by no means a small category. Steinfeld’s critique implies that free labour, properly conceived, did not become a dominant legal idea until the later eighteenth century, nor the dominant paradigm until the nineteenth century. However

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23. Information, kindly provided by my colleague Erik-Jan Zürcher (at the time IISH, now University of Leiden).
important this view for the prevailing ideas about free labour, it is less important for the degree
to which labour is available at the market.

The dominant free-labour paradigm faces a much harder test in the massive exceptions made
to the general rule by the ever stronger nation states. They range from compulsory military
service through the treatment of prisoners, and especially prisoners of war (earlier and elsewhere
either killed or classical recruits for slavery!), to large-scale mobilisation of unfree labour in
dictatorial states like Hitler’s Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin.

The conscription of militia members as such is no infringement on the principle of free
labour, but it can become so under circumstances. Leaving aside some short-lived and partial
experiments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (and the Russian case to be discussed
later), conscription in Europe dates from the French Revolution, though after Napoleon France
reverted to the old recruitment of volunteers and mercenaries. Only a few countries like the
Netherlands continued the conscription system, albeit initially only half-heartedly. Until the
Belgian Revolt, king William I tried to combine a royal standing army (including foreign
regiments) with a national cadre-militia army. 27 Most important in this respect, however, was
Prussia. Deeply frustrated by its defeats by the French, it not just continued but perfected the
conscription system, which proved its effectiveness in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. As a
result, all European countries except the United Kingdom adopted universal compulsory
military service as a defensive measure in peace time. The First World War even forced it upon
England for some years. Only since the end of the Cold War a new development is viable. The
Netherlands abolished their nearly two centuries-old draft in 1996.

Wherever introduced conscription implied that during one to three years a complete male
cohort, at an age of great strength, was taken away from the free labour market. One can roughly
estimate its size at between 5 and 10% of the labour force in peace time. The estimate for any
particular country depends especially on the length of the active service and on the extension
of the exceptions. At the low end was the minimal pressure exerted by the classical Swiss system,
with only a few months training during active service to be followed by annual refreshments
of two weeks. Before the Great War France knew an active service of one year, but Germany,
Austria, Russia, Turkey and some smaller countries claimed their boys for three years of active
service.

Exceptions to universal military service were of course made because of physical or mental
unfitness, but in many countries also on a class basis and sometimes on a religious basis or a
combination of both. As a rule, those parents who could afford it could “buy” their sons “free”.
In 1845, in the Turkish Empire, the universal draft was introduced for Muslim subjects, whereas
adherents to other religions had to pay a special military exemption tax instead, which lasted
until 1909. Muslims could buy themselves free, but at a much higher price. 28

Clearly, both wars and after-war periods show important variations. During the preparations
and the actual war boys could be compelled to serve for periods of nearly five years, as in the
First World War, or even more if we think of the German soldiers in the Second World War;
and we don’t even speak about the situation of soldiers taken prisoner of war. The reverse
sometimes occurred after a war, not only – as in France after Waterloo – because of a wide-

27. H. Amersfoort, Koning en Kanton. De Nederlandse staat en het einde van de Zwitserse krijgdienst hier te lande,
1814-1829 (’s-Gravenhage, 1988).
spread revulsion against the system, but because of a prohibition by the conquerors. In Germany the general draft was prohibited from 1920 to 1935 and from 1945 to 1956, so for a quarter of a century.

The call of the Russian state upon its subjects in peacetime was much stronger than anywhere else.\textsuperscript{29} Since the early modern period the Russian Empire compulsorily drafted subjects for no less than lifetime military service. Those who had to leave forever were as a rule appointed by the mir. The serfs selected were thus unfree in a double sense. In 1793 the period was diminished to 25 years, not too different from lifetime service for many. State courts or their lords could also condemn serfs to military service. No wonder that desertion was no exception. In the 1830s the government even launched a propaganda campaign praising mothers for turning in their fugitive sons and awarding the informers special silver medals with the inscription “for diligence”.\textsuperscript{30} With the emancipation of the serfs this peculiar draft system had to change as well. As a consequence of the conversion into a European-style conscription system, however, existing exemptions for minorities had to be abolished. This resulted in the great exodus of conscientious objectors like Mennonites and Hutterites from the South Russian to the American great plains.\textsuperscript{31}

As with military service, the imprisonment of criminals as such is no infringement on the principle of free labour, but can become so under circumstances. Any modern society counts a number of persons locked up for shorter or longer periods as a punishment for breaking the law. Although the numerous variations that occur through time and space have a greater or smaller impact on the availability of free labour, we are particularly interested in situations where labour is pushed forever from European soil by massive compulsory eviction, and in those where imprisonment provides the state with hands rather than protecting society from criminals.

Large-scale compulsory eviction of criminals has a long history in some countries with a well-developed state machinery. Before the American War of Independence English prisons had disgorged some 50,000 of their inmates to the colonies, mainly to Maryland and Virginia. Scotland added thousands more.\textsuperscript{32} When this destination was barred after the Declaration of Independence, Australia became the main colony of debarkation for convicts. Between 1788 and 1868 some 160,000 were shipped in that direction.\textsuperscript{33} Until 1868 England continued exporting convicts to its colonies. In its heyday this meant the annual eviction of 2,000 people.

France\textsuperscript{34} had an age-long tradition of sending prisoners to the galleys or putting them to hard labour in “bagnes” in naval arsenals, before it started to send them overseas. After the repression

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of the June 1848 uprising Louis Napoleon sent more than 6,000 prisoners to Algeria, from which most returned. This was child’s play compared to what happened some years later, when penal colonies were founded in French Guyana. Until 1938 about 52,000 prisoners and 15,600 banished were sent over. This destination, with Alfred Dreyfus as possibly its most famous prisoner, was abandoned only in 1945. Next to Guyana a second destination was opened in the Pacific, after the Australian example. Between 1864 and 1896 New Caledonia received 20,000 prisoners, among whom many Communards, plus 10,000 banished. The picture of some 100,000 forced evictions from France should be completed by taking into account the thousands sent to the North African infantry battalions between 1889 and 1939.

Other European countries also forcibly evicted part of their convicts to the colonies, like Spain, Portugal and especially Russia, which sent its prisoners to Siberia already since the seventeenth century. In the first half of the nineteenth century these were counted already by the thousands per annum, but at the end already at over 10,000 men per annum, not including wives and children. In 1885 15 per cent were hard-labour convicts, 27 per cent forced colonists, 37 per cent so-called “communal exiles” (persons banished on account of their generally bad character by the village communities to which they belong), 17 per cent vagrants and 4 per cent political and religious exiles. This policy was continued by the Soviet government.35

A special kind of prisoners are prisoners-of-war (POWs). Not only are they kept away from warfare and from the free labour market, on many occasions they are also mobilised in direct compulsory production. This was especially the case when war economies were in dear need of hands as a result of conscription. In the nineteenth century Napoleonic Spain, the Crimean war, and the Franco-Prussian War offered well-known examples of massive forced labour by prisoners-of-war. Germany at the end of the First World War counted two million POWs. These numbers were quickly reduced after the Armistice, but on 16 January 1919 the Armistice Commission prohibited the continued remigration of the 650,000 Russian POWs still in Germany, in view of the negatively appreciated developments in the Russian Civil War. Fearing reprisals from the Russian side, the Germans managed to continue the transports for some weeks, but until 1920–21 some 300,000 Russians remained in Germany, well appreciated by German agricultural employers.36 The Second World War may have set the record for prisoners of war, partly because of its long aftermath on the eastern front: the Russians spent more than a decade on releasing all prisoners taken from Germany and its allies.

Although in part coinciding with the Second World War and therefore also partly explained by the pressure a great war will exert on labour markets, unfree labour in Stalin’s Russia and Nazi Germany took on such a large form, that it asks for an explanation sui generis (see Appendix 1).

In sum, many European labourers have been freed from slavery and serfdom in the first half of the nineteenth century and beyond. This should not be taken to imply that the continent was ever since a purely free labour market. Too many exceptions, popping up time and again,
show that free labour is no “natural” characteristic of modern and contemporary European history.

So far, we have discussed our variables mainly from the angle of the individual and his life cycle. And clearly, the trajectory between non-labour and wage labour (b) takes place within the life of one individual, as may also be the case with the trajectory between the reproductive and the productive status (c). Yet the latter (c) as well as the trajectories between entrepreneurial status and wage labour (a) and between unfree and free labour (d) can take place both within one’s lifetime and between generations. This is the difference between intra- and inter-generational mobility. The opposite of inter-generational mobility often is the result of occupational heredity, in which children directly or indirectly take part in the resources of their parents. Common to both is the combination of individual and family strategies.

Intra-generational mobility is related to the life-cycle of the family. Seen from the perspective of the family, at any given moment its different members may find themselves in many different stages. A family may consist of, say, a reproductive housewife, an artisan housefather, a son working outdoors for wages, and school-going youngsters. As a rule such combinations are the outcome of more or less conscious strategies (cf. Appendix 2).

1.2 Modes of Wage Labour

Conditions of wage labour relations are manifold: the hours involved, the personal setting of the relation, and the modes of the contract and of the remunerations. All these conditions leave their impact on the duration of the relation, and directly influence the frequency at which wage labourers are bound to search for new jobs and new employers. A brief overview of some historical developments in this field is therefore necessary.

In the family economy, working hours normally depended on seasonal variations: a short wintertime and a long summertime, weeding and harvest peaks, and a low in activities in between. A low in one sector, e.g. agriculture, could mean a high in alternative activities like house-weaving. Market constraints, as in the aftermath of house-weaving in the nineteenth century, could force such patterns to accommodate extreme situations in which all family members were busy in production except for short sleeping hours, only in order to maintain independence from the labour market.

The centralised workplace started on the same basis, especially where families rather than individual workers were hired, but soon – as in the case of children’s and women’s work – several agencies including the workers themselves urged for regulations and restrictions. In the United Kingdom one of the first victories after a generation of struggle was the Ten Hours Act of 1847 applied in the textile industry to women and children. At about the same time the French settled for a twelve-hour workday. In the following century, the industrial work-year has fallen from 3,000-3,600 hours to the contemporary standard of 1,650-2,000 hours.

The universal struggle of the international labour movement for the eight-hour-day was crowned by its insertion in the Peace Treaty of 1919, which stated that “peace can be founded only on social justice”, implying the “application of the principle of the eight-hour day or 48-hour week”.

Although it took more time than many a signatory party may have thought the principle of the eight-hour day was introduced in all free countries. The only later gains of leisure over work took place in the second half of this century with the extension of holidays and the introduction of the free Saturday, resulting in a standard week of forty hours or sometimes a bit less.

At the end of the twentieth century, the individual labour contract based on time wages is the rule. Equally normal is remuneration in money, not in kind. Most wages are paid at month’s end through a bank account, although especially in today’s Russia reality is different. Yet these forms of contract, remuneration and payment took shape only gradually and were still far remote in many parts of Europe at the beginning of our period. We should also realize that they were not introduced smoothly, but obtained after many confrontations between organized labour and employers, as in the case of the eight-hour-day.

The prevailing system of wage-remuneration of individual workers for the time they have worked should not tempt us to forget about the many alternatives that were predominant during the greater part of our period under study, and in circumstances still are. Besides, the achievements of the labour movement are by no means an immutable character of modern society.

Many labour conflicts in the nineteenth century originated in the workers’ claim to be paid in money, not in kind. The “truck”, the obligation to buy in the shop of the employer or one of his relatives, was particularly resented. Legislation as well as consumer cooperatives were the answers to the expensive, unverifiable and unfree truck.

Less unanimity existed about the advantages and disadvantages of time-wages versus piece-wages and, related to this, about individual versus collective remunerations in the case of (sub)contracting. In contracted work, three major systems have been in use: “collective work”, when the employer pays wages to the individual members of the collective; “piece-wage foremanship” or “sweating”, when wages are paid to the foreman of the collective, without the ordinary workers sharing in the piece-rate profits; and “co-operative work”, when the employer pays the foreman, who in turn shares the gains with his fellow-members of the contracting unit.

David Schloss provides such a nice and concrete example of these systems in the case of a printing shop at the end of the nineteenth century that we will reproduce it here at length38:

If a compositor is engaged by a master printer at 8d per hour, this workman is employed on time-wage.

If the contract between the compositor and his employer be that this workman shall receive payment for whatever work he shall perform at the rate of 8d for every 1,000 “ens” of, say, brevier type set up by him (the en, i.e. the letter n, being the customary unit in calculating the wages of compositors, because of the width of that letter is the average of all the letters of the alphabet), he is employed on piece-wage.

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38. D.F. Schloss, Methods of Industrial Remuneration (3rd edition) (London, 1898), 9-12 (the monetary system is 12 pennies ("d") in a shilling ("s")).
The Increase and Decrease of Wage Labour in Europe

If the contract were to be that the compositor shall be paid at the rate of 8d per hour, but subject to his setting up in every hour at least 1,000 ens of brevier type, and with the agreement that, if he sets up in one hour only 750 ens only, then the employer shall have the right to pay him 6d only for that hour, and that, if he should set up 1,250 ens in an hour, the employer is not to be bound to pay him for that hour more than 8d, this man would be employed on task-wage.

If the contract were to be that the compositor shall receive 8d an hour with, in addition, a premium of 1d for every 100 ens in excess of 1,000 ens of brevier type which he shall set up in the hour, this workman would be employed under the method here termed progressive wages.

If the employer were to make a bargain with a group of ten compositors that they should receive between them 6s 8d for every hour worked by the group, but subject to their setting up in the hour not less than 10,000 ens of brevier type, and with the agreement that, if they set up in one hour no more than 7,500 ens, their pay for that hour shall be 5s only, while, if they should set up in an hour 12,500 ens, then their employer shall be under no obligation to pay to the group for that hour more than the stipulated 6s 8d, these compositors would be working under the method of collective task-wage.

If the group of ten compositors were employed under an agreement that they should receive between them (say, in equal shares) 6s 8d for every 10,000 ens of brevier set up by them, these men would be working under the method of collective piece-wage.

If the master printer were to agree with the group that their remuneration should consist of a fixed wage of 6s 8d for every hour worked, divisible between them, say, in equal shares, with, in addition, a premium, similarly divisible, of 10d for every 1,000 ens of brevier set up by the group in an hour in excess of 10,000 ens, then these compositors would be employed under the method of collective progressive wages.

