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Agencies and Clients: Labour Recruitment in Java, 1870s-1950s

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Introduction

This paper discusses the labour recruitment organisations that sent a large number of coolies from Java to the other Indonesian islands and elsewhere. Since the colonial period, overpopulation in Java led to consistent exploitation of the labour force in commercial agriculture and mining in the Indonesian archipelago. In the process a number of different groups participated in recruiting, inspecting, insuring and transporting the immigrant labourers to the newly opened mines and plantations. Part of the labourers' wages was also sent back to their home villages by some of the agents participating in the recruitment. The agents included field recruiters, local bureaucrats, depot masters, physicians, transporters or shipping companies, insurers, remitters or financial agencies, recruiting agencies, clients and mining and agricultural companies. Although several important historical studies on miners and plantation workers in Southeast Asia have already been written, the labour recruitment organisations and their associations remain largely unknown. In this paper we will discuss the recruiting agencies and the mining and agricultural companies first.

Coolie labour in Indonesia, the plantation workers in Sumatra (Stoler: 1985, Breman: 1987), the miners on Bangka island (Mary Somers: 1992), and the miners on Billiton island and western Sumatra (Erwiza: 1995, 2000) have all been studied. ¹ These studies focus not on the migration process but on settlement and social transition. As a result the labour recruitment system has been treated only secondarily. The forced labour during the Japanese occupation placed coolies, or *romushas*, in special wartime circumstances, which led to scholars researching this period to treat it as separate from conditions in the colonial period. ² The studies mentioned above ignored the fact that the same people sometimes performed similar functions in this period. In this paper, therefore, we begin with the 1870s, when Javanese labour migration started and labour

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¹ Stoler L. A., *Capitalism and confrontation in Sumatra's plantation belt, 1870-1979*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1985, Breman, J., *Koelies, planters en koloniale politiek*, Leiden, KITLV Uitgeverij, 1987, Somers Heidhues, M., *Bangka tin and mentok pepper* Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992 Erwiza, *Kesenjangan buruh majikan*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995.

² Gotō, Kenichi, *Nihon senryōki Indonesia kenkyū*, Ryūkei-shosha, 1989, Kurasawa, Aiko, *Nihon senryōka no Jawa nōson no henyō*, Sōshi-sha, 1992, Satō, Shigeru, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, Australia, Allen & Unwin, 1994, Kobayashi Hideo, Rōmudōin Seisaku no Tenkai, *Nanpō kyōeiken*, Taga-shuppan, 1995, Eng, P. van der, *Food supply in Java during war and decolonisation, 1940-1950*, Hull, University of Hull, 1994, Raben, R.,Arbeid voor Groot-Azië: Indische koelies in de Buitengewesten, 1942-1945, *Oorlogsdocumentatie 40-45*, Negende jaarboek.

recruitment began to be institutionalised, and examine the situation up to the 1950s, when those formerly in control no longer played that role, and the Indonesian government reorganised labour recruitment.

We will describe the beginnings of the recruitment and its social background, as well as the development of the recruitment organisations, especially the multinational, multipurpose organisations of south and east Sumatra. We also detail how the Japanese occupation reformed the labour recruitment system.

1. The Beginnings of Recruitment

(1) A Substitute for Chinese Immigrant Labourers

It was only in the 1870s that organised forced emigration from Java began. It started with the Deli district on the east coast of Sumatra, where Dutch planters had set up tobacco plantations in the 1860s. In the early decades the entrepreneurs solved the labour shortage in the underpopulated Sumatran jungle by recruiting Chinese coolies from the Straits Settlements (a British colony), with the help of private recruiting agencies there. Chinese secret societies controlled these agencies and organised the 'coolie trade', taking advantage of their connections in Singapore and Penang, which dated from the middle of the nineteenth century. Labour recruitment networks of overseas Chinese supplied the tin mines in Malaya, Bangka, Billiton (Belitung), and Singkep with cheap labour.³ The commissions paid the Chinese agencies to bring in these labourers to the Straits Settlements were very high. Tobacco planters negotiated with the local Chinese authorities, importing labourers directly from the south of China since 1888. In addition to the labourers from southern China, some were also brought in from Java, although in the beginning these were much fewer. As the rubber plantations spread throughout the east coast of Sumatra in the early twentieth century, more Javanese labourers departed for east Sumatra. Nevertheless, the labour force on the tobacco plantations on the east coast of Sumatra were still mainly comprised of Chinese immigrants – a situation that lasted until the last decade of the colonial period.⁴

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³ Chinese businessmen were ahead of the Europeans in the tin mine exploitation. In Malaya European (British, French, and Australian) companies entered the tin mine business in the 1880s.

Allen, G. C. and A. G. Donnithorne, *Western Enterprises in Indonesia and Malaysia: A study in Economic Development*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1957, pp. 149-150.

⁴ With 'Latakia' (Turkey) and 'Havana' (Cuba), 'Deli' was known for its choice quality tobacco. In 1884

At this time European sugar planters in the Straits Settlements began to think about the potential labour supply in Java, and asked permission from the Netherlands Indies government to recruit labourers from Java beginning in the late 1890s. The Dutch authorities reluctantly allowed some recruitment in Java, even though an 1887 law prohibited the natives from working outside the Netherlands Indies. Chinese labourers were under the control of overseas Chinese organisations that boasted of their strength and solidarity. Thus the European entrepreneurs considered the Javanese, as well as other ethnic groups in Java, as alternatives to the Chinese labourers. A further incentive to consider this alternative was the deterioration of the economic situation in rural areas of Java, which made it difficult for farmers to own enough land to subsist.