If the arrangement under which the work is done were to be that one of these ten compositors shall take the work at a contract price of 6s 8d for every 10,000 ens of brevier set up by the group, the wages of the nine subordinate members of the group, at the rate of 8d per man for each hour being deducted from his price, and that the leading man (contractor) receiving, as his remuneration, the balance remaining after the aggregate amount of the wages due to the nine subordinates had been so deducted, then the work done in this case would be said to be done as contract work.

Lastly, if this group of compositors were to agree with their employer to produce, say, a weekly newspaper at the price of 6s 8d for every 10,000 ens of brevier type set up, dividing this sum of 6s 8d amongst themselves in such proportions as should be agreed upon between themselves, this work would be done as co-operative work.

What Schloss calls “contract work” in this example, is also known as “piece-wage foremanship”, but above all as “sweating”. The labour movement has strenuously fought this system because sweated workers risked to be grossly underpaid, to be employed during unconscionably long hours, and above all to be compelled to tax their powers to an unreasonable extent, whether the period of their employment be long or short, and even if their wages were not extremely low. The latter risk was the greater where the sweaters, mostly women and children working at home, received piece-wages, which – in contrast to the system of co-operative work – stood in no reasonable relation to the remuneration of the contractor.39

1.3 Employment and Unemployment

Those looking for paid work are called unemployed as long as they haven’t found it. So before finishing our discussion on the confines of the labour market a few remarks about employment and unemployment are in order, though only some broad developments can be sketched. After the appropriate adjustments are made for minimal frictional unemployment, economic textbooks assume a balance between demand and supply on a national level over time – a balance, that is, between the number of unemployed at any given moment, and an equal or larger number of job vacancies. Another adjustment is made for seasonal variations. Even in the early 1960s Swedish unemployment in winter was three to four times as high as in midsummer.

Yet statistics of employment and unemployment are not unambiguous, to say the least. As Mark Thomas put it: “they tell us very little about the character of unemployment. Thus, for example, an unemployment rate of 20 per cent is compatible with states in which all workers are out of work for 20 per cent of the year, 20 per cent of the labour force is out of work for the entire year, or anything between these extremes.”\(^40\) Besides, statistical practices in different countries and under different regimes vary widely as to the definition of employment and unemployment.

These definitions, and how they are reflected in statistics, are highly dependent on the practice of unemployment insurance, which vary widely between countries. This is one reason why unemployment figures for the 1930s differ so much between Great Britain (high) and France (low).\(^41\)

Finally, statistics are manipulated for political reasons. The widely accepted view of the National Socialist “economic miracle” of 1933-1935, before rearmament, has been seriously questioned because of statistical manipulations.\(^42\) Similar questions may be raised concerning other changes, such as the “improvements” in the unemployment rates in the Netherlands in the mid-1990s.

In addition to employment and unemployment there is the important phenomenon of “underemployment”. This occurs everywhere, from among casual labourers in harbours to, most notably, the small entrepreneurial family economy of many farms and artisanal workshops. Italian agricultural statistics in the First World War offer a clear example.\(^43\) During that period 2.6 million male agricultural workers were drafted and consequently entirely lost to productive work. Meanwhile, capital-extensive techniques must have increased, since the quantity of fertiliser used decreased considerably. In spite of this, the sector’s output did not diminish, suggesting that those who remained on the land worked considerably more days per year. But it is possible that even they did not reach full employment. Some authors estimate that Italy’s 1911 agricultural output might have been produced by 5.7 million people, instead of 9.8 million actually employed, without any change in production techniques. Forty years later this situation had not yet fundamentally changed.

\(^{40}\) Thomas, “Labour Market Structure”, 98.
\(^{41}\) Salais, “Why was Unemployment So Low”.
\(^{42}\) Silverman, “National Socialist Economics”.
\(^{43}\) Toniolo and Piva, “Unemployment in the 1930s”, 223-224.
Nation-wide, 3 percent unemployment is taken to be acceptable, and in the heyday of the Welfare State in the 1960s full-employment targets in leading European countries varied from 1.5 to 3 percent of unemployment. Greater imbalances in the long run are considered to indicate structural unemployment. In the short run the most serious type of structural unemployment is cyclical, or [*]conjunctural[*dit woord bestaat niet in het Engels!], unemployment.

This occurred in most countries in the Interwar Period. Especially the early 1920s saw an unprecedented crisis; after some recovery in the second half of the decade, cyclical unemployment surged to over 10 percent in most countries in the early 1930s. Both Germany and the UK peaked in 1932.

Within national economies, unemployment was spread very unevenly. In the 1920s and 1930s recorded unemployment rates in most countries were higher in industrial production than in the economy as a whole; higher in some industries and areas than in others; higher for men than for women; higher for married than for single women; higher for older workers and the very young ones than for the age groups between 25 and 55.

In 1944 Beveridge remarked that “Prolonged unemployment falls with crushing weight on the older men, once they have lost their niche in industry. The risk of losing one’s job is much the same from 60-64 as it is from 35-44. The risk of being out of a job is half as much again at the later age than at the earlier age; the risk of becoming chronically unemployed, that is to say of being out for more than a year, is two and a half times as great.”

In fact, the labour market in the 1930s was bifurcated into a segment with workers with a rapid turnover and high re-employment probabilities, and another one of long-term unemployed. In 1938 official agencies in Britain rejected the popular perception of long-term unemployed as generally work-shy. Instead, two different types of workers were seen likely to reject all job offers: “men with large families whose unemployment allowances may approach the normal wage level for the unskilled or semi-skilled worker [...] and, secondly, the “respectable” type of young man who, having once had employment at a good wage, refuses it at rates which seem to him to be unreasonable”. In fact, the first group must have been very small, because in Britain 80 per cent of those out of work received benefits of less than 70 per cent of their normal wages, and the argument of the generosity of the benefits scheme after 1920 can be dismissed.

Apart from its increased duration, British unemployment during the Great Depression was characterized by the substantial group working three days a week (“short-time”) and the equally important group alternating unemployment of less than six weeks with casual work, the so-called “unemployed casuals”. Both groups showed a high attachment to one and the same employer. Short-time employment was already common before the First World War, but received a boost afterwards, when from 1920 on short-timers became eligible for benefits. It was found in the

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44. Cf. the discussion on this norm in chapter 4.
45. We are well aware of the pitfalls of any unemployment figure, cf. the discussion by B. Eichengreen and T.J. Hatton, “Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective: An Overview", in: Idem (eds.), Interwar Unemployment, 1-59.
46. Eichengreen and Hatton, “Interwar Unemployment”, 29 and 31-34.
47. Quotation from Beveridge’s, Full Employment (1944), 70 in Eichengreen and Hatton, “Interwar Unemployment”, 41.
cotton industry in the 1920s, but also in coal, shipbuilding and iron and steel. Some employers, often in cooperation with their workers, systematically resorted to this system (covering 15 percent of all short-timers in what was called OXO, where O stands for work and X for leisure) when work was in a slack. The unemployed casuals were mostly untrained and unskilled workers in the building trades, the docks, road building, and the transport sector. This "rotating underemployment" hit more than a quarter of the casuals at any given moment in these years. This means that many more individuals were affected during their career.

It is important to realize that this system, also called "work sharing", was commonplace among dockers and showed a great continuity with age-old distribution systems as shown by Salais: “Workers formed themselves into “pools” of five or six members who arranged with their employers the rotation of unemployment among the members of the group, one or two of them being unemployed at any given moment. In extreme versions workers on short-time alternated between three days of unemployment and three of work. [...] On the dockside a port works committee maintained registers or preference lists conceived as means of limiting the number of dockers seeing work. These registers permitted the organisation of work in such a way that the rule of “three days on the hook, three days on the book” was always respected.” This system is similar to that practised by the porters’ guilds in the greater European harbours in the nineteenth century and earlier.

As after the First World War, Germany experienced high unemployment after the Second, but in Western Europe especially Italy suffered for a very long period. The unemployment figure even reached a 10.2 high in 1933. From a situation in which around 1970 unemployment was nearly absent in Western Europe, low in Southern Europe and officially non-existent in Eastern Europe, things have changed dramatically at the end of the century. In 1995 the European Union counted more than 18 million registered unemployed citizens, or 10.6 per cent of the total labour force. The rate is even higher among youths: over 20 per cent in many member states, even over 30 per cent in Italy and Spain.

These figures would certainly have been higher if they had not been met by a downward flexible wage rate, as on many occasions collective wages (including pensions and fringe benefits) have been given up in order to prevent mass redundancies. No incentives from Brussels have been able to change these figures fundamentally. Small wonder that Eastern Europe with 7.6 million unemployed reaches a rate of 14.5 percent. The republics of the former Soviet Union, which maintain that their rates are only 2 percent, obviously apply different statistics.  

50. Salais, “Why was Unemployment So Low”, 283.
51. Cf. also Toniolo and Piva, “Unemployment in the 1930s”, e.g. 224.
52. Eurostat, VK 10.11.95.
2 The Action Radius of the Wage Labourer

2.1 Mobility and Migration

Where does the worker look for employment? In the village or town where he lives, or elsewhere? An individual’s actual labour market in spatial terms, and consequently the labour market as such, depend to a great extent on the rate of geographical mobility of the working force.

There are good reasons to believe that proletarianization in itself stimulates geographical mobility. This does not mean, however, that geographical mobility is restricted to free wage labourers. Farmers can decide to emigrate from a poverty stricken area in Europe to the American prairies. Unfree labourers were often transported against their will, as we saw in Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany. Yet one may contrast farmers, artisans and shopkeepers with fixed capital on the one hand, and mobile workers without it on the other. The inheritance of fixed capital among the first group reinforces the structural difference between more and less mobile persons.

If we concentrate on the geographical mobility patterns of free wage labourers or those who shift to that stage, we may wonder about the action radius of the European worker in the last two centuries. The worker could change existing constraints in three ways. First, by changing residence. Second, by keeping this residence but changing his or her transport pattern, e.g. by taking up seasonal work elsewhere, or by commuting. Third, by changing neither residence nor travelling pattern, but changing employer instead, in the same village or town.

Clearly, because of the very nature of their work, some wage earners are highly mobile in the second sense mentioned. Mobility is part of the job of salesmen, mule or truck drivers, peddlers, etc. These groups will not be followed in detail in this chapter.

The distinction between the first and second types of mobility has only analytical value. In reality, permanent and temporal migration often get blurred. People may hold the firm conviction that they are emigrating far away to return never more, but in reality come back after a few years, with or without their savings. Others may plan to depart for one or two years only, but stay away forever. Although the objectives of the two groups differ completely, the actual outcome may be the same.

Changing Residence: Emigration

This kind of mobility as a rule involves changing jobs as a result of searching for work. Depending on the distance travelled, or more precisely, the kind of boundaries crossed, the following types are usually distinguished: geographical mobility in the form of removal (change of residence within the same community, or “local movement”), internal migration (change

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of residence within the same country, often linked with urbanization), and international and intercontinental migration.

Not long ago the stability of peoples was seen as predominant in European history. International migrations were treated as exceptions to the rule, mostly caused by disasters of various kinds, like wars and famines. Within national borders, another exception was known: urbanization, caused by what many thought of as another disaster, enclosure in many forms and the Industrial Revolution.

Recently, many authors have radically reversed this vision of European history. Not stability but mobility is the rule, and it is the exceptional case of little mobility that deserves an explanation. This holds not just for the last two centuries, but for an earlier period as well. According to Peter Clark, in seventeenth and eighteenth century southern England mobility was the norm. About 65 percent of men and women left their home parish, and 17 percent of those their home county. For rural inhabitants the figures were higher than for city dwellers. For other countries and later periods similar results have been reached. In the words of Leslie Page Moch: “a rethinking of human mobility is at the heart of the current writing of European history. Migration is a missing piece in the standard understanding not only of the pre-industrial world but of the nature of historical change as well”. It is essential “to bring the patterns of mobility into our thinking about pre-industrial life, rural industry, the industrial revolution, and urbanization. Migration is present in every level of historical study”.

The different types of migration just mentioned are parallelled by ever widening labour markets, from local through national to international, in the last case sometimes linked to “globalization”.

Local movement is something we know rather little about. This doesn’t affect our subject too much, though, since a change of dwelling or home within the community often had and has nothing to do with job rotation. Such removals sometimes took place on an annual basis, as renting a new house implied total cleansing and a new whitewash by the landlord.

Change of residence often, but not always, was linked with job rotation. The major other reason is marriage, after which one of the two partners changed residence. For farmers, another may lie not in the marriage but in the land market. For migrations in the context of the labour market, at least at short distances, the alternative of commuting (on which more later) has to be envisaged.

The long-existing systems of internal migrations expanded in the nineteenth century, not least for women, who played an especially significant role among migrants into textile, commercial, and administrative cities. The best information available (for large German cities) strongly suggests that geographical mobility peaked in the late nineteenth century. James Jackson Jr. showed that the migrant to nineteenth-century Duisburg was most likely a single man aged 15 to 25, who changed residence 15 to 25 times in his lifetime. Ten of these moves were made between the age of 15 and 30 in connection with the stages of his life-cycle: leaving the family, entering the job market, finding a spouse, and establishing a separate household.

It is not easy to generalize about these migrations. For urbanizing Europe, Moch gives the following picture.\(^5\) Textile cities attracted a high proportion of women migrants and relatively few men. Their draw was largely regional. Heavily industrial and coal mining cities, on the other hand, attracted male labourers, and the former may have had the greatest population turnover of any kind of city. Commercial and administrative cities offered many jobs to women, mainly domestic servants. Moch cites Kertzer and Hogan to characterize the Europeans between 1850-1914 as “not simply urbanites or rural bumpkins, not divided neatly into agriculturalists and industrial workers. Rather, they were part of a regional network of economic opportunities and constraints, a system of shared knowledge and ramifying kinship networks”.

Distances bridged became so big that this conclusion is not only true for national, but also for international migrations, and even for that special form of international migration that is called long-distance migration and is often intercontinental (including “globalization”).

In general overviews of long-distance and intercontinental migrations of Europeans there is a tendency one-sidedly to stress overseas migrations from Europe to North America, especially since the 1840s. Both the time and the space framework of this widely accepted notion are misleading. Not only did mass-migrations from Europe start much earlier, but for a long time they also went in other directions.

If we take a broader time-perspective than the last two centuries, we find frequent international mass migrations from the sixteenth to the first half of the seventeenth centuries. The sending countries were Scotland and Ireland, western and southern German-speaking lands, and other, mainly mountainous parts of western Europe. Major poles of attraction were economic centres like the Venetian and Dutch Republics. In the latter case, half of the labour force of its western part, the core provinces of the “Golden Age”, is now known to have consisted, generation after generation, of people born outside this area. Possibly, the heydays of proto-industrialization saw less long-distance migration, which may have caused the ill-conceived idea that it started only with the Industrial Revolution.\(^6\)

As to the destinations, until well in the first decades of the nineteenth century more emigrants went east than west. For the eighteenth century it has been estimated that against 70,000 adult emigrants from the German Empire and the Swiss Confederacy leaving for North America, no less than 516,000 went to Eastern Europe\(^7\) and hundreds of thousands – especially Swiss – must have left as soldiers to countries like the Dutch Republic and its colonies, Prussia, France, and some Italian states. The destinations of this east-bound trek were mainly Eastern Prussia and Hungary, and to a lesser degree Poland and Russia. There was even a backdoor in the east through which refugees left Europe. The Russian conquest of the Caucasus forced thousands to seek refuge in the Ottoman Empire, like Circassians and Chechens. The predominance of Eastern European destinies and the relative insignificance of America may

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5. Moch, *Moving Europeans*, 142-143. Cf. also the beginning of § 1.1 of this essay.
have lasted up to the 1830s and 1840s, when proportions changed quickly in the central parts of the continent. For some countries the change took place even later. When Finnish emigration overseas (totalling about 350,000) became a mass phenomenon in the 1880s, St Petersburg counted already nearly 25,000 Finns.8

The exceptions to the early modern European pattern were the Atlantic and North Sea Coasts. For Britain, since the seventeenth century, the Caribbean and later North America were the main traditional destinations for overseas emigrants. After the American independence the movement shifted to other parts of the expanding colonial empire, although many Irish continued to go to the United States. The Iberian Peninsula had the most stable emigration patterns. Since the eighteenth century until after Second World War Brazil was the main destination for Portuguese emigrants, and the Americas played the same role for Spain.

After the Napoleonic period, European emigration to the United States picked up again. From an annual average of 30,000-40,000 in the decades before the potato blight and the revolutions of the 1840s, the numbers went up eightfold before the middle of the century. Between 1800 and 1960 a total of at least 61 million Europeans left the continent, of whom 41 to North and 8 million to South America, 6 million to South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, and 6 million to the Asian part of Russia.9

Most came from the British Isles, Germany, Italy (more to South than to North America) and Russia in its pre-1914 shape, with minor numbers added by virtually all European countries, especially Scandinavia and the eastern and southern parts of the continent.

Mass emigration to North America started with the simultaneous crisis in the countryside in Ireland and Germany in the 1840s. These classical emigration countries were joined by Eastern Europe from the 1870s onwards, and a little bit later by Southern and South-Eastern Europe. Migration intensity could vary from an annual average of 6.6 persons per thousand for Norway to 0.2 for France. In some parts of Norway, by the time of the 1920 census one adult male in four had spent some time in the U.S., which incidentally points again to the mix of permanent and temporal migrations within this Atlantic network.10

These massive Atlantic emigrations overshadowed not only the mostly earlier eastward movements, but also those to the south in the framework of Europe’s colonial expansion. Countries like the Netherlands had a long history of sending large numbers to their tropical possessions, but only in the nineteenth century other colonial powers were also forced to send there more than the odd colonial official, tradesman or expeditionary force. The vastly more intensive pattern of nineteenth century colonization required first of all large military investments, especially in men, because of the murderous climates they were sent to.

In a book with the eloquent title Death by Migration11 Philip D. Curtin has shown that the conquest of Algeria was a major military operation compared with other nineteenth-century

10. Moch, Moving Europeans, 149.
11. After Ph.D. Curtin, Death by migration. Europe’s encounter with the tropical world in the nineteenth century (Cambridge, 1989), esp. 28-30 and 160.
imperial wars. The French needed more Europeans in this campaign than the British used to conquer India. In the beginning, the French military promised to defeat the Dey of Algiers with 10,000 troops, but by 1847 they needed more than 100,000. The main reason were not Algerian bullets or swords, but diseases. Death rates peaked to 160 per thousand in 1840. After the middle of the century the sinister mortality record improved quickly, mainly because of empirical measures like moving troops to highlands to escape malaria, moving them under canvas, away from barracks and cities to escape cholera and yellow fever, or improving the water supply. Even so, imperialism costed many more soldiers in the half century preceding the First World War. Afterwards, more civilians left for the colonies until decolonization in the post-1945 decades.

Free immigration into the United States ended rather abruptly after the First World War. Severe restrictions were established by the Quota Act of 1921 and reinforced by the Johnson Bill of 1924 and the National Origins Law of 1927. Henceforth only limited quota per country of origin were allowed to settle. Similar limitations in other classical immigration countries came only fifty years later.

A main reason why the south and the east overtook the central and western parts of Europe in the mass migrations to America from the end of the nineteenth century on, was the growing need for labour in the emerging industrial and agricultural centres of the old continent. Instead of sending out workers, countries like Germany, Belgium and France started attracting them from abroad in ever growing numbers. Most famous is the Ruhr area with its Poles, but other industrial centres in Germany, like Saxony, and in other countries show similar features. In the Interwar period France was a more important immigration country than the United States, which maintained its quota since c. 1920. To this economic migrations we have to add the massive streams of refugees after the First World War. An estimated 700,000 Poles had been repatriated by 1923, as had 200,000 Germans, mainly from re-established Poland and the exchange between Germany and France (involving 120,000 Germans moving from Alsace-Lorraine to the Rhineland and 50,000 Frenchmen taking their place). Further east, 1.35 million Greeks fled Turkey, and 430,000 Turks went the other way.

Internal European long-distance migration made K.C. Thalheim predict as early as 1930 that in the long run in the advanced industrial “nations of Western civilisation [...] where population growth does not keep pace with economic development, former overseas emigration might be replaced by continental immigration” from the industrially underdeveloped countries of Europe. This was exactly what happened after the big refugee streams caused by the Second World War and decolonization had more or less settled down. One might as well say that the war-related immigration streams postponed the fulfilment of Thalheim’s prediction with a decade. Most impressive in sheer numbers were the migrations from Eastern and Central Europe into Germany. Twelve million had reached the zones of occupied Germany by 1950 and more than a million were to follow, moving mainly from Eastern to Western Germany. Many ex-colonial powers, more or less reluctantly, accepted their share: France its “pied-noirs” from

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Algeria, Britain its Asians from Eastern Africa, the Netherlands hundreds of thousands from Indonesia and Surinam, and Portugal half a million from its African colonies.  

The “guest-workers” were recruited between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, with a slump around 1967. First Italy, then Spain and Portugal saw their “guest workers” leave for Western Europe, to be followed by workers from further-away countries like Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey – until in the last quarter of the century “fortress Europe” started to close its doors. If we count all Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Turkish, Moroccan and Tunisian citizens in the main countries of destination – Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland – in the early 1960s, the early 1970s and 1981, we reach the impressive numbers of 2.5, 8 and 8.5 million residents, respectively. Even communist Eastern Europe received small numbers of “guest-workers” : the German Democratic Republic occupied 40,000 “socialist brethren” from Vietnam.

Even after the formal immigration stops for “guest workers” in the years following the “oil crisis” of 1973, numbers continued to increase because of family reunification and natural growth. This is clear if we compare the number of economically active persons in this group, which dropped from over fifty per cent to forty during the 1970s, a tendency that continued afterwards. What started as temporal migration turned into something more permanent. The guests were to stay.

In the last two centuries Europe continued its tradition of high geographical mobility established in an older age. Short-distance mobility was the rule, long-distance migration became increasingly more important, peaking with ups and downs between 1875 and 1975. The main shifts in destination were from eastbound through west- and southbound to internal migrations and, willy nilly until now, Europe became an immigration continent in the second half of this century.

Temporal Migration and Commuting

In our period, the range of action, i.e. the average maximum one-way distance one can expect to cover daily, increased for most wage labourers from 5 to 100 kilometres. Until the middle of the nineteenth century as in the ages before, commuter traffic parameters were based on a walking distance of one hour, or some five kilometres. This was the maximum distance people were prepared to walk to their workplace.

The change came with the introduction of low train tariffs for commuters, of which the Belgian railways, transporting Flemish workers to the Walloon industrial centres, were the forerunners. Local and inter-local horse-, steam- and electric streetcar filled out the roughly textured train network in the half century to follow. In this century the bus has replaced rail transportation. A little bit earlier, in the private sector the availability of bicycles for workers had become essential in refining this network; the device extended the workers’ range of action by four times and more. Thanks to the moped, the motor-cycle, and from the 1960s the car, the range of action of the European wage labourer is nowadays around 100 kilometres.

17. After J. Lucassen, “Man on the move. European developments from Roman times to the present”, in: J. Gelabert (ed.), Man on the Move (Danbury, CT, 1993), 16 and 17.
This increased range of action can be widened even more (without permanent emigration of the whole family) if one or more of its members agree to leave not as daily commuters, but to stay away temporarily for longer periods. This can range from seasonal absence for weeks, months or even the greater part of the year, to multi-annual leaves.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a seasonally determined action radius could cover up to 250 or 300 kilometres, as is shown by the results of a French questionnaire covering the greater part of Western Europe. Wherever regions specialised economically, as in dairy farming, grain or grapes or industrial and mining activities like peat-bog digging or brick making, large fluctuations arose in the need for wage labour. By definition large-scale building activities had the same effect. Sometimes the suitable periods covered the whole year except winter, sometimes they were shorter. In July and August, the grain had to be harvested in a short period of time. June was for grass-cutting. Turf could only be cut or dredged in the spring (because it needed several months to dry up) and madder only harvested in the fall, as was the case for the quickly spreading sugar beet and potato cultivation in the nineteenth century. The grape harvest required innumerable hands in the fall, as did the restoration of the vineyard terraces during the winter.

In such places, wages and prices tended to reach higher levels than in neighbouring areas unable to specialize in this way. On the one hand were highly specialized areas offering high seasonal wages, on the other poor, often mountainous areas with small farms, which were possibly active in home industries as well. The small farmers would hire themselves out as migrant workers to the highly specialized areas during peak production seasons.

Around 1800, seven large areas of recruitment could be distinguished in Western Europe, receiving each a minimum of 20,000 migrant workers annually. In the north, the smallest recruitment area was located in the southeast of England, where large numbers of Irish came for the grain and hop harvests. Across the North Sea, the narrow coastal region between Calais and Bremen with the province of Holland at its centre offered a variety of jobs for some 30,000 workers, especially from Westphalia. The Paris Basin, also predominating in grain cultivation, welcomed harvesters primarily from the Massif Central, but Paris itself, with its large construction works among others, also offered plenty of opportunities for seasonal workers. The fourth area of recruitment, central Castile, was a grain producing area as well, pulling workers from Galicia and adjacent poor regions in the north-west of the Iberian Peninsula. By contrast, the Mediterranean coast between Barcelona and Marseille was more varied. It recruited grain cutters as well as grape pickers from the Pyrenees, the Massif Central and the Alps. The largest recruitment areas, requiring some 150,000 migrant workers or more annually, were to be found in Italy, in the Po valley, along the coastal planes of Tuscany, on Corsica and in the Campagna Romana. Up north, inhabitants from the Alps, the Dolomites and the Apennines worked in the rice fields of the western Po valley. Corsica attracted workers for the grape cultivation. Inhabitants from the Apennines also went down to the coastal plain region of central Italy for the immense grain farms of the Roman high nobility and clergy.

In the century to come, the scope and make-up of these areas of recruitment changed radically. After 1870, the eastern North Sea Coast made way for the Ruhr area. Even more important than such shifts in recruitment areas was the enlargement of the action radius due to the development of public transport. The Ruhr area, for example, obtained its workers

primarily from East Prussia and Poland, while the French recruitment areas of the time got theirs from Belgium and Italy. New catchment areas developed outside Western Europe. In pre-revolutionary Russia, millions of harvesters travelled up to one thousand kilometres to the South. Even longer distances were covered by those seasonal workers, many of them Italians, who did not restrict themselves to Europe but added both North and South America to seasonally determined year-round trips. Migrant work probably reached its climax in Europe on the eve of the First World War and must have encompassed some 10 million workers a year, or twenty times more than a century earlier.

The success of most migrant workers paid off at home. They worked away from home from spring to fall (or sometimes, like the Savoyards and the other mountain dwellers the other way round, from fall to spring), year in, year out. Married men in particular could earn a living that allowed them to avoid their greatest fear: permanent emigration. This was made possible by the supplementary incomes gleaned at home during their absence; earnings from small farming, which their wives oversaw with the help of the children, occasional wage labour by all family members on large farms in the neighbourhood of the cottage, and occasionally home industries. Here we see the work cycle (cf. § 1.1 and Appendix 2) again in full swing.

There is some relation, depending on the technological stage of public networks and transport, between the period a worker stays away and the distance he covers. The maximum distance – and the costs this inevitably involved – which workers obviously deemed worthwhile to travel in order to reach the workplace were closely related to the earnings expected and so to the time available to realise these earnings.

Yet for occupations demanding an absence of several years this relation shows more variations. Here we meet youngsters and young adults wanting to save money for their marriage and to establish themselves independently. Girls reached this goal mainly by entering the domestic service, boys in a more varied way by entering the army or the navy, by becoming a “travelling brother”, or in this century by becoming a “Gastarbeiter” or “guest-worker”, as we have seen in the previous chapter. In the case of the domestic servants we find of course Swiss nannies and domestic teachers settling for years in many European countries, including Russia. To be sure, most domestic servants in any given European town simply came from the surrounding countryside or just from the town itself. Among the men the relation is somewhat more fixed, but there, too, many variations are possible.

Job Rotation

A worker, a person depending on wages for his or her income, can stay with a single boss lifelong, as found among some unmarried farmhands, many bureaucrats, and many staff employees of multinationals. At the other extreme are casual workers, or in the last decade youngsters depending exclusively on temporal job agencies for their jobs.

What determines whether there is a high turnover or a stable long-lasting employment relationship between an employer and a labourer? What are the forces leading to casual work on the one hand and tenured jobs on the other?

Three parties are involved. Workers striving for the optimum between security and independence; employers striving for the optimum between availability of sufficient (and sufficiently skilled) supply and flexibility in response to the market; and at a national level, the state, more and more involved in legislating the enforcement of labour contracts and job security in the framework of the welfare state.
It seems two contradictory developments can be discerned in the period from the middle of the nineteenth century to the 1970s. On the one hand, we find increasing turnover rates, primarily because of the spread of the free labour contract. This tendency is visible from the abolition of the trade guilds and the lifting of penal sanctions on break of contract, as discussed in paragraph 1.1 above. On the other hand, we also find restrictions on turnover rates. This countertendency springs from two aspects of economic growth. First, the increased scale of industrial production in what was mostly an expanding market stimulated firms to offer tenured jobs, especially to white collar workers and senior staff. Governments, becoming big employers of civil servants and military personnel, also strongly fostered tenure. Second, the growth of workers’ insurance schemes linked to a particular job and often transferable elsewhere only at the cost of total or partial loss of paid premiums and entitlements, strengthened the inclination of workers to stay with the same employer.