After the abolition of slavery in the West (largely completed by the mid-nineteenth century), the main labour force used to exploit natural resources was indentured labour. Replacing the slaves was a great number of contract labourers from the overpopulated areas; they were brought in to work the newly opened mines and plantations. There were three major areas that supplied labour in Southeast Asia: southern China, southern India, and Java. Javanese and Indian immigrants mostly worked on the rubber estates, while Chinese immigrants filled a greater variety of functions, ranging from miners, plantation workers, farmers, and peddlers to entrepreneurs. Considering the dimensions of the emigration, the movement in Southeast Asia, and the variety of occupations, Chinese migration was remarkable. Though the Chinese courts officially prohibited emigration until 1860, for some time famines and demographic pressures had caused poor farmers in southern China, especially in the Fujian and Guangdong provinces, to immigrate to Southeast Asia and elsewhere. As soon as the Ch'ing dynasty abandoned this policy in the Treaty of Peking, significant emigration began in earnest, and the 'coolie trade' of the Chinese secret societies became rampant. The main destination of

Deli exceeded Java in the production of tobacco, but its popularity had declined as the habit of smoking had spread widely among the common people.

⁵ As early examples, 500 labourers were requested for the railway construction in 1889, and 780 labourers for a sugar estate in Pekang.

^{&#}x27;Betreft emigratie van Javaansche arbeiders naar de Straits Settlements', Inv. nr. 305, 10 April 1905, no. 43, Ministerie van Koloniën, [ARA (Algemeen Rijksarchief)/ The Hague].

⁶ Individual Malayan planters began actively to recruit Javanese labourers in 1902, and after 1902 they received permission to import a large number of labourers.

Craig, A.L., The Javanese as Emigrant: Observation on the Development of Javanese Settlements Overseas, *Indonesia*, no. 11, April 1971, pp. 48, 52.

⁷ Fukuda, Shōzō, *Sweat and Abacus: Economic Roles of Southeast Asian Chinese on the Eve of World Warll*, Singapore, Select Books, 1995 (English edition), pp. 20-22.

the Chinese was Singapore. For example, a British government report indicates that 6.2 million Chinese had arrived in British Malaya during the 30 years from 1911 to 1940.⁸

The British colonial government declared the Chinese secret societies illegal in 1890. In contrast to the rapid dissolution of secret societies following 1890, the *taukeh* class of rich merchants and businessmen who financed the secret societies (i.e., import traders, shopkeepers, and managers of tin-mines and plantations) were unassailable. The labour recruitment organisations supported by the Chinese secret societies survived by shifting their focus to legal methods. The Chinese labour recruitment system took advantage of the slave trade, but it had another side. The Chinese societies looked after their fellow countrymen not only by obtaining employment for them, but also in taking care of the remittances to their families. To counter the Chinese networks, British and Dutch colonial authorities, as well as other European entrepreneurs, looked for new options for their labour force. They turned to the native peoples within their colonies, such as Indians and Javanese, who seemed to be easy to recruit and manage. The Western recruiting business was developed in response to this demand.

(2) The Emergence of European Agencies

Some Western recruiting agencies appeared in the late nineteenth century in Medan, an area that was developing in east Sumatra. Western traders and commission merchants operated these agencies. For example, there was the Indrapoera Trading Company, a trading house in Deli district that managed the A. Siemssen & Co. agency. This agency placed advertisements to recruit coolies in a Dutch newspaper, *Deli Courant*. The immigration office of J.C. De Jongh was an extension of a trading house in Batavia (Jakarta), and its representative in Medan, Mr. Herman A. Lefebre, was a commission merchant. At the turn of the century two larger agencies emerged: the Emigration, Sale and Commission Office in Surabaya (east Java) and in Bandung (west Java), which was established in 1900 with a capital of 150,000 guilders, and the Soesman's

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⁸ Parmer, J. N., Colonial Labour Policy and Administration: A History of Labour in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya, 1910-1940, New York, Augustin, 1960, appendices, table 2 Chinese arrivals and departures, 1911-40 (includes male and female adults and minors), p. 271.

⁹ Shiraishi, Takashi, Kamin-goeisho no setsuritsu to kaitō: 19 seiki Shingapōru kakyō-shakai no seijiteki-henka, *Ajia Kenkyū*, no. 22-2, 1975, p.76.

¹⁰ Sugihara, Kaoru, *Ajiakanbōeki no keisei to kōzō*, Minerva-shobō, 1996, p. 309.

¹¹ Breman, J., *op.cit.*, pp. 234, 269-278, 294. (See advertisements)

Handboek voor cultuur-en handels ondernemingen in Nederlandsch Indië, 1888-1940, De Bussy, Amsterdam.

Emigration, Sale and Commission Office in Semarang (central Java), established in 1898 with a capital of 300,000 guilders. ¹² Soesman dealt in auctions, commission sales, second-hand furniture, and harnesses and horses, as well as arranging labour contracts among companies outside Java and potential emigrants in Java.

The rapid growth of the automobile industry in the United States in the early twentieth century made rubber an essential raw material. Stimulated by high market prices for rubber in 1910 and 1911, rubber plantations rapidly spread on both sides of the Strait of Malacca, western Malaya, and eastern Sumatra. Although the production of natural rubber from Brazil was declining, the output of cultivated rubber from Malaya and Sumatra was increasing. As a result both these areas became the centres of rubber production in the world. To produce this rubber, European entrepreneurs and colonial governments promoted emigration from India and Java. Indian labourers were committed to the rubber plantations in British Malaya. Most Javanese labourers were committed to the rubber plantations on the east coast of Sumatra, but some were also sent to the rubber estates in Malaya at the request of British planters there.

Two private agencies were established when labour recruitment in Java became important: the Anglo-Dutch Labour Bureau, Ltd. in Batavia (1907) and the Emigration Bureau A. F. Hillebrand in Batavia (1911). Each of these companies started with a capital of 50,000 guilders. Campbell MacColl & Co., a trading firm in Batavia, operated the Anglo-Dutch Labour Bureau. One of this agency's commissioners was F.J.H. Soesman, the president commissioner of Soesman's Emigration, Sales and Commission Office. This illustrates the close relationship among the private agencies. The Hillebrand Bureau was also known under another name: A.P.M. Macht, the name of the director of the agency. These two, MacColl and Hillebrand, were finally taken over by the labour recruitment organisations of the planters' associations in 1930. For enterprises planning to start doing business in the Indonesian archipelago, MacColl and Hillebrand were the most reliable labour recruiting agencies. ¹³

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¹² Ibid.

¹³ According to a letter from Mikinosuke Matsumoto, the Japanese counsel in Batavia, to Shinpei Gotō, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (13 May 1918), it cost 130 guilders (a man) and 135 guilders (a woman) plus 15 guilders per capita as travel costs if the coolie brokers in Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya were involved. He named Hellebrand and MacColl as reliable coolie brokers. *Jawa keiyaku kūli Eiryō Boruneo yusō no ken*, Rōdōsha Kankei Zakken 3-7-2-1 [the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Tokyo].

(3) The Entrance of the Planters' Association in Labour Recruitment

In 1910 a union of the tobacco planters in east Sumatra, the DPV (Deli Planters' Association, or *Deli Planters Vereniging*) was the first such organisation to recruit labour. The DPV dispatched twenty laukehs (or old countrymen) to their home villages in Java, and *laukeh* recruiters persuaded their fellow countrymen to work for a specified period, usually 3 years, in east Sumatra. 14 They brought the villagers as *sinkehs*, or newcomers, to the tobacco estates in east Sumatra. One purpose of the Recruiting Ordinance promulgated by the Dutch colonial government the previous year was to restrict the self-serving recruiting activities. The planters' associations were no longer allowed to recruit labour by themselves. The DPV entrusted the recruitment to a private agency, the Soesman Office, with its *laukeh* recruiters. As *laukeh* recruiters gained ten guilders per capita as a premium, they were understandably eager to recruit labourers. Later the recruiter's premium was banned in an effort to stop the threats, swindling, and abuse in the labour recruitment. Many village heads cooperated with *laukeh* recruiters. They confirmed agreements with the applicants' families and earned one guilder per capita by providing their recommendation. ¹⁵ This recruiting method helped keep up the 'quality' of labourers, because villagers that had been ostracised by the village community were seldom selected. Following the agreement, the emigrants were transported to an inland depot and then to a harbour depot in Semarang. They waited there for a steamship of the KPM (Royal Shipping Company, Koninklijk Paketvaart *Maatschappij*) to embark for east Sumatra. 16

Rubber planters in east Sumatra set up the AVROS (General Rubber Planters' Association on the east Coast of Sumatra, Algemene Vereniging van Rubberplanter ter Oostkust van Sumatra) in 1910. Two years later they established the JIB (Java Immigrants Bureau of the AVROS, Java Immigranten Bureau der AVROS) as an immigrant reception bureau in Medan. The DPV members were mostly Dutch

¹⁴ Chinese words, *laukeh* (oldcomer or old countryman) and *sinkeh* (newcomer), were widely used in the

plantations.

15 Engelen, E. H. M., Van beroepswerving tot vrije werving: Achteruitgang, stilstand of verbetering?; De balangen van Westerse planters en Javaanse koelies bij de werving op Java voor ondernemingen in Buitengewesten tussen ±1940 –1940, MA thesis, Leiden University, pp. 17, 31-32.

¹⁶ With the introduction of steamships in the 1870s, passenger traffic became a profitable business. English and German shipping companies were rivals in the early days. The DPV requested a German company, the Norddeutscher Lloyd, to transport Chinese coolies from southern China to east Sumatra. As German shipping companies withdrew from Southeast Asia after the First World War, a Dutch national company, the KPM, established in 1888, monopolised passenger traffic from China and Java to the Netherlands Indies.

enterprises, while the AVROS consisted of not only Dutch but also American, British, German, and French-Belgian enterprises, thanks to the 'Open Door Policy' of the Dutch colonial government. Two planters' associations, the DPV and the AVROS in east Sumatra, formed a lobby and had significant influence on the labour policies of the colonial government.

The Recruiting Ordinance of 1915 allowed the planters' associations for the first time to recruit labour in their hands. In the following year a labour recruitment agency, the ADEK (General Deli Emigration Bureau, *Algemeen Delisch Emigratie Kantoor*), was established in Bandung in partnership with the DPV and the AVROS. This agency opened offices to conduct business, and to accommodate emigrants, located the depots in three port cities of Java, Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya, and in the hinterland.

Coffee, tea, rubber, and cinchona planters in southern Sumatra, following the example of the east Sumatran planters, established their union: the Zusuma (South Sumatra Agricultural and Industrial Association, *Zuid-Sumatra Landbouw- en Nijverheidsvereniging*) in Lampong, a city in southern Sumatra, and started labour recruitment in Jogyakarta in 1916. The Zusuma employed agents in Java, and dispatched *laukeh* recruiters as well as the DPV to east Sumatra. During the second half of the 1910s, there was serious competition to collect Javanese labourers among the private agencies and the planters' associations, the DPV, the AVROS and the Zusuma.