Both tendencies could sometimes coexist. The emergence of big industrial enterprises in Italy, starting in the 1880s but gaining momentum during the First World War, didn’t signify an immediate change in traditional labour turnover patterns. In agriculture the braccianti (day labourers) used to be engaged by the day or the week. The same pattern was reproduced at the factory gates, as has been noted for part of the workforce in the industrial area created at the edge of the Venice Lagoon in the 1920s and 1930s. No wonder that roughly half of the workers spent only a year or less in the same factory, as can be shown for large manufacturing firms in the interwar years, like Alfa Romeo and others.

The results of these developments are hard to catch in simple and clear figures. As a rule, national annual averages of fifty per cent turnover rates seem to be normal for Western Europe during the twentieth century, only to go up in times of economic crisis, as in the interwar years and the last quarter of the century. This means that on average every year half of the work force quits an employer and/or joins a new one. How long workers stay with one employer on average is hard to say in this case. Surely, it is not simply two years, but substantially longer, because the two-years average would presuppose a perfectly stable labour force (nobody entering or leaving). In fact, labour turnover rates and their interpretation depend very much on the stage in which an economy or economic sector finds itself at a particular period in time.

This can be nicely illustrated with one of those not so frequent cases where we know early turnover rates: the Western German coal-mining industry during the Second German Empire. Between 1850 and 1913 the work force in the mines multiplied more than thirty times, from 13,000 to 395,000. Of course, this implied a very high average annual turnover rate. It varied in the years 1896 through 1913 from 89 to 147 per cent of the labour force, where the trend was rather upward. John Kulczycki has shown that at closer examination the highest turnover rates – up till over 200 per cent! – tended to occur in the youngest mines. Initially, newly arrived miners (whether Pole or German made no difference) were prepared to change jobs and even to break contracts as soon as they could earn something more somewhere else, either per time unit or – through overtime – in total. This was possible in new mines: “Without a settled,
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experienced work force, new mines had to offer higher pay to attract workers, who then may have found conditions worse than in the older, well-established mines, which resulted in a high number of both new arrivals and departures”. Yet after some years and growing savings, the same miners got settled, long-term plans were made involving the appreciation of a more stable job. Older mining communities therefore showed much lower turnover rates than new ones.

Obviously, apart from economic developments, young workers will be inclined to change quicker than older ones. And white collar workers will change less often than blue collar workers.

The evidence for national figures is rather restricted: it refers only to some more developed countries, and only from the interwar period on. The annual insured labour force turnover in the UK in 1932-38 (a period characterized by an ever growing number of vacancies notified and filled by labour exchanges) amounted to a remarkably high 50-60 per cent of the labour force. This equals a monthly flow of 4-5 per cent.

It is striking that the British labour turnover in the 1930s was similar to that in the USA. Figures on job rotation or labour turnover for the USA between 1924 and 1938 show the following average monthly rates: accessions went up from a 3.3-5.2 level in the 1920s to 6.5 in 1933, to drop to 4.3-5.3 in 1935-1938; lay-offs went up from a 0.4-0.7 level in the 1920s to 4.2 in 1932, to stay a little lower in the next years; quits dropped from a 2.1-3.1 level in the 1920s to 0.9 in 1932, to rise a little bit thereafter. Apparently these two industrialized nations, whatever their differences in social policies, were more equal in this respect than one would expect at first sight. Moreover, according to Eichengreen and Hatton, who gave these figures, “all the evidence points to the conclusion that labour turnover in the interwar years was significantly higher than after the Second World War”. 22

Legal regulations regarding unemployment and its statistical representation play an important role, as is shown again by the British example. 23 Inflows into permanent (i.e. not “temporarily stopped, but more than six-weeks”) unemployment in the early 1930s were running at two to three times the volume of fifty years later. In the early 1930s, this cohort could expect to stay unemployed during 4 to 5 months, while in the 1920s with a similar inflow the period was probably half.

The inflow figures exclude not only the “temporarily stopped” (often linked to the same employer on a semi-permanent basis), but also those working at least three days a week. The latter pattern of short-time work occurred not seldom on a systematic basis. The start of a recovery was not marked by a great change in flows, but by a drop in the duration of joblessness.

2.2 Possibilities and Restrictions for Mobility

All these hundreds of millions of migrants within, from and to Europe were constrained in manifold ways in their decisions whether to go and where to go. During the last two centuries many possibilities for geographical mobility improved or became available. But this is only part of the story. Many restrictions grew as well.

We have already seen many examples of individual and group differences. So far, our emphasis has been maybe a little bit one-sidedly on economic motives, like wage differentials. Now we have to go deeper into the structural conditions.

Possibilities

Mobility opportunities depend partially on the state of transportation facilities in society. As noted above, for those who decided not to migrate but wanted to enlarge their range of action by commuting, cheap train tickets, the bicycle, the bus and finally the private car enlarged the diameter of the circle they could travel daily from five to a hundred kilometres between the third quarter of the nineteenth century and the third quarter of the twentieth. Let us look a bit more into the history of passenger transport, so important for the understanding of the labour market.24

In the middle of the nineteenth century the average West European travelled 1,500 km annually. Fifty years earlier this had been about the same, especially for the workman. For him this meant mainly foot travel; and c. 1850 the train was still of minor importance, except for a few countries like Belgium. Fifty years later, at the turn of the century, the average West European may have travelled 2,000 km a year, with cargo transport adding another several hundred kilometres. This growth was caused mainly by the extension of public transportation. As we saw before, train and passenger ship served the need for long-distance travel, while the steam and electric tram did the same for short distances. In personal transportation the bicycle had come to play an important role. Non-motorized private transportation was no longer restricted to walking.

Another fifty years later, around 1950, the average West European travelled 4,000 km per year, again to be increased by several hundred truck-transportation miles. Railroad statistics show that the average total distance travelled by train per person doubled in the first half of the twentieth century, from approximately 250 to 500 km annually. This increase took place in most countries before the Second World War. In Germany, France and Belgium, a peak of 750 annual passenger kilometres per person was reached around 1925. In public transportation, the bus took over from the tram, while air travel amounted to a few dozen kilometres per capita per year only. Long-distance travel over water was a viable alternative to air travel. In private transport the bicycle got competition from moped and motor-cycle. At that time, these were almost as important as the car. Around 1950, only one in a hundred West Europeans had a car. Although by then more miles were driven per car than nowadays, this only amounted to 400 km per capita each year.

Towards the end of this century, the average West European travels no less than 12,000 annual kilometres. Almost 70 percent is done by automobile, more than 20 percent by public transportation, and the remaining 10 per cent by foot or— in a limited number of countries or regions— by bicycle. The car clearly has become the front runner in transportation, and one in three West Europeans owns one. If we add the miles covered by truck drivers to the passenger traffic totals, the statistic would increase by at least 500 kilometres.

The difference between the middle and the late twentieth century is explained by the rapid increase in leisure-time travel, in travel to and from school, but— surprisingly— much less in

commuter travel. This is estimated to take a mere 40 percent of all distance travelled, whereas 10 percent are “shopping miles”, and at least half are covered during leisure time – during annual holidays, and even more during innumerable short trips throughout the rest of the year.

From these statistics it is clear that from the last quarter of the century onwards traffic limitations are no longer impeding the workings of the labour market in Western Europe. At the same time, however, new dangers for mobility have appeared. Traffic jams have become more serious, while public transport facilities are simultaneously being curbed in many countries. These developments are perhaps counterbalanced by the information revolution, enabling teleworking, but it is too early to make strong predictions in this respect. Anyhow, the European statistics have to be broken down in many respects, at least between Western and Eastern Europe.

What has been said about those who do not emigrate, goes even more for those who do. In our period, the development of railways all over the world, which took place mainly in the second half of the nineteenth century, was the first major achievement. The development of intercontinental shipping went on a par. In 1800, the voyage from Europe to America took 43 days to and 22 days from. In 1900 it was only a matter of 17 and 15 days on the great steam liners. Since the explosion of passenger traffic per air plane in the last decades of this century, we calculate the journey in hours. By virtue of air travel the “global village” has really come into existence.

Labour mobility not only depends on the actual possibility of travelling. A decision to travel is based on the available information. Mobility also depends on employment opportunities and wage levels. Of course, information can be communicated by travelling fellow workers, as has been the case for ages. The spread of literacy, which made written information available, greatly enhanced the chances of wage labourers to improve their position on the labour market. Although literacy rates, also among workers, had already gone up to more than 50 per cent in quite a few Northwest European countries before the beginning of the nineteenth century, the introduction of compulsory education in most European countries before the First World War and the simultaneous emergence of a popular press made personnel advertisements in papers available to virtually everyone.

The spread of popular education also introduced ever more people to a national culture. Radio, but in particular television, and the introduction of foreign languages in education on a larger scale, is even leading to an international, mainly Anglophone, culture at the end of the millennium. The consequences of these developments for the internationalisation of the labour market are obvious. Nationalisation and internationalisation of culture also affect standardisation and qualification. The scope of professional education methods grows ever larger.

If the link between employees and employers thus becomes looser, the results for the former are not necessarily positive. The other side of the coin of increasing freedom of choice for the employee is the organization of production on a global scale. Producers move to places where wages and other production costs are lower than in Western Europe with its high-living standard. Ready-made clothing manufacturers moved their ateliers to North-African and Asian countries since the 1970s, printing houses and publishers are taking the road to Asia as well.

The latest development in the communications revolution is data-transportation by systems like the Internet. For those whose daily job consists of the manipulation of texts, as is the case of millions of civil servants, researchers and other white collar workers, teleworking has a future. Here we are on the verge of a revolutionary split between the geographical place of settlement.
of employer and employee. This revolution in employment relations puts a premium on the
capacity of individuals to change, which depends highly on their investment in knowledge and
skills.

Restrictions

The history of the European labour market is not only one of continuously increasing
permeability – on the contrary. The rather technical possibilities to travel sketched in the
previous paragraph are often more than offset by restrictions and limitations on mobility. These
restrictions can be directed against outsiders, but insiders can be, and have been, severely
restricted in their mobility as well.

Protection against outsiders of course precedes our period for many centuries. Until the end
of the guild system this was the task of local governments (see paragraph 3.3). The actual policies
of preventing or conditioning outsiders from or in certain trades, either independently or for
wages, was left to the trade guilds.

For a rather short period (in most countries outside France, England and the Netherlands
only for some decades) such policies disappeared after the abolishment of the guilds. In the
heydays of liberalism labour migration was free.

At the end of the nineteenth century, however, national governments started to reintroduce
restrictions on the unlimited entrance of foreign workers. As an early example consider the
German policy against free immigration, mainly into Prussia, of Poles from the Russian and
Austrian parts of their former fatherland.25 Whereas Prussia was trying fiercely to impose
“Germanisation” of its Poles in the eastern provinces of the kingdom, it now had to face the
dangers of “Polonisation” because of its hunger for workers, which was fed mainly by the
massive immigration of Poles from over the eastern borders. In the German Empire, the need
for foreign labour was so great that between 1889 and 1891 farmers in Prussia, West Pomerania
and Silesia seriously considered importing Chinese coolies to harvest sugar beet.26

The ghost of a resurrected Polish state loomed large over Prussian labour market politics,
and the government in Berlin tried to solve the dilemma by preventing foreign Poles from
taking up permanent residence. A system of compulsory rotation was introduced, which
required foreign Poles to leave Prussian territory before 20 December of each year and forbade
them to return before 1 February of the next. Besides, the Prussians tried – without much success
– to replace Poles by other foreigners. They also prohibited foreign Poles to work in Germany
outside agriculture, except in the four easternmost provinces (East and West Prussia, Posen and
Silesia). As Bade concludes: “Imperial Germany did not become a country of true immigration
but merely “the second most important labour-importing country in the world”, first place
being taken by the United States.”27

The restrictions imposed on foreign Poles in Germany were only child’s play in comparison
with the regulation of foreign labour that became the norm during and after the First World
War in nearly all European countries, with France as the main exception. Imre Ferenczi wrote
in 1927: “Since the First World War the majority of countries regulate their citizens’ rights of

emigration and the immigration of foreigners entirely at their own discretion, and their demands towards other countries are possibly even more at variance with their own behaviour than in the field of customs duties” 28.

After the period of relatively free international migration in the European “Gastarbeiter”-era of the 1950s and 1960s, the same or more can be said about the end of this century. The main difference with the first period of national restrictions on international migration is of course the free movement of persons within the European Union.

In November 1973, West-Germany started to stop workers from non-EEC countries, especially from Turkey, and within a year other countries followed suit. Those to be banned were workers from poor countries in North Africa, from Turkey, later from other parts of the world, and after the fall of the Wall in 1989 also from Eastern Europe.

After the international oil crisis, repatriation programmes were introduced, to little avail. Switzerland initiated the most severe measures of all, effectively barring the entry of dependents and introducing measures not unlike the Prussian ones vis-a-vis the Poles before the First World War. Whatever the measures, they were by and large unsuccessful, regardless of the countries involved. Migration, increasingly semi-legal and illegal, continued, now also in the southern member states of the European Unions: Egyptians enter Greece, Albanians and West-Africans, Italy, and Moroccans, Spain.

Not only foreigners were restricted in their possibilities to enter, Europe also has an impressive history of checks on insiders to leave their country or to migrate internally. We shall distinguish between intentional and unintentional checks.

Part of the intentional checks on free geographical mobility on the labour market have already been discussed when we treated of unfree labour. States determine part of the lives of their subjects through conscription and much more in times of war. Of course these claims do involve geographical mobility, but not on the labour market. As we will see in the next chapter, states also restrict mobility by endorsing local guild regulations and – as a kind of follow-up to the demise of these institutions – by issuing work-books, internal passports, etc., all meant to link employees more closely to their employers. Some kinds of unequal labour contracts have the same result, as we have seen.

There are also many examples of restrictions placed on specific groups of subjects on the labour market. Most general are those restricting women. All women experienced structural problems relating to women’s skill acquisition and employment. Married women, moreover, knew specific barriers, especially in much white-collar employment from the later nineteenth century on.

Less people (but still millions) were hit by discrimination on the basis of religion. Jews, the best-known case, were generally excluded from the guilds and later curbed by antisemitic formal regulations and widespread informal practices in most European countries until 1945 – and in Eastern Europe even longer.

The twentieth century introduced the phenomenon of workers being discriminated on the labour market because of their political conviction. Leftist convictions probably have been punished most often in this way. The German “Berufsverbote” of radical leftist activists in the 1970s and 1980s are a recent example.

Unintentional limitations on geographical mobility were the effect of the welfare state (see paragraph 4) in general, including the trap of good primary or secondary labour conditions (e.g. for high civil servants and for managers).

Conclusion

These examples of limitations on actual migration within the labour market of course do not preclude migrations as such. They can or they can’t, depending of the circumstances. Just consider the example of the East European Jews, enclosed by all imaginable limitations for centuries until the second half of the nineteenth century, but thereafter migrating in great numbers – not because Eastern Europe had become a paradise, but in most cases, to the contrary, to flee all limitations. It is important, nevertheless, to stress again that migration is not a mere and simple function of the technical possibilities for mass transportation.

Limitations are at least as important as possibilities in explaining actual mobility. This tendency is rather increasing over the whole period of our book, because of the overwhelming power of the state as compared to the power of local authorities in the beginning of the period and, recently, because of the impact of supranational authorities in east and west.
3 Job Mediation

3.1 Introduction: Modes of Job Mediation

Many people who hold a job never have seen a labour exchange inside, others many times, some have never reacted to an advert, others first consult the adverts before they even look to the front page of a paper. Some people do not know what a curriculum is, others have distributed copies all over the world and filled in application forms many times in their life. There are numerous ways to find a job indeed, ranging from the very personal (direct mediation of one’s parents, other relatives or intimate friends) to the anonymous (an employment service or an advert).

There are also major individual variations according to the distance bridged between the places where one lives and where one takes a job. The relations between the extent and strength of networks on the one hand, and the ability to bridge geographical distances on the other can be illustrated by a diagram (see diagram 2).

Strong and common ways of mediation are found in the lower left part of the diagram: parental or kindred help in finding a job. A special and very strong variant is the situation in which a son is entitled to succeed his father as a guild’s master. Such a person, though not escaping the official rules of apprenticeship and year-long work as a journeyman in the trade, never had to search for labour: he inherited it. In the upper left part we find mediation within a firm, or the so-called “in-company career”, i.e. change within one firm, possibly with the help of the personnel department. There we also find patronage. Organizational patronage is mostly embedded within political parties. Private patronage leads to a start or a change of jobs in particular segments of the market, like the arts and sciences.

At a short distance, the initial assistance of family or kin may be important not so much in order immediately to find a job, but in an indirect way, by helping a youngster to gain experience (by apprenticeship or schooling) in order to enter a guild or other protected niche in the labour market. This possibility is found in the lower middle part of the diagram. If a long distance is bridged, e.g. in the case of tramping, Wanderhaft or compagnonnage, we find ourselves in the upper middle part of the diagram.

In this view, the least attractive option is to enter the labour market or (if already within) to change jobs by means of more or less anonymous intermediaries like trade union officials, an even less personal labour exchange, or the most anonymous of all: commercial intermediaries, including newspaper adverts. Sometimes, real or physical labour markets, e.g. for servants or specific types of migrant workers, mediated for temporary jobs at longer distances. These variants are found in the middle and upper right part of diagram 2.
### Diagram 2. Modes of Job Mediation: Distance and Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>STRENGTH OF NETWORKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>long</td>
<td>in-company (incl. multinationals)</td>
<td>anonymous / weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 km</td>
<td>chain mediation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>patronage (organizational and personal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 km</td>
<td>tramping (compagnonnage or Wanderschaft)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 km</td>
<td>job fairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local</td>
<td>- commercial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- labour exchange</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- trade unions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parental mediation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>guilds closed professional groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>personal / strong</td>
<td>anonymous / weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There may be a certain historical trend from short to long-distance mediation, because of the extending possibilities for commuting. But if so, the development is not linear (commuting on the Belgian railways was long-distance as early as 1850) but rather shock-like. And new impediments such as passport legislation from the First World War on, the Iron Curtain 1945-1990, the Schengen Agreement of 1985, worked in the opposite direction.

However, there certainly is no historical trend from personal to anonymous, as if over time the strength of personal networks were decreasing, even though internationalization (the European Union), liberalization of markets or globalization could induce one to think so. Brief, the variety of forms depends more on the characteristics of specific segments of the labour market than on any evolution over time.

Job mediation is part of the functioning of agencies in charge of the distribution of unemployment benefits. In order to maintain their funds such institutions try to get their dependents back to work. That’s why our diagram also shows a pattern regarding the different unemployment provisions according to the personal, professional and public sphere. All have their own particular ways to urge or even to press the unemployed to accept opportunities offered. In the personal sphere, provisions in case of unemployment often will also be of a private nature. This puts strong pressure on the unemployed to accept opportunities offered by the intimate circle.

A similar pressure will be exerted by the public agencies in the central right corner of the diagram. Public unemployment benefits tend to go hand in hand with compulsion to have the
benefiting accept jobs offered. This can even take the form of compulsory labour, as introduced by several countries in the interwar period. Mutual assistance schemes (e.g. insurance) blossom in the intermediate space of professional job mediation. Although here we find no compulsion to take up another job, limitations on, and eventual withholding of, support are common practice. In reality, in this professional sphere, several forms of job mediation and support together make up a strong combination, of which the viaticum is quite characteristic: monetary support to leave and to look for work elsewhere.

The strong extension of combined job mediation and unemployment support by the state, superseding the greater part of the professional domain and parts of the personal networks domain since the beginning of the century until very recently, shows how mediation and support are two sides of one and the same coin. Its rapid decrease at the end of the millennium attests to the same fact. In the central and upper right part of our diagram we are presently watching simultaneously a decrease in unemployment benefits and an increase of private agents.

Below, we will make an attempt to reconstruct the use made of different mediation forms. The bottom left part of the diagram presents particular difficulties. In order to treat it systematically we ought to know more about the extent to which children follow the footsteps of their parents in their choice of a living. There are many examples of children working in the same factory as their fathers, e.g. from the British and Belgian (Ghent) cotton industry. But examples are not enough. It would seem, however, that this way of mediation has been very important, as illustrated by workers’ autobiographies and recollections. Peter Scholliers mentioned the example of Pol de Witte, the son of a Ghent Cotton spinner: “One night in December 1857, Pol’s father came home, announcing that his young scavenger had left, and that he would take his son with him from then on. There were two advantages: the pay of 3 francs was saved and the boy would learn to work. Pol was nine years old at the time. After vehement protest by the mother and her son, Pol started work next morning”.

The more anonymous forms of mediation are better known, so we will focus on the central right parts of our diagram (see paragraph 3.4). But we start with the upper left (paragraph 3.2) and middle parts (paragraph 3.3).

3.2 Personal Mediation

Personal mediation is the kind which is not paid for, at least not directly. In this essay we therefore do not consider commercial out-placement or head-hunting as aspects of personal job mediation (see paragraph 3.4, where these forms will be discussed as part of “private commercial mediation”).

Within this context, personal mediation may be used to get a job or an apprenticeship, to enter school (aimed at a particular job or branch), or to change a job between firms or within

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a (big) firm. In the latter case we are dealing with so-called “internal” labour markets or ILMs.\textsuperscript{2} Such ILMs exist not only in big firms, like in Britain from the second half of the nineteenth century – like e.g. railway companies\textsuperscript{1} -, but also in large institutions like the church and the army.

As soon as personal mediation exceeds the limits of the nuclear family, we call it patronage. This may be of an individual nature, as when a prince supports a poor, but talented painter or musician. Private patronage leads to a job or change of jobs within a particular segment of the market like the arts and sciences. In our period, however, patronage as a rule is of a more organizational nature: in twentieth century Europe it is mostly embedded in political parties.

In some countries political mediation plays hardly any role. In the Netherlands, for instance, only a few key civil servant functions go to ex-politicians by way of re-compensation and recognition. On a national scale the major burgomasterships (a Dutch burgomaster is not elected, but appointed by the government, in principle until retirement) are divided among important members of the main coalition partners. Yet in adjacent Belgium, virtually no civil servant gets a post without a party membership card. The power equilibrium between the major parties determines how many jobs are on offer.

Along these lines it is only logical that in one-party states, as in Eastern Europe for most of this century and in most other countries from the 1920s or 1930s up to 1945 (or even longer in some Southern European countries), public functions – and in this very situation the public sector used to be greater than elsewhere! – only went to party members. This could stretch deep into the private sector.

On the other hand, the more party patronage was the rule, and the more party membership a conditio sine qua non for entry to the labour market (or continuing career building), the less it counted for specific jobs. Sure, in 1938 Germany, an unskilled, but zealous Nazi would be preferred for school “concierge” over an experienced non-party member; but the same man could not successfully apply to become a teacher at the same school. However distorting party affiliation may be for the working of the labour market in one-party states, as a rule professional qualification is not totally disregarded.

3.3 Professional Networks

Professional networks are underestimated in current discussions of the workings of the labour market. If referred to at all, one generally only refers to guilds, which in this vision died a natural death a long time ago. This is misleading in two ways. Guilds are an integral part of nineteenth century European history but, more importantly, similar organizations continue until this very day and are growing in force. One explication for the simultaneous persistence and underestimation of professional networks is the fact that they are closely connected to something

\textsuperscript{2} This terminology after François Eyraud, David Marsden and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, “Occupational and internal labour markets in Britain and France”, International Labour Review 129 (1990), 501-517.

not supposed to be characteristic of modern Europe: the notion of trade, skill and knowledge as property and the related, albeit not identical, notion of occupational heredity.

The Guilds

Craft guilds originally came into being in the emerging towns of the Middle Ages. In their classical form they existed longer than often is thought in many parts of Europe. We now know that they are also part and parcel of much of European urban history in the nineteenth century, and were not unknown in the countryside either.

Of course, through the décret d’Allarde and the loi Le Chapelier, all guilds were abolished in France in 1791, not to return afterwards. Yet certain functions, like checking unruly journeymen, very soon returned in disguise. As a result of the introduction of the “livret” (work-book) in countries like France, Belgium and the Netherlands, wage labourers could only change jobs with the cooperation of their masters.

If professional control of the French labour market outlived the abolition of the guilds, even in England, the classical the free market country, guilds played a greater role, and for much longer, than usually supposed. Although “entrepreneurial” trades had abandoned guild controls as early as the late seventeenth century, overall guild membership and recruitment, after a temporary collapse during the Civil War, recovered after 1660 and reached a peak between 1700 and 1720. “Manufacturing” trades largely abandoned guild controls between 1720 and 1740, and service and “assembly” trades between 1760 and 1780, although some sustained a – sometimes near total – measure of control much later. As the guilds were never legally abolished in the United Kingdom, new ones were started even in the second half of our century. A nice example was seen in London in 1964, when great festivities accompanied the foundation of the eighty-fourth guild, the guild of the scientific instrument makers. Besides, the Statute of Artificers of 1563 was in vigour until 1814, stating that all who wanted to become master in a trade should have finished a seven-year apprenticeship.

In other countries the system survived much longer. In the Netherlands, abolishing the guilds was a protracted process that lasted from 1798 to 1818, and even then it took another half century to do away with many big guilds of “town’s workers”. In the German states, Prussia was first in attacking the guilds from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, following this up by alleviations of the regulations in 1810 and 1845. Other states came much later, Bavaria in 1868 and Mecklenburg in 1869. Some were compelled to do so by the proclamation of the “Gewerbefreiheit” in the North German Confederation in 1869, to which all states in the newly-established Reich had to adapt in 1871. Up till these acts, in most German cities (counting more than half of the population) one third of the population was subject to guilds. But this was

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not the end. In some respects similar organizations, called “Innungen” (see next paragraph), took over from their predecessors. In nearly all European countries except on the Balkans the guilds were abolished only in the second half of the nineteenth century: in Austria in 1859, and in Hungary in 1872. On the Balkans, the Turkish “esnaf” had an even longer and very active life.7 In Turkey, the guilds were abolished in 1909 by the Young Turks (to be replaced by very similar structures in the form of compulsory employers’ associations).8 In Serbia they ceased to exist in 1911.

For many townsman, entrance to the labour market and job rotation were checked by guilds. One implication was that in bigger cities each masters’ guild or journeymen’s guild entertained its own ale- or wine house. It goes without saying that those who wanted to enter the craft or trade had to go there. But travelling journeymen could also expect there one night’s shelter, information about available work or a “viaticum”, i.e. money to travel to the next town. If work was available, a journeyman was told exactly where to go. Once arrived at the workshop he was supposed to give the customary greetings to masters and journeymen. One might also be told to avoid a workshop that employed a “cursed” journeyman, meaning somebody who had offended the rules of the trade.

It was crucial for the continuity of the system that all travelling journeymen within a greater area, e.g. the French or German-speaking world, knew the codes of their specific trade, and could show their legitimation papers in order to prove that they had finished their apprenticeship in a proper way, and had satisfactorily been acquitted by their former masters. Before the first phase of German unification under Napoleon’s onslaught in 1805, such papers, called “Kundschaften”, had been issued by the guilds and the journeymen associations since the 1740s. In the Napoleonic period many authorities replaced the Kundschaften by French “livrets” or livret-like “Wanderbücher” issued by the state authorities. These had to be presented by a tramping artisan to the police at each stop or on demand. But especially in Germany the old traditions were strong enough to allow for the simultaneous use of unsanctioned passes, called “Gesellscheine”, issued by the journeymen’s associations and in fact tolerated by many authorities.9

Although the authorities on the one hand tried to suppress the old journeymen’s associations for fear of the dissemination of revolutionary ideas, especially among those who still practised the tramp, they tolerated on the other many activities because of their clear advantages. The associations found jobs for travelling and unemployed men, provided travel money for those leaving town, gave sick money, and maintained hostels for wanderers. As a rule, in the countryside the industrial labour market had already been freed by the emergence of proto-industry during the ancien régime.

As a result, from the last quarter of the nineteenth century at the latest, the labour market in most jobs was no longer controlled by one body per sector, and people were free not just

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8. Information, kindly provided by Erik-Jan Zürcher.
to establish themselves, but to enter the market as wage labourers. This seemingly universal trend increasingly encountered exceptions in the establishment of formal training requirements for all sorts of jobs, and of monopolies granted to new organizations (mainly in the professions) by the national state.