Private agencies used professional recruiters, with Javanese assistants engaging in direct labour recruitment in villages. The recruiters were very ambitious, because private agencies paid them 40 to 50 guilders per labourer as a premium. At a depot used to house the emigrants, one depot master earned 20 guilders per capita.¹⁷ It took years before the entrepreneurs' own labour recruitment organisations fully functioned, and in the early years, they had to depend on private agencies for labour recruitment.

When market prices for rubber reached a record high during the first half of the 1910s, the demand for labour force to work in the rubber plantations increased, and the commission paid to private agencies also increased. One rate was raised to 165 guilders per capita in 1913. To help Japanese entrepreneurs make inroads in the agricultural business of Indonesia, the Japanese authorities provided a rough estimate in 1918, when

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¹⁷ Engelen, E. H. M., *op.cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁸ Taishō 4 nen (1915), 'Jawa jijō' kaitei-zōho, gedai 'Ranryō Higashi Indo', Chapter 22. Kakkoku jijō kankei zassan, Ranryō Higashi Indo, 1-6-3-17-4 [the Diplomatic Archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs/Tokyo].

they were eager to exploit Sumatra. According to this estimate, a Japanese agricultural company needed 378,238 guilders for first-year operating expenses if the company had a lease of 1,000 *bau* (1,750 acres) to establish a rubber plantation in east Sumatra. The labour recruitment cost was 62,000 guilders, based on the assumption that the company could obtain 500 Javanese contract coolies through a private agency (125 guilders per capita). This must have been the easiest way to acquire labourers through private agencies for a company that had a late start, even if it had to pay high commission fees. Virginia Thompson states that even if labour was in great demand, employers increased the commission paid to recruiting agencies rather than offer higher wages to labourers.²⁰

The planters' associations, supported by large banks, trading firms and rubberproducers, gradually expelled the smaller private agencies from the labour recruitment sector. In east Sumatra the private agencies' share dropped to only 10% of the total recruited labourers in 1917.²¹ The competition between the planters' associations and private agencies was not over, however. For example, there were 42,500 Javanese labourers under contract with the agricultural companies of east Sumatra in 1919; of these, the ADEK had 35,959, laukeh recruiters of the DPV collected 2,037, and private agencies undertook arrangements for only 4,504. In contrast, of the 29,588 Javanese labourers recruited for plantations and mines outside of east Sumatra, 20,060 labourers, or nearly 70%, were employed through private agencies. Private agencies shifted their primary scope from east to south Sumatra, other islands of the Indonesian archipelago (the 'Outer Islands' of the Netherlands Indies), and elsewhere. The following year private agencies still retained a 60% share of the transactions for 26,666 immigrant labourers in regions other than east Sumatra (16,286 labourers). From then on, however, they were gradually edged out of their share by the planters' associations.²² Though MacColl and Hillebrand survived to the end, and the latter undertook arrangements for more than 9,000 Javanese labourers even in 1929, they were finally taken over by the

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¹⁹ Taiwan Sōtoku-fu, (Minami-shina oyobi Nanyō chōsa, no. 28), *Sumatora higashi-kaigan jijō*, 1919, pp.54-58.

²⁶ Thompson, V., Labour Problems in Southeast Asia, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947, p. 122.

²¹ Langeveld, H. J., Arbeidstoestanden op de ondernemingen ter Oostkust van Sumatra tussen 1920 en 1940 in het licht van het verdwijnen van de poenale sanctie op de arbeidscontracten, MA thesis, Leiden University, 1975, p. 16.

²² Jaarverslagen van het Algemeen Delisch Emigratie Kantoor, 1919-1931, Inv. nr. 338, de archieven van de N. V. Deli Maatschappij [ARA/The Hague]. Verslagen van den Dienst der Arbeidsinspectie, 1913-1939 [KITLV (Koninkrijk Instituut voor taal-, land-, en volkenkunde)/Leiden]. (By the author's calculation)

ADEK and the Zusuma in 1930. The competition between private agencies and the planters led to more organised labour recruitment.

2. The Development of Labour Recruitment by the Integration of Enterprises

(1) The Organisations of the Planters and Clients

Since 1918 the number of labourers required in east Sumatra declined in comparison with other regions of the Outer Islands: south Sumatra and southeast Borneo (Kalimantan) became the emerging centres of production.²³ Not only did the ADEK begin to obtain various clients -from agricultural enterprises to mining and industrial enterprises - but the regions covered by the ADEK also expanded beyond east Sumatra during the 1920s. This organisation gradually drove out the private agencies. Various enterprises and the local governments had been enrolled in the ADEK as external members so they could acquire labourers with the help of the ADEK. For example, the government of Surinam, the Netherlands Indies Portland Cement Company in Padang (west Sumatra), the Kinandam Sumatra Mining Company in Padang, the Dutch government coal mines in Ombilin in Sawah Lunto (west Sumatra), and Bukit Asam in Palembang (south Sumatra), and the Pulu Laut coal mine (southeast Borneo) became external members by 1921. The Netherlands Indies Development Company (southeast Borneo), a subsidiary of a Japanese national enterprise, the East Development Company, was enrolled in 1923. The Dutch government tin mine in Bangka and the Singkep tin mine became members in 1926. The Nomura East Indies Farming Company (southeast Borneo), a subsidiary of a Japanese zaibatsu financial combine, joined in1929. The government of British North Borneo enrolled in the ADEK in 1931.²⁴ In 1919 the ADEK undertook arrangements for only 558 labourers for external members. Several years later it was making arrangements for 10,000 labourers, which lasted until the Depression. (See table 1.)

After entering into an agreement with an agent of Jogyakarta in 1916, the Zusuma began to engage in labour recruitment. The number of labourers recruited by the Zusuma went from 2,339 in 1917 to 16,048 in 1929. The Zusuma also tried to increase

²³ Houben, V. J. H., Labour conditions on Western firms in colonial Indonesia: Outline of an approach, *Jahrbuch Für Wirtschafts Geschichte*, 1995/1, p. 95.

²⁴ Jaarverslagen van het Algemeen Delisch Emigratie Kantoor (ADEK), 1919-31, Inv. nr. 338 [ARA/The Hague].

its membership in south and west Sumatra. As an external member of the ADEK, the Netherlands Indies Land Syndicate, which operated coffee and cocoa plantations in Bengkulu, had been provided with coolies by the ADEK. Later this company switched to Zusuma. By the late 1920s, 57 out of 64 agricultural enterprises operating coffee, tea, rubber, or cinchona plantations and other commercial crops in south Sumatra had joined the Zusuma. The head office of the ADEK was located in Bandung, while the Zusuma located its head office in Batavia. Both opened still more offices and depots in Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya. For example, the number of inland depots of the Zusuma increased from 14 in 1927 to 46 in 1929.

(2) The Stimulation of 'Free Emigration'

In 1928 a new recruiting agency, the VEDA (Free Emigration of DPV and AVROS, *Vrije Emigratie van DPV en AVROS*), was established to prompt 'free emigration'. To begin with, we should explain what was meant by 'free labourer' and 'free emigration', as well as the social background of this organisation.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the miserable life endured by native peoples in the Netherlands Indies was brought to light in the Netherlands. The government published the 'Ethical Policy', requiring the colonial bureaucracies and planters to improve labour conditions and develop a better labour system.

The regulation in effect at that time, the Coolie Ordinance of 1880, was first applied to east Sumatra and later to the other regions of the Outer Islands. It had been amended several times, but the essence of the Coolie Ordinance - the application of the penal code to a breach of labour contract - had never changed. Contract labourers were lured with an advance payment and a labour contract with penal sanctions. In the Netherlands Indies a labour contract was usually for three years. Many contract labourers were unable to pay back the advance in three years, and in some cases the debts kept mounting because of addiction to opium and gambling, which were prevalent among the coolies. This accumulated debt often resulted in re-engagement as a coolie for another contract term. Such a contract labour system angered public opinion in the Netherlands. The British colonial government, which promulgated a similar labour code before the Dutch law, abolished the indentured labour system for Indian immigrants in 1910 and

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²⁵ Hoedt, T. G. H., *Indische bergcultuurondernemingen voornamelijk in Zuid- Sumatra: Gegevens en beschouwingen*, Wageningen, Veenman, 1930, pp. 105-108.

for Chinese immigrants in 1914.²⁶ In the Netherlands Indies, on the other hand, the labour contract with penal sanctions legally survived until 1941, although it had been the subject of heated debate for some time. In general, the planters and agricultural enterprises in the Netherlands Indies had a stronger influence on the labour policy of the colonial government.

A law passed in 1911 instituted a new labour category 'losse arbeider' or free labourer. This group was comprised of some Javanese immigrants who had settled in the neighbourhood of the plantations after their labour contracts expired, as well as native Sumatrans (Malays and Bataks) who worked as seasonal labourers for European planters.²⁷ By entering into a short-term labour contract without penal sanctions with a planter, they were classified as free labourers rather than contract labourers. From this beginning the colonial authorities drew up a plan to improve labour conditions by gradually changing over from contact labourers to free labourers. In fact it was only before 1932 that the main labour force of the Outer Islands was comprised of contract labourers bound by penal sanctions.²⁸

The Free Recruiting Ordinance in 1921 and the subsequent Modification of the Recruiting Ordinance in 1927 relaxed the restriction on recruiting activities. Before embarking on a voyage, it had been obligatory for emigrants to undergo a physical examination; they were also fingerprinted in the presence of the officials. The new laws rescinded these obligations, making labour recruitment almost free from government supervision. The management or the planters' associations and their recruitment organisations obtained a free hand to recruit labour. The labourer also received several benefits from the new regulations. Emigrants could select a company and enter into an employment contract after arrival, travel free of charge from Java to the Outer Islands, and return to Java if they were not satisfied with labour conditions.²⁹

In 1928 the VEDA was established in Semarang to promote free emigration. This agency supplanted the *laukeh* recruitment of the DPV, because the *laukeh* recruitment had been based on links between *laukehs* and *sinkehs* in the same village, and it was

²⁶ Gamba, C., *Labour law in Malaya*, Singapore, Moore, 1957, p. 7.

²⁷ Javaansche ondernemingsarbeiders in de Buitengewesten, *Kolonial Tijdschrift*, 1931, p.407.

²⁸ The numbers of contract labourers and free labourers in the Netherlands Indies changed from 203,366 and 156,267 (1931) to 54,103 and 209,355 (1932).

Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia, Batavia z.j., 1947, p. 65.

²⁹ Engelen, E. H. M., *op.cit..*, pp. 29-35.

similar to free emigration. As previously mentioned, the port city of Semarang had been a stronghold of DPV labour recruitment and of a private agency, Soesman. It was thought that the VEDA would supersede the labour recruitment networks of the DPV and Soesman. 'Free emigration' is unrelated to 'free labourers'. Most labour contracts arranged by the VEDA were for two years and carried penal sanctions, although there were some contracts without penal sanctions. For the first few years the VEDA was not active, relying on *laukeh* recruiters. When the VEDA was established, the world was experiencing a major depression. In the Netherlands Indies the number of repatriates exceeded that of new arrivals because of the depression. This trend continued until 1934, during which time a large number of labourers were forced to return to Java. In the period of the economic slowdown, it became unprofitable for employers to enter into a two- or three-year contract with labourers. The depression led to sudden replacement of the contract labourers in the Outer Islands by free labourers. Finally, the number of free labourers exceeded contract labourers in 1932. When the depression was over the VEDA started recruitment in earnest.