The Professions

The similarities between modern national associations of professions like doctors, lawyers, architects, etc. and guilds are striking, in spite of their different names and the fact that they operate on a national instead of a local level. This holds also or in particular for the entrance to jobs. Practitioners influence or even decide how many newcomers are allowed to enter the training courses and on what conditions. Only when properly certified can such newcomers establish themselves, either independently or in a wage-agreement. Sometimes obtaining a training certificate will suffice to set them up, but this is not a rule.

Clearly, we are dealing here in part with the “free professions” and so cannot speak of a labour market proper. Yet the professionals in question increasingly are ordinary waged employees: medical doctors and chemical analysts in hospitals, accountants and legal specialists in international accountancy and lawyer firms, etc. For all of them certification is the ultimate weapon to check entrance in order to maintain the average income level of the in-group. How strong these associations are, is shown by the difficulties caused by their adaptation to the principles of the free labour market in the European Union.

In Germany, where we have seen the artisanal milieu lose its production monopoly and control of prices, important elements were able to regain a monopoly of the formation and qualification of newcomers since the end of the nineteenth century. The so-called “Innungen” organized some 25 percent of all German artisan masters before the First World War. For them, as for their apprentices, the age-old compagnonnage system and the master-piece as an entrance examination to the trade remained in place. In 1904 Innungen-mediation was handled by 2,425 bureaus, or 65 percent of all non-commercial agencies with 19,5 percent of their activities, as well as some 25 percent of all labour mediation bureaus, commercial and non-commercial. In the following years their activities and their share strongly declined.

In France, with its early abolition of the guilds, compagnonnage survived nevertheless: during the Restoration some 200,000 compagnons were under way for their Tour the France. Even so, its importance did not at all equal the German case. North of Paris compagnonnage was unknown. In Paris in 1848 just one in seventeen male and female workers had a formal apprenticeship. Only in the building and the book trades did this type of organization survive in France into the twentieth century. In England, apprenticeships were known, but rather

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than domination by the masters in order to close the trade they represented a monopoly of the journeymen (see infra sub “unions”).

3.4 Impersonal Mediation

How do parties unknown to each other, either through family or other networks, or through the channel of professional training, meet in the labour market? Apart from actual marketplaces (on which more at the end of this chapter) several types of mediation are possible.

One may distinguish first of all between non-profit and commercially motivated, profit-seeking intermediaries. Among the former we find above all those directly interested, the organizations of employers and employees, whether or not cooperating in this field. In addition, there are the far less important philanthropic bodies fighting unemployment, and last but not least the public authorities. All of them can and do work together under specific conditions.

Another distinction may be made between the public and private spheres. All commercial agencies are by definition private, and so are most trade unions and employers’ organizations. But the private sphere also covers all voluntary agreements between employers and employees.

Contrary to what may have seemed the case only some decades ago, there is no inevitable evolutionary development from one form to the other, neither from commercial to non-commercial, nor from private to public. Any order is therefore arbitrary, and we will stick to that shown from the bottom to the top in the right part of Diagram 2, which reflects more or less an increasing degree of anonymity.

Trade Unions and Employers Organizations

This type of non-commercial though private form of mediation succeeded on a wider, national scale to the former local guilds or, in Britain, trade societies. The latter began to operate in the later eighteenth century and were widespread by the 1820s or 1830s. Additionally, less formal but not necessarily less effective for that, weekly and monthly published reports of skilled trade unions were circulated to all branches and often contained information on the state of trade in a district or town, or the availability of jobs recruited by large employers. They are found in the metal trades in Britain from the 1830s onwards.

In other countries this form of mediation dates back mainly to the end of the nineteenth century, after the emergence of trade unions and, subsequently, of employers’ organizations. Separately or in co-operation, members may bind themselves to bring together all supply and demand they know off to the advantage of the participants. Work-permits are one way of doing this. They clearly remind us of livrets and may be used for blacklisting, which puts a strain on this type of cooperation. No wonder that the 1896 congress of the German free trade unions rejected such co-operation on principle, and pleaded for one-sided trade union mediation. The employers’ organizations, led by the very active Hamburg-Altona Metal Employers’ Association, answered with their own exclusive schemes and work-permits. The agricultural employers, organized in the “Landwirtschaftskammern”, were particularly successful, most notably in the recruitment of foreign labour.

14. Personal communication, kindly provided by Geoffrey Crossick.
Some big firms tried to ban unions and to force their employees into so-called “yellow unions”, or firm-based organizations. They also might force the workers to sign so-called “yellow dog contracts”, meaning the resignation from union-membership. The Siemens works in Berlin were a case in point. Of course, it was very hard to recur to the free labour market after the establishment of a yellow union and the suppression of others. Yet Siemens promised lifetime tenured jobs and, as a logical consequence, started in-firm training schemes. In this way – and many European firms followed this example – it tried to restrict the workings of the labour market to the point where prospective employees left school and entered the firm. This cohort was then to be trained and selected on a semi-permanent basis in order to fulfil the specific labour demands of the firm.

France, and especially late nineteenth century Paris, offered one of the best examples of trade-union initiatives to establish one-sided labour-exchanges, with the help of local authorities. Between 1884 and its suppression by the national government in 1893, Paris had a labour exchange paid for by the city government and run by the “syndicats”. Many other French cities followed. These institutions had a great impact, not so much as mediators of labour, but in uniting the French workers’ organizations. In 1891 the trade unions’ labour exchanges were involved in 100,000 mediations as against 800,000 by the private bureaus.

The English system of closed shops and their recruitment differs very much from what we have seen in Germany and France. Here, on the level of the firm, organized labour had and still has a great say in whom to recruit and who not.

In times of structural unemployment, unions face a dilemma that Garraty formulated as follows: “Union officials everywhere claimed to be deeply concerned about the fate of the jobless and there is no reason to doubt their sincerity. However, the fact remains that their first concern was nearly always for their own constituents. Since unemployed members tended to drop out of unions – because of a conflict of interest between workers and the unemployed – this meant unions reflected the attitudes of those with jobs. With only a handful of exceptions unions rejected work sharing as a means of coping with unemployment”.

This dilemma was reinforced when the unions got involved in the insurance of their members, especially against the risk of unemployment, as became usual from the end of the nineteenth century. To what extent were they obliged to continue supporting members unable to pay their premiums because they had been fired?

Co-operation between employers and unions seemed hardly possible at the start of this century. Yet under the pressure of the First World War it came about suddenly and quickly. Only four days after the outbreak of the war, employers’ and workers’ organizations in Germany decided to cooperate in mediation for experienced workmen. And in virtually all European countries, trade unions became involved in public policy, first hesitantly, in the framework of

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crisis management like the distribution of food, but sooner or later structurally, including in public labour market mediation.

**Public Employment Services or Labour Exchanges**

Non-commercial public bodies started to offer mediation on a local scale, and moved to the national level at the beginning of our century. In Germany, the labour exchanges started in the big cities around 1850 originally had a philanthropic background. The first public labour exchanges were created by some Swiss cities: those in Bern (1888) and Basel (1889) were among the earliest ones in Europe. The institution spread northwards, first to Southern Germany (Stuttgart and Munich in 1895) and soon all over the Reich. Other countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy imitated these examples. Soon, national organizations of local labour exchanges came into being. The German organization of 1898 counted 128 members in 1902. Their success was crowned by the introduction of the “Stellenvermittlungs-Gesetz” (Job Mediation Law) of 2 June 1910, which obliged private agents to obtain a license, without interfering with their operations. Total rates for men and women together were only 53 percent in 1913, but increased rapidly in the following years to 84 percent in 1919. In the 1920s no further increase was possible as the figure stabilised at around 90 percent. The early high rates of public mediation among women resulted from the competitiveness of public agencies against private, commercial ones. Commercial mediation among men, especially in industry, was far less important.

The main alternative to personal mediation (leaving out adverts) for men and women at the end of the nineteenth century was still the commercial bureau. In 1895 the 6,000 commercial bureaus active in Germany were responsible for two thirds of all mediations in the largest kingdoms, Prussia and Bavaria. In the first two decades of this century their market share fell to the advantage of public mediation and especially of mediation by employers and mixed employer-unions agencies.

In 1904, 40 percent of all non-commercial mediation was public, “Innungen” and employers handled 20 percent each, trade unions 10 percent, and mixed employers-trade unions 5. In 1912, when real numbers had risen more than threefold, the distribution had changed: a small reduction for the public agencies, a severe reduction for the “Innungen”, equal importance for unions and mixed employers-unions, but a huge increase for employer mediation. In absolute figures the latter’s activity grew from some 230,000 to 1.2 million places, their share in non-commercial mediation from 21.1 to 33.5 percent. They must have been the hardest competitors for commercial mediation, just before public agencies took this role.

The outcome of this development was the establishment of the “Reichsamt für Arbeitsvermittlung” (a special branch of the “Reichsarbeitsministerium”) on 15 January 1920,
and a new law, the “Reichsarbeitsnachweisgesetz” of 22 July 1922. This established a fully centralized governmental organization of German labour mediation, in which employers’ organizations and trade unions participated with regard to the actual execution of the law. At the same time, it created a monopoly for public mediation and supervision of the commercial bureaus left by the new bodies. The monopoly held for all non-agricultural enterprises with more than four employees. International developments went the same way. According to an international agreement concluded in Genoa on 15 June 1920, any commercial mediation for seamen was forbidden.

Still, Germany was not the first country to organize a national mediation system. In 1909 the British Labour Exchange Act had already established a national system of labour exchanges organized by the Board of Trade Ministry. The whole country was divided into 11 Divisional Offices, each of them overseeing dozens of labour exchanges. The important involvement of both labour unions and employers’ associations was reinforced in 1911 and 1920, when their tasks came to include control of local unemployment benefits.

Sooner or later other countries followed suit, most notably when after the First World War the ILO adopted a policy of propagating national systems of public employment service at the detriment of existing private schemes.

After the Second World War public employment services began to justify themselves in economic terms as well. In the Keynesian mood that characterized the reconstruction era of the late 1940s and 1950s public employment services were attributed a key role in national equilibrium economic policies.

To what extent have public employment services been able to exert a monopoly? According to Sergio Ricca, the notion of monopoly has two senses. In the first, the public employment service centralises all hiring operations. In this case no employer is authorised to recruit personnel without first having registered his job offer with the public employment service, and without the selected worker having been registered as a job-seeker. This could only be accomplished in a closed shop system. In the second sense, the monopoly consists in prohibiting any intermediary coming between the worker and the job apart from the public employment services, though employers remain free to recruit workers of their choice directly.

This second, more generally adopted model is currently under attack in Western Europe. Although established by law in many countries, for various reasons public employment services in countries like Greece and Italy have never been able to tap more than 10 to 15 percent of the annual job offers generated. This is scarcely better than in countries like the United Kingdom where no such monopoly exists.

Private Commercial Mediation

In the early modern period private commercial mediation was only possible in some very special sections of the labour market. Most urban job mediation was monopolised by the guilds. Private initiatives were virtually restricted to the markets for domestic servants, sailors and mercenaries, the three categories of young-adult unmarried labour migrants discussed before. Commercial

military recruitment became less important in the modern period, but mediation for servants and sailors had a golden future in the nineteenth century. With the demise of the guilds, urban placement bureaus were able to extend their activities. Dailies with their adverts also entered this growing market. Early examples of papers created explicitly with the aim of private commercial job mediation are “Der Arbeitgeber”, started by N.W. Wirth in Frankfurt in 1856, and “La Bourse du Travail”, by G. de Molinari in Brussels in 1857. In France Molinari from the 1840s on propagated a transparent labour market parallel to the markets for goods and stocks, which according to liberal economic theory had to be transparent as well. The state that had created exchanges for raw materials and capital, ought to do the same for labour; “bourses du travail”. Actually, France hesitantly took a first step when it introduced a public licensing system for commercial job mediation in 1852.

Because of widespread abuse, many governments started to regulate the private bureaus. In Germany the “Stellenvermittlergesetz” of 2 June 1910 promoted public over commercial mediation. It established a concession system which prohibited commercial mediators to own an inn or similar establishment. In addition to the regulation of remunerations special attention was paid to the mediation of girls in order to prevent white slave trade. At the time more than 7,000 commercial offices in Germany (nearly 70 of which were headed by women) mediated especially for house servants, agricultural labourers, navvies, seamen, actors and inn-helps. According to the new law of 1922 the commercial bureaus were restricted a great deal.

As we have seen in the preceding section about public labour exchanges, in the half century between 1920 and 1970 the tide was against private mediation. Then the pendulum swung back. This is not only apparent from the sheer numbers of private mediations, but also from the diversification of the activities of the agencies, which now include “head-hunting” and “out-placement”, as well as in the scale of their operations. Some organizations have really become international.

The return of the private employment agencies is illustrated by the history of the international agreements reflected in ILO regulations. Whereas the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention of 1933 advocated their gradual abolition, under the revised Convention of 1949 the ratifying states are allowed to choose between progressive abolition or regulation. Since 1982 a proposal for a standard to regulate temporary work agencies is being discussed.

### Job Fairs

In a peculiar form of mediation, private employers and aspiring employees meet physically, though anonymously, on a “real” labour market, best-known for domestic servants – “job” or “mob fairs”, or “Gesindemarkt” in German. Until the first half of this century these used to be organized in cases of temporary, mostly seasonal work for aspirants from the countryside willing to work in a town or a specialised region. This takes impersonal contact to its limits: the parties do not know each other, have not been mediated by a third party, but meet in the open, especially on market places, like cattle merchants and their customers.

27. Cf. Ricca “Changing role of public employment services”.
Job Mediation

In the case of domestic servants, who were much sought after in the nineteenth-century towns, girls from the surrounding countryside, whether or not accompanied by relatives, would assemble on specific market days, usually once or twice a year. Here an employer could selected them in a way that contemporaries often compared to slave markets in the American South. Physical ability and health were mustered, and a kind of merchant’s deal was made at the town well, where the aspiring servant was offered a symbolic sum of money.29

Such “real” labour markets are documented for some categories of seasonal workers as well. Examples are found among seasonal hay mowers in the Dutch provinces Friesland and North-Holland (in the latter case right up to the Second World War), and in Hungary still during the war. Sometimes the market’s main aim was not to bring together employer and employee, but a sub-contractor and individual employees or a cooperatively contracting gang.