The Ōkura Plantation Company, a subsidiary of *Ōkura zaibatsu*, started operating rubber, oil palm, coffee, and coconut plantations in east Sumatra in the middle of the depression. After leasing 20,779 *hectares* in Bengkalis, the company cleared the forest and completed planting in three years (by 1933). It began operating with a labour force of more than 200 Chinese labourers, led by two Chinese *mandurs*, or foremen, and some 350 Javanese free labourers and local people, led by five *mandurs*. Ōkura did not ask the AVROS for the Javanese contract labourers, partly because the planters' association would have required a considerable amount of money up front. Besides, its business report states that Javanese free labourers were easily available in east Sumatra in those days.³² This shows that without the help of the planters' association it was possible to acquire labour from Chinese immigrants, local people, and Javanese settlers in Sumatra.

Throughout the period of the depression the entrepreneurs in the Netherlands Indies

³⁰ 'De wervingssystemen en het immigratievraagstuk', *Nieuwe Rotterdam Courant*, 24 Dec. 1929, Het Archief van Sneevliet [IISG (Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis)/Amsterdam].

³¹ Jaarverslagen van de Vrije Emigratie van DPV en AVROS (VEDA), 1928-1938, Inv. nr. 341, de archieven van de N. V. Deli Maatschappij [ARA/The Hague], L2053 [KIT (Koninkrijk Instituut voor de Tropen)/Amsterdam].

³² 'Ōkura Sumatora Nōjō gaikan', Ōkura Sumatora Nōjō sengo hikitsugi shorui (2), 78-3 (the South) 16-2, Ōkura Zaibatsu Archives [Tokyo Keizai University/Tokyo].

were required to take some new measures. They tried to form an organisation and unite against changing circumstances.

(3) The Reorganisation of the Planters' Associations

Major alliances of agricultural enterprises formed by the late 1920s. These included: in Java; the ALS (General Agriculture Syndicate, *Algemeen Landbouw Syndicaat*), covering 735 estates of rubber, tea, coffee, cacao, and cinchona.; the VJSP (Integrated Java Sugar Producers, *Verenigde Java Suikerproducenten*); the ASSF (General Syndicate of Sugar Factory Owners, *Algemeen Syndicaat van Suikerfabrikanten*); and the JSWB (Java Sugar Employers' Bond, *Java Suiker Werkgevers Bond*). In Sumatra; the AVROS (General Rubber Planters' Association on the east coast of Sumatra, *Algemene Vereniging Rubberplanters ter Oostkust van Sumatra*), covering about 300 estates, and the DPV (Deli Planters' Association, *Deli Planters Vereniging*), covering about 100 estates.³³ In the late 1920s, a new association, the ZWSS (South and West Sumatra Syndicate, *Zuid-West Sumatra Syndicaat*), was under consideration. The ZWSS of Sumatra was close to the ALS of Java because the ALS's members were expanding their businesses to Sumatra.³⁴

While the Zusuma was being liquidated, the ZWSS was established in 1931 to absorb the former members of the Zusuma. The representatives of the enterprises conducting business in south and west Sumatra managed the board of the ZWSS. Among them was one of the largest of the five Dutch trading firms 'Internatio' (International Credit and Trading Association 'Rotterdam', Internationale Credit- en Handelsvereniging, 'Rotterdam'), an agricultural bank financing plantations, the HVA (Trading Association 'Amsterdam', Handels Vereniging 'Amsterdam'), the trading firm of Erdmann & Sielcken, a Shell Group affiliate, and the BPM (Batavian Petroleum Company, Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij). 35 As a matter of course the labour recruitment of the Zusuma was replaced by the ZWSS.

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³³ Memorandum on the work and organization of the ALS and its experimental stations, ca. 1926.

³⁴ Verslag over het eerste vereenigingsjaar van het ALS en de Bonden van eigenaren van Nederlandsch-Indische rubber-, koffie (& cacao-), Thee- en kina-ondernemingen, 1 Jan. 1927 to Dec. 1929, p. 17, L2126 [KIT/Amsterdam].

³⁵ Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen, 1933, p. 31, L2126 [KIT/Amsterdam].

The VEDA of east Sumatra and the ZWSS of south and west Sumatra shared labour recruitment in Java during the 1930s. The ADEK, which played an active part in the 1920s, lost in importance as the number of free labourers increased. Both the ADEK and the VEDA were recruitment organisations established by the two planters' associations of east Sumatra, the DPV and the AVROS, but their client base was somewhat different. In the course of its competition with private agencies, the ADEK succeeded in obtaining various clients from the agricultural, mining, and industrial sectors. The VEDA, however, dealt exclusively with the old agricultural members of the DPV and the AVROS. Its clients were four major Dutch tobacco companies, the Deli Company, the Deli Batavia Company, the Tobacco Company 'Arendsburg', and the Senembah Company, as well as large Western rubber companies like the HAPM (Holland American Plantation Company, Hollandsch Amerikaansche Plantage Maatschappij), the Goodyear Rubber Plantation Company, the Rubber Culture Company 'Amsterdam', the HVA (Trading Association 'Amsterdam', Handels Vereniging 'Amsterdam'), and others.

In the beginning (1912) the AVROS organised an immigrant reception bureau named the JIB (Java Immigrants Bureau, *Java Immigranten Bureau*) in Medan. In the first half of the 1930s, the JIB functioned partly as a recruiting agency, providing the external members of the AVROS with 3,790 labourers. Within the AVROS three organisations took charge of immigrant labourers up to the middle of the 1930s: the JIB (1912-), the ADEK (1916-), and the VEDA (1928-), and the same person often held the leadership posts in all three organisations. The members of the AVROS obtained contract labourers through the ADEK in the 1920s and free labourers through the VEDA in the 1930s. The planters' association managed to keep up with the trend of the colonial government.