The frequency of job markets depends on prevailing hiring customs. When long (annual) hires were the norm, as in nineteenth century North-English and Scottish agriculture, annual regional hiring fairs were the occasion for a change of employer. This tended to produce a greater turnover of labour than in other places where the formal period of hire was shorter and turnover not structurally established. Another and rather different example was dock labour: especially in London and Liverpool, workers seeking employment in these highly casualised trades would gather in front of the dock gates once or twice a day to see if they were selected.30

Conclusion

Among the different possibilities mentioned in Diagram 2 and discussed in this chapter, the major role of personal mediation should be emphasized, even though it is hard to quantify, as is the role of adverts. Other organized activities, public or private, tend to claim most of our attention, but are for that very reason easily overestimated.

This is illustrated by a comparison between the annual job turnover figures (as we have seen, roughly 50 percent of the labour force) and the statistics of labour exchanges and the like. To take just one example, in Germany, with what was probably this century’s best-organized system of public mediation in Europe, Faust31 calculated for 1913 a turnover of 10 million (on 19 million economically active people), and estimated that only some 30 percent changed jobs through non-commercial mediation. It is hard to say how many of the other 70 percent were mediated by commercial agencies or adverts, and how many were not mediated at all, but changed jobs as a result of direct contact between supply and demand. Obviously, the latter way is hard to trace and easy to overlook.

29. Dehing “... Eene soort van dynastie”, 75-81; Lucassen, Migrant Labour, 4 (fn.9 on 279), 53 (fn. 6 on 284), 93 (fn. 128 on 291-292) and plate 14.
30. Personal communication, kindly provided by Geoffrey Crossick.
4. Pretensions of Labour Market Policies

4.1 Introduction

We are going to focus on policies and hence will have to change our perspective. The man or woman looking for a job, who has been at the centre of our concerns so far, will turn from subject into object of this essay.

According to neo-classical economic theories, unemployment is unnecessary as long as national or local governments do not interfere with the market and make sure that no one else does. In this opinion, which is in line with the republican ideal that no intermediate bodies should place themselves between the individual and the state, the market will always cure this evil. Unemployment will occur temporarily (and is then called frictional), but not structurally.

Governments, however, mostly lack the patience to wait for this theory to come true. For them, unemployment is something to be countered, if only in order to prevent an upsurge of public unrest and the unpredictable political consequences this may have.

Until far in the nineteenth century this was the task of local governments. Although they were increasingly controlled by national states, for most of the nineteenth century the latter, following the principles of economic liberalism, were reluctant to take over labour market policies or to raise them to a national level, with the possible exception of the second French republic. Only at the end of the nineteenth century, national governments started to define employment policy as a core responsibility, first in Western, then also in Eastern and Southern Europe. This development went hand in hand with the growing pretensions, all over Europe, of “welfare states” of various ideological shades (social-democratic, corporatist, fascist, national-socialist, communist). These pretensions, culminating in the 1950s-1970s, have since come under attack, and the last quarter of the century is witness to a fundamental reexamination.

The way the state’s policies went was from local poor relief and (mutual and commercial) self-help to national and centralised schemes; and from relief or mitigation of the consequences of unemployment to the economic prevention or cure resulting from positive employment policies (general or specific).

Traditionally, local politics saw unemployment as part of the general problem of poverty. Casual workers seemed to be particularly vulnerable in this respect. The answer to the problem was sought in a mix of poor relief, compulsory work, (re)training and (re)education, or even emigration to the colonies. In general, however, the financial compensation in social benefit systems bound individuals to a fixed place, as was the case of the English poor laws, and had a negative influence on the geographical mobility of certain classes.

The development from local poor relief through national welfare schemes to a reappraisal of these schemes at the end of the twentieth century is general throughout Europe. Seen on a very broad scale, it oscillated between “British” and “continental” (especially German) poles that dominated general European trends in succeeding periods, in close connection with the political history of the continent. Nineteenth-century developments are well illustrated by the British case; those in the first half of the twentieth century are characterized by a competition

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between the two models. In the post-war period they somehow seemed to fuse until recently, when one observes a renewed divergence.

4.2 The English Case: Unemployment as Part of the Local Poverty Problem

The old English Poor Law was in vigour until 1834 (Scotland had no actual Poor Law before 1845). According to this and related rules like the Statute of Artificers as practised in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the parish or township was responsible for those born there who appealed to public relief. And in the countryside this group was more numerous than in continental parts of Europe because in Britain by that time the “work cycle” of the rural agricultural labourers had been broken up already in the eighteenth century. Beggars should be punished, the impotent poor could be cared for in almshouses, and the able-bodied poor should be put to work, as a rule with private employers (by way of subsidising wages), sometimes in workhouses, or as assisted emigrants in the colonies.

The new Poor Law of 1834 envisaged the co-operation between groups of parishes, whose rate-payers elected a Board of Guardians in charge of the poor. Much more emphasis was now put on the establishment of workhouses, at the detriment of outdoor relief. In reality, this planned major shift stayed a pious wish, and outdoor relief never lost its dominant place. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the 1834 law was essentially an attempt to solve a rural problem, in particular in the grain-producing parts of the country (excessive labour supply, excessive poor relief payments, supposed demoralization, and rural protest), and that it was poorly adapted to the needs of an urban and industrial economy.

Economic growth and the spread of its results over larger sections of the population, especially after the depression of the late 1830s and early 1840s, made the number of paupers as a proportion of the population fall from 8.8 percent in 1834 to a mere 2 percent in 1914.

The workhouses, although involving only a minority of the unemployed, had a very bad name and labourers tried everything to avoid public relief. One of their strongest defensive weapons was self-help. Mutual Benefit (or Friendly) Societies and savings banks appealed to important parts of the British working class.

Under the influence of the extension of the franchise down the social ladder the unemployed entered the ranks of the “deserving” or “respectable” poor more easily. In 1886 Joseph Chamberlain, then President of the Local Government Board, instructed the Guardians in charge of the Poor Law to look for work that would not stigmatize the unwillingly unemployed as paupers. Gradually, and partly the famous publications and initiatives of men like Andrew Mears, William Booth and Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree, the climate became ripe for the Labour Exchanges Act of 1909 and the 1911 unemployment insurance system. The act of 1909 recognised unemployment as a legitimate problem of inadequate demand and supply on a national level.


This change in attitude was also reflected in the vocabulary. Until the 1890s, the word unemployment was hardly used in Britain and France. Whereas the French census of 1891 offered no possibility to register someone as unemployed, that of 1896 did so for the first time. Now an explicit distinction was made between those voluntarily unemployed (persons aged 65 and over had to be regarded as no longer active and hence not among the unemployed) and the real jobless.6

In the second half of the nineteenth century economists discovered the regularities of the trade cycles. These were reflected in the labour statistics, which by now became gradually available. From these figures one concluded not only to regularities over time, but also in space. An international comparison made after the First World War, for instance, showed the following unemployment figures over 1904-1913: Germany 2.1 percent, Belgium 2.7, Norway 3.1, England 4.7, France 7.8, and Denmark 9.5. The author remarked that national differences are not just to be linked to economic performance, but also reflect major strikes and lock-outs. Lock-outs were clearly visible in the Danish figure.7

The discovery of unemployment as a cyclical economic phenomenon is reflected in the results reached by the British Royal Commission on the Poor Laws of 1909. Its Minority Report, famously associated with the name of Beatrice Webb, was still mainly concerned with casual unemployment. What was new was the proposal to abandon the much-hated local relief programmes, and above all the alternative: instead of the traditional remedies the report proposed counter-cyclical variation in work contracted by the central government departments. Labour should be rewarded by normal standard wages. The report also raised the issue of funding these works by borrowing from underemployed capital during a depression, to be repaid during a boom.8

4.3 From the First to the Second World War

The First World War, which ended the long nineteenth century with its endless series of official and less official reports on the poor and then on unemployment, brought about a new period of intensified activity.9 Two causes of this major change – in brief, from British to German solutions – stand out clearly: first, massive state intervention in national economics (a.o. at the cost of employers’ initiatives10), including the labour market; second, claims by the working classes on social security in exchange for the sufferings of the war, claims that had to be taken seriously by national governments because of widespread revolutionary threats.

When the Great War turned out to be different from a single campaign with a handful of major battles, like the Franco-Prussian War more than a generation earlier, governments increasingly had to mobilise their national resources, now including the labour market. Major parts of the labour force not only were channelled into military service, but didn’t return for

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good. Sixteen million men died or were lost in the war, and another 20 million were wounded. In order to meet increased production targets, more and more men and in particular women were drawn or even forced into the labour market, especially into the war industries.

In the revolutionary years following the Armistice governments started to proclaim the right to paid work for their subjects – an old claim of the French revolutionaries of 1848. As the Weimar Verfassung stated in article 163: “Every German will be offered the possibility to take care of himself by paid labour. As far as appropriate labour cannot be offered, his basic needs will be taken care of.”

But not only in the defeated countries workers claimed their rights. In Britain, in March 1919, Lloyd George’s Cabinet abandoned the gold standard out of fear for the prospect of unemployment, especially among demobilized servicemen. For the first time in British history unemployment gained political priority over the opinion of the Bank of England and the Treasury.

In many countries, compulsory state-induced unemployment insurance and a state-organized labour exchange became intertwined. After a try-out of the combination in 1911, Britain was the first country to introduce a virtually universal compulsory unemployment insurance scheme connected to the Labour Exchanges. In fact, this proved to be harmful for the success of the latter’s labour mediation function, since unemployment benefits came to capture most of their efforts. Other countries like Sweden developed a dual system, in which the government primarily dealt with unemployment insurance, and employers and unions cooperated in labour mediation.

The Great Depression once more intensified the debate about ways to steer the labour market. The diverging paths of Britain and Central Europe, already visible before, now became very clear. While the former emphasized understanding of the workings of the market and ensuing economic policies, the latter held to the primacy of politics.

In Britain, for the second time (the first being 1919-20), politics were dominated by mass unemployment that differed from earlier chronic underemployment. The overriding determinants were now based on the widely accepted conclusions of the 1909 Minority Report and William Beveridge’s new and influential book, *Unemployment: A Problem of Industry* (1930). His analysis is clear: unemployment is nothing more nor less than an economic problem of matching supply and demand in the labour market. As a result of these intellectual developments the liberal government in the 1930s again abandoned gold, thus enabling exchange-rate policies that, next to protectionism, favoured competitiveness and so employment opportunities. It also promoted labour exchanges, counter-cyclical works of “national utility”, and above all national insurance for those in cyclical trades – relieving unemployment, not curing it. From its narrow base of 1911, insurance embraced most of the working class by 1920.

Most European countries, notably in the centre, east and south, adopted different measures, much more heavily biased towards a primacy of politics over economics. Germany’s answer was a total state monopoly on labour market regulation: not a universal right to labour, but the universal duty to work became the point of departure, years before Hitler came to power.

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In fact, strong labour market policies or even dictatorial measures became widely accepted in view of the new situation. At the Geneva Conference of 1934, the director of the International Labour Office (ILO) stated that Italy, together with the United States, the Soviet Union and Germany, was at the forefront of creating a new economy. He praised Italy because of its progress “in the construction of the corporative system that breaks away with economic theories based on individualism”. This was all the more remarkable since by that time unemployment in Italian industry was two and a half times higher than in 1929. Most of the policies of the Italian fascists were not new after all. Their semi-official recognition showed how deeply the Depression had influenced the ideological approach to labour policies on an international level.

4.4 The Welfare State, 1944-1973

Not only in those countries that were already heavily centralized in the 1930s, but also in others like Britain, the Second World War signalled a rapid expansion of government intervention in the economy, even deeper than in the First. London now accepted a fiscal policy aimed not only at funding the war, but also at fighting inflation (the great problem in the preceding war) by keeping personal budgets down. This revolutionary Keynesian integration of national budget and national accounts was there to stay in the post-war decades. From 1942, comprehensive manpower planning was organised by a Ministry of Labour and National Service. The Treasury lost its central role, as illustrated by the proliferation of economists in the government bureaucracy, and a growing trust in rational intelligence as a way to resolve social problems, also during reconstruction after the war. Liberals like Beveridge and Keynes became more important than Conservatives and Labour. Their ideas influenced policy not only during the war, but even more so thereafter. They wanted to reform capitalism through enhanced state intervention without threatening private property.

The 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy distinguished between frictional, structural and general unemployment, and pleaded for “high and stable” employment. Beveridge’s target of reducing average unemployment to 3 percent was considered to be unattainable. High and stable unemployment had to be reached less through planning than through continued dominance of consumer choice, aimed at reducing fluctuations in demand. The government’s main devices were public investment levels and variations in social insurance contributions.

William Beveridge’s 1944 report, Full Employment in a Free Society, made a plea for “full employment”. He advocated a strong role for government planning in the public sector, though private investment would continue. According to Beveridge, full employment was a precondition for the success of a social welfare programme.

The 1945 Labour Government tried out many of these proposals. Some proved fruitless, while others encountered a different context than anticipated in 1944, for instance as a result of the then unforeseen nationalization of industries like mining and electricity.

These ideas deeply influenced politics not only in Britain, but all over Europe outside the influence of the Soviet Union. Because of the increased competition between the two great social

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14. This can be found already in the Meade Memorandum The Prevention of General Unemployment (spring 1941): Tomlinson, Employment Policy, 47.
systems, Western European governments now were much more convinced than after the First World War that they had to answer the claims of the working classes by the introduction of fundamental changes to social and economic policies.

Notably when in the 1950s the Cold War gained momentum, while economic growth proved possible beyond imagination, the Welfare State became the norm in Western Europe – even to such an extent that nothing seemed more normal than this state of affairs. A combination of scholarly insight and political will seemed to have resulted in a final solution to “make” society. The general optimism about what was seen as the result of Keynesian economic policy was expressed by M. Stewart in 1972: “Mass unemployment was brought to an end by the Second World War. It never returned. Despite dire predictions in 1945, Britain has now enjoyed full employment for more than thirty years. Such a tremendous transformation might be expected to have many causes. But in fact the evidence points to one cause above all others: the publication in 1936 of a book called The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes”. Another illustration of the mood, as well as of the convergence of economic policies in Western and Eastern Europe, where central planning became the norm, was the adoption of national unemployment targets. In 1951 the British government was first to set a target: the 3 percent put forward by Beveridge in 1944, but dismissed as impossible in the White Paper of that year.

The period is also characterized by an emphasis on international agreements. European governments considered them essential to the success of the welfare state. Only these agreements could prevent a country from being drawn into a crisis by another one, with unforeseeable consequences. Britain was particularly active in pursuing such agreements in the late 1940s and early 1950s, especially through the Economic and Social Commission of the UN (ECOSOC), but largely in vain because of American opposition. In the end, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was the only device left after the still-birth of the ITO (International Trade Organization) and the short-lived Bretton Woods Agreement. This was a far cry from the Keynesian ideals of the late 1940’s.

4.5 Reappraisals of the Welfare State

Nowhere else has the Welfare State been jeopardized more than in the country that started it all. In 1985 Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government published the White Paper, Employment: The Challenge for the Nation, with as its central message that the government has (only) to create a climate in which private enterprise can flourish. The main difference with the 1944 White Paper was the rejection of the government’s responsibility for welfare; its only task was to “set the framework for the nation’s effort”. It should concentrate its efforts not on the demand side, as in 1944, but rather on the supply side, by training young people, by propagating better management and wage moderation, and by starting an extensive programme of “deregulation”.

The change in international perspective between the 1944 and the 1985 White Papers was striking. In 1985 there is no longer any talk of international cooperation, only of national

policies: “external events are treated as entirely exogenous, outside any control by government,” as Tomlinson sums up. This clearly reflected the decline of Britain’s international power in forty years time, but also the fact that “its perceived scope for successful action [was] reduced almost to vanishing point”.  

Although the tendency to deregulation and reduced pretensions of the Welfare State are found in all European countries (with Eastern Europe as a special case), there are still substantial differences between Britain and the continent. On the latter, the so-called “Rhine Economic Model” is upheld against the Neo-American model of Reagan and Thatcher, with social justice versus efficiency; compromise, consensus, and cooperation versus confrontation and competition; long-term stability versus dynamism and change focusing on short term results; and finally, a concept of government as a difficult yet vital partner, with a mutual dependency between government and the economic actors, versus a modest government that should be kept at arms’ length. It is remarkable that Germany, with its major difficulties in uniting the two former parts of the country after 1989, still sticks to the principles of the Rhineland economy.

Whatever the actual outcome, however, it is hardly doubtful that in Europe important elements of the Welfare State will be maintained, resulting, among other things, in the unavoidable spread of the informal economy with important numbers of illegal immigrants. The tension between the pretensions of national welfare states and unification conceived as a purely economic matter is another complication, with Jacques Delors and some other socialists calling in the desert.

Conclusion

Over the last two centuries, the importance of paid work compared to other sources of income has increased beyond recognition in European society. In public life, labour relations have also gained in comparison with other human relations.

The growing importance of paid work is no longer primarily associated by most Europeans with maintaining a subsistence level of income. Most people now have more to lose – not just property, but a standard of living defined in terms of how to spend free time. Paradoxically therefore, although the part of human life spent at work has greatly diminished, the importance of paid work has not. Most people spend long years in order to qualify for a paid job, and unemployment is the single most important issue in national and European politics.

The grown importance of paid work, statistically expressed in the surge of national income since the 1960s, may be cause of the fact that, after a period of unification of labour conditions and relations, and forms of job mediation, we now seem to discern a new diversification in these and related fields, like income insurance – a diversification which naturally is also apparent in communal welfare arrangements.

Although we can draw this overall conclusion without much risk, we should bear in mind that there is no straightforward development. We record too many exceptions and retrogressive movements. Simply, no achievements regarding the organization of work have eternal life.
Appendix 1. Modes of Unfree Labour
Stalin Russia and Hitler Germany: Arbeit macht nicht frei

Two important European countries have known extensive systems of unfree labour in the twentieth century, the Soviet Union, especially between c. 1930 and 1955, and Germany between c. 1935 and 1945. At the time, these countries had nearly fifty per cent of the total population of the continent among them. If we add the populations of the countries squeezed between the two during the war and its aftermath, we are even talking about sixty per cent of the population of Europe.

Other war-waging nations also put prisoners of war to compulsory work, and some post-war “European Volunteer Workers” e.g. those from the Baltic states in Britain, suspiciously looked like unfree labourers. Yet unfree labour in the Soviet Union and Germany in this period didn’t stem from emergencies, but constituted an integral and essential part of the politico-economic system.

Both states had in common a combined system of unemployment benefits – workers were entitled to a job and the state had a right to assign jobs to unemployed workers. The Soviet Union introduced this system in Art. 1, paragraph 1 of the Labour Law Code of 1918 stating that all citizens from 16 to 50 shall be subject to compulsory labour. The state would provide sufficient jobs. Article 12 of the 1936 Constitution laid down that “he who does not work, does not eat” and explained this to be the basis of socialism: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his effort”. This differs not a little, as Kloosterboer has noted, from the classic socialist slogan “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”. Anyhow, until the introduction of the first five-year plan in 1928, these ideals were not put into practice.

The Weimar Republic was in a way ahead of the Soviets. The 1924 law on unemployment benefits strengthened the obligation for those on welfare to carry out compulsory labour: “welfare through work”. And already in 1925 Germany had a voluntary “Arbeitslagerbewegung” leading to parliamentary debates about “Arbeitsdienstpflicht” (compulsory labour service) in the early 1930s. Since 1927 claimants of unemployment insurance could be assigned jobs by the authorities. This hit in particular the young and the single unemployed. The combination of unemployment benefits with an obligation to work, as introduced by the Nazis some years later, had a long history.

Many more countries introduced “labour service”. Bulgaria had its “trudowa powinnost” initiated in 1920 under Stambolijski (and continued by the communists after 1945). Rumania followed this example a bit later, as did Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Italy and France in the 1930s. Some countries attached similar conditions to the entitlement to unemployment benefits, e.g. Spain in its Constitution of 1938 and France in its Constitution of 1946.

Appendix 1. Modes of Unfree Labour

Yet only the Soviet and German dictatorships developed a full-fledged system of unfree labour consisting of three major elements: increasing restrictions on the freedom of “ordinary” workers to move; compulsory work for prisoners of war and inhabitants of occupied countries; and a combination of terror, extermination and enslavement of socially unwanted parts of the populations of both home and occupied countries.4

Increasing Restrictions on the Freedom of “Ordinary” Workers to Move

The Soviet decree of October 1930 on “The immediate employment of the unemployed” stopped benefit payments without delay and applicants refusing work were stricken from the rolls of the labour exchange. In 1938 the very unpopular work-books were introduced, giving the plant manager full power over the worker. A year later, social insurance rights were tied to the duration of employment in one and the same establishment, and in June 1940 a change of jobs was made unlawful unless approved by plant management. Employment, once begun, was founded on compulsory labour and non-compliance made a criminal offence. Thus within ten years unfree labour had become the rule, a principle that lasted into the 1960s.

Between 1934 and 1936 Nazi Germany started to restrict the freedom of contract in certain branches and introduced legally compulsory labour. In 1934 workers were barred from immigration into Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen, where unemployment was high. Other orders prohibited agricultural labourers from accepting employment in mining, metallurgy, construction, brick-works and railway construction. 1935 brought six months of compulsory work in the Labour Service for young men, and the “Arbeitsbuch” (work-book) for all workers and salaried employees.5 The first four-year plan, starting in 1936, brought more restrictions on contractual freedom. In February 1939 general compulsory labour was introduced. Interestingly, in 1946 the allied powers extended this law until 1949! Also in 1939 – in September, half a year before the Soviet measure – a change of jobs was forbidden.

Compulsory Work for Prisoners of War and for Inhabitants of Occupied Countries6

Already before the war many foreigners (375,000 in 1938) worked voluntarily in Germany as a result of agreements between the German government and countries like Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Netherlands. After the war against Poland a target was set to force one million Polish labourers, in particular Polish girls, to go to Germany. After the war in the west, other nationalities were recruited, resulting in 2.1 million civilian labourers by the late summer of 1941. In addition to this, 1.2 million conscripted POWs, most of them French and Poles, worked in the Reich.

By then the Nazis seemed to have solved their serious labour shortages once and for all, and believed they could afford to leave Norwegian, Dutch and a large proportion of Belgian POWs at home. Hence their lack of interest in taking prisoners during the subsequent attack on the

Appendix 1. Modes of Unfree Labour

Soviet Union. Of 5.7 million POWs captured by the Germans some 3.3 million died, most of them in the beginning of the war from starvation and disease. This brutal policy of neglect was soon regretted when since the beginning of 1942 the war turned out to last and labour shortages became apparent. More and more inhabitants of territories under German control were forced to work in Germany, and gradually even inmates of concentration camps were mobilized. In 1944, over 100,000 Hungarian Jews were selected not immediately to be gassed, but to be deployed in the war industry.

For years after the war unfree labour by POWs and civilian prisoners continued, especially in the Soviet Union. The largest groups were about 1 million Poles, who returned only in the mid-fifties and the Germans.

A Combination of Terror, Extermination and Enslavement of Socially Unwanted Parts of the Population of Both Home and Occupied Countries

At the beginning of collectivization Stalin set out simultaneously to induce forced migration from the countryside to the new industrial centres, to execute real and presumed opponents (the “terror” cost more than three million victims), and to construct concentration camps. The population of the camps rose from half a million inmates in 1930 to a peak of 7.6 million in 1950, representing 12.4 per cent of the total labour force and nearly a quarter of the non-agricultural workers. The inhabitants of the GULag were employed mainly in construction, mining and lumbering, often in Siberia. Starting with the “kulaks”, all kind of groups became involved including so-called collaborators with the Germans like Russian Germans, Poles, Ukranians, Balts, Chechens, etc. Some of these peoples stayed outside the GULag, but were forcibly resettled nevertheless.

The Nazis organized terror along similar lines, but a much greater part of those sent to the concentration camps were not put to work at all and immediately killed, like millions of Jews, and hundred thousands of gypsies and of political opponents. As we saw, only in 1944/5 the emphasis shifted slightly to work.

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Appendix 2. Work Cycles

On Boxing-Day 1811 the former head of the district of Diepholz, in western Westphalia, wrote a report to his superior in Osnabrück, in which he vividly depicted the living conditions of the seasonal workers who left annually for Holland. He wrote:

“All people from my canton who go to Holland own only a small amount of land which doesn’t yield enough to meet rents and duties. They must also choose this secondary work whose advantages, not to underestimate them, are more considerable than any other alternative. Nor is their absence a drawback in the least.

Those who have travelled out are back by St Jacob’s and departure for Holland only takes place after the sowing season. This way workers miss only the hay-making which can be carried out by the family members who remain at home.

Because the Holland-goer takes pork provisions with him – from his own slaughtered pig – he realizes the maximum profit from his production and that is an advantage to the state that should be especially taken into account.

Just so from a statistical point of view it is extremely important that practically every migrant to Holland carries along a piece of linen which on his own, without a middleman, he sells there for the highest possible price.”

The annual journey to Holland yielded some 40 Reichsthalers (or 160 French francs) for the average worker from Diepholz. The former district-head emphasises yet again that it is impossible to think of any other secondary work (“Nebenerwerb”), “which doesn’t interfere with the primary vocation”.

The emphasis he placed on the complementarity of agriculture and migratory labour is striking. Although he does not explicitly mention domestic industry, we know that migrant workers from his canton engaged in such work as well. If they had not indeed themselves woven the linen they took to Holland, they would certainly have spun flax during the winter.

We can visualise the income earned by a migrant worker’s household in Diepholz in 1811 in the form of a circle, and allow segments of the circle to represent the activities of all members of the household during the year (see figure). The tasks carried out on the migrant’s own farm are situated in the central part. This symbolises that such work constitutes the primary work of the household, or, to use the term of the report, the “Haupterwerb”. On the other hand, this manner of portraying the household’s activities would mean that migrant labour, because of its situation in the outer circle, occupies a large area. This spatial attribution can be justified, however, in terms of the comparatively high incomes that such work abroad generated: the 40 Reichsthalers the migrant earned in a quarter of a year away from home represented at least an estimated third of the total annual income of this household.

From scattered data one may draw up a slightly more complicated work cycle, which includes various tasks performed by migrants in succession while away from home. The basic principle, however, remains the same.

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Appendix 2. Work Cycles

Figure 1 Examples of the Work Cycle of Westphalian “Heuerlinge” in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

From: Lucassen, Migrant Labour, 98

Such work cycles could vary according to specific local conditions and to the present stage of household development. In early-nineteenth Westphalia domestic industry was the main alternative to seasonal migratory work outside the region. Slightly over 50 kilometres south-west of Diepholz, in the region of Tecklenburg, different work cycles could be found among the peasant farmers. Those in the villages in the east of this small region (800 square km.) were less numerous, controlled slightly more land and were nearly all home weavers. Moreover, they hardly went to Holland. Those in the western villages were more similar to those in Diepholz.

For other parts of Germany, and in fact for the countryside all over Europe, one could reconstruct such work cycles for the rural proletariat and for the peasants. Crucial everywhere was how to fill the winter segment, because of the lack of agricultural occupations. Besides cottage industry, many other solutions are known, like those of the Irish migrant worker’s households in the nineteenth century, where the husbands went to England in summer to harvest, and all family members were engaged in spinning, fishing and the production of kelp during winter. For many mountain dwellers a temporal stay in the big cities was one of the few possibilities to find work during the long winter season, witness the following quotation from Louis Sébastien Mercier’s Tableau de Paris (1789):

“Already at the age of eight the child follows his father, who, although he wanders throughout France, prefers the capital. Like birds driven by cold to a temperate place, these people flee the snow which covers the mountains for eight months out of the year. Yearly he returns there, makes a child by his wife, leaves her in the hands of the elderly and the parish-priest, and starts to wander again the kingdom without fixed abode”.

As all members participate, some more, some less, in the family work cycle, its actual appearance depends on the composition at the time. Are the father and the mother still alive?
How many children do they have, how many girls and how many boys? What age do they have? Do they still contribute to the income of the household?

If we start from the basic premise that every member of a household was both a consumer and a potential producer immediately after marriage, a household contains as many consumers as producers: two. The ratio of consumers to producers is one. As children are born the ratio changes, climbing by the fourteenth year of marriage to an average of practically two. As soon as the oldest offspring begin to help out, the ratio dips sharply. The (economically) fortunate situation of a ratio of one, however, never returns, in part because the original partners grow older. If we apply this analytic scheme to migrant workers, two situations or periods of time are imaginable when leaving home to find work elsewhere will appear indicated as a way to generate supplementary household income: several years after marriage when the ratio of consumers to producers has increased steadily; and during those years when, given the amount of work that has to be done on a small farm, there are consistently too many producers present. In the former case, the head of the household is likely to leave alone for part of the year. The latter will be especially true when a couple has sons 15 or more years old. The prospect of such a youth’s being able to earn savings for a future marriage can then act as an added inducement for him to seek a job away from home.
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