The ZWSS concluded fewer labour contracts than the VEDA, but it had a large membership, whereas the VEDA's membership was decreasing.³⁷ From 1933 to 1940 the ZWSS agricultural membership increased from 48 to 218, and mining and industrial

³⁶ Verslag van het Java Immigranten Bureau der AVROS, 1919-1935, pp. 5-6 (1 juli. 1932/30 juni. 1933), pp. 5-6 (1 juli 1933/30 juni 1934), pp. 4-5 (1 juli 1934/30 juni 1935), p. 4 (1 juli-31 dec. 1935), L2052 [KIT/Amsterdam].

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³⁷ The membership of the VEDA decreased from 204 in 1930 to 153 in 1935. After the Modification of the Recruiting Ordinance in 1936, the VEDA was asked to recruit labour not only for members but also for non-members.

Verslag van het Vrije Emigratie van DPV en AVROS (VEDA), 1928-1938.

membership increased from 9 to 29.³⁸ With the Modification of the Recruiting Ordinance in 1936 and an economic recovery in the latter half of the 1930s, the ZWSS became an even more important organisation. This regulation returned labour recruitment to the supervision of the colonial government, and more than 12,000 contract labourers were recruited in 1937.³⁹ The government once again granted the VEDA and ZWSS permission to recruit labour in Java, and allotted them this region. The VEDA was asked to supply Javanese labourers to both members and non-members in east Sumatra, Aceh, and Tapanuli (east and north Sumatra). The ZWSS was requested to fill the labour requirements of the companies in south Sumatra, west Sumatra, other islands of the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies, and elsewhere.⁴⁰ In 1937 the VEDA recruited 77,579 Javanese labourers for the companies in east and north Sumatra, while the ZWSS provided 20,002 Javanese labourers for the companies in south and west Sumatra, Borneo (Kalimantan), Celebes (Selawesi), Riau, Ceram (Seram), and the French colony of New Caledonia.⁴¹

(4) Labour Recruitment by the ZWSS

The ZWSS deserves special attention. Labour recruitment by the ZWSS offered a variety of jobs in oil fields. Unlike plantations and mines, oil fields required somewhat more skilled labour. This need led an oil company like the BPM to recruit labourers independently from a labour recruitment organisation like the ADEK, and it helped other oil companies to supply labourers. Although the BPM became an external member of the AVROS in the early 1920s, it recruited a labour force in its own way. With the establishment of the ZWSS, the BPM was represented on the board of the ZWSS. Since the ZWSS developed close ties to the oil industry, it was required to meet demands for semi-skilled labour as well as for manual labour.

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³⁸ Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen, 1933-1940.

³⁹ Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia, 1947, p.66.

⁴⁰ The ZWSS, no. Z1208, Onderwerp: Wervingsvergunning (Batavia 27 November 1936), Artikel uit 'Java Bode' (29 October 1936), Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague]. ⁴¹ Verslag van het Vrije Emigratie van DPV en AVROS (VEDA), 1928-1938.

Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen, 1933-1940.

⁴² Notulen: Algemeen Vergadering der AVROS, 4 January 1836 (83ste), L2118 [KIT/Amsterdam].

One of the ZWSS's tasks was to recruit entertainers, a ronggeng, or dancer, and a panjaks, or gamelan musician, especially for the mining companies. In 1937 it supplied the Bukit Asam coal mine in Palembang with 835 single men, 27 families, and 4 dancers, the Ombilin coal mine in Sawah Lunto with 831 single men, 143 families, and 9 dancers, the Rejang Lebong gold and silver mines in Bengkulu with 13 dancers and 8 gamelan musicians, and the Simau gold and silver mines in Bengkulu with 160 single men. 12 dancers, and 4 gamelan musicians. 43 With Javanese villagers going to Sumatra as miners, traditional Javanese performers also went to the mines of Sumatra.

In 1938 Ransiki, a Dutch government enterprise in Manokwari (New Guinea), asked the ZWSS to recruit woodcutters. It was not easy to find woodcutters, because people who practised this profession could only be found in a certain area of Java. To meet the demand for woodcutters, the ZWSS opened a branch in Wonosobo (Central Java) in 1934. 44 The ZWSS managed to send the company 35 labourers in December of that year and about 100 labourers the following year. 45 In 1939 the ZWSS sent 300 labourers to work on road construction in Palembang at the request of the BPM, and began to recruit workers who could bore in the same year. 46 The ZWSS tried to recruit woodcutters, navies, nurses, performers, and even native teachers as well as plantation coolies and miners.47

The ZWSS also included multinational enterprises. Because it had been established in close alliance with the ALS of Java, Western and Asian enterprises conducting business in Java became involved in the formation of the ZWSS. From the early years of the twentieth century, a class of Dutch-educated Chinese business elite had emerged in the Netherlands Indies. The Chinese Agricultural Association joined the ALS in 1933. 48 and there were major Chinese planters and trading firms in Java, 49 especially those in west

⁴³ The ZWSS, no. A3221, Onderwerp: Rekening en verantwoording 1937 van de Eigen Werving (Batavia, 12 September 1938), Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

⁴⁴ Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen,

⁴⁵ Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen,

⁴⁶ Bericht aan de leden: ALS en ZWSS, no.23 (1939), p.70, L1755 [KIT/Amsterdam].

⁴⁷ Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen, 1940, p. 130.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 1933, p. 31.

⁴⁹ Among the members of the ALS were major Chinese firms, N. V. Cultuur & Handel Maatschappij Tan Wie Siong that owned rubber plantations in west Java, and N. V. Handel Maatschappij Sioe Liem Kongsie

Java where the Chinese elite owned large private land tracts (*particuliere landerijen*), as well as Chinese entrepreneurs in the Outer Islands who took part in the integration of agricultural enterprises. Chinese names began to appear on the boards of Western business associations. Tan Yam Hok, a rubber plantation owner in west Java, played a role in the Association of Owners of Rubber Enterprises in the Netherlands Indies, a subordinate organisation of the ALS, and Tan Eng Djin, a tea plantation owner in west Java, was seen on the Commission of Advice Concerning Tea Restriction. ⁵⁰ It is unlikely that Chinese enterprises were aided by the ZWSS to obtain labourers, but the Chinese and European entrepreneurs did join forces aimed at business integration, including labour recruitment.

The major clients of the ZWSS were the Dutch government mines, Bukit Asam and Ombilin, and the European agricultural companies of south and west Sumatra. Beyond Sumatra, the Nomura East Indies Farming Company (southeast Borneo), a Japanese company that managed large rubber estates in Borneo, was the biggest client. Nomura's oil palm and coffee estates in Aceh (north Sumatra) were provided with labourers by the VEDA. Since Nomura began its plantations as part of the Netherlands East Indies after the First World War, it had been closely associated with European organisations.

By the time the Japanese military invaded, the ZWSS had developed into an organisation that would undertake arrangements for any enterprise in the Indonesian archipelago that needed Javanese labourers. In 1937 one Japanese company, the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, contacted the ZWSS through the Japanese consul to request Javanese labourers for its new cotton business in Dutch New Guinea. ⁵² In the late 1930s Japan was very interested in growing cotton in Southeast Asia. One Japanese

that owned coffee and cocoa plantations in Malang (east Java).

Twang Peck Yang, *The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence, 1940-1950*, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 42.

According to Ledenlijst van het Algemeen Landbouw Syndicaat en het Zuid-en West Sumatra Syndicaat (1938) [KITLV/Leiden], Tan Yam Hok was a representative of seven agricultural companies (rubber plantations) in west Java. Tan Eng Dijn was a representative of N. V. Cultuur Maatschappij Paranggong (tea plantations) in Bogor.

51 In 1937, 77,579 labourers were recruited by the ADEK and 20,002 labourers by the ZWSS. In the same

⁵¹ In 1937, 77,579 labourers were recruited by the ADEK and 20,002 labourers by the ZWSS. In the same year Bukit Asam and Ombilin received 866 and 983 labourers, respectively. They were the top two recruitment organisations with the most liabilities to the ZWSS.

The ZWSS, no. A3221, Onderwerp: Rekening en verantwoording 1937 van de Eigen Werving (Batavia, 12 September 1938), Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

From mailbrief A. 153/M.2, dd. 19 Januari 1937, Van ALS aan Federatie (received 27 January 1937), Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

national enterprise, the South Seas Development Company, transferred its specialization from coconut to cotton in Manokwari (New Guinea). This state company, which later monopolised development and trade in food and clothing in New Guinea, New Britain, the Moluccas, Celebes (Sulawesi) and the Sundas during the occupation, had already joined in the ZWSS.

The ZWSS also received orders from enterprises abroad. When the ZWSS started, Javanese labourers were inclined to return to Java from 'foreign' countries rather than work outside of Java for a more extended period. Between 1930 and 1940 Javanese labourers returning from Surinam and British and French colonies numbered 19,947, while only 9,079 left Java. Of those leaving Java, 86% went to New Caledonia, a French colony where the plantations and nickel mines needed immigrant labourers from the beginning of the twentieth century. From the outset, the ZWSS maintained a close relationship with the government of New Caledonia and sent off nearly 8,000 Javanese mostly to work as contract labourers between 1933 and 1939.⁵³ Emigration to Surinam started in the late nineteenth century, after negotiations with both colonial governments. During the 1920s Javanese labourers leaving for Surinam were handled exclusively by the ADEK. From the time the government of Surinam became an external member of the ADEK, it received 11,036 immigrant labourers from Java (1921-1929).⁵⁴ Emigration stopped after 1930 because of the depression. In the spring of 1939 the government of Surinam became an official affiliate of the ZWSS as a foreign member, and it received Javanese labourers from Sukabumi in Buitenzorg (Bogor) Province for the first time in ten years. 55 The first time the ZWSS sent workers to a British colony was in 1938, at the request of an oil palm plantation in Johore (British Malaya). They sent 40 labourers in response.⁵⁶

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⁵⁶ Bericht aan de leden: ALS en ZWSS, no.21 (1938), L1755 [KIT/Amsterdam].

⁵³ Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia, 1947, p.67. According to the reports of the ZWSS, 808 (1933), 1,037 (1934), 286 (1935), 716 (1936), 1463 (1937), 2,272 (1938) and 265 (1940) laborers had been brought to New Caledonia through the help of the ZWSS.

⁵⁴ Jaarverslagen van het Algemeen Delisch Emigratie Kantoor (ADEK), 1919-31, Inv. nr. 338 [ARA/The Hague].

⁵⁵ From mailbrief A. 1054/M. 18, dd. 28 April 1939, Van ALS aan Federatie (received 5 May 1939), Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

(5) Labour Control by the Entrepreneurs and the State

The entrepreneurs worked with one another to control labour through an integration process. Although workers were no longer required to be fingerprinted (according to a law passed in 1927), the Zusuma established the Fingerprint Bureau in Semarang in 1928 to eliminate any 'undesirable elements' among the emigrants. Moreover, the DPV and AVROS had already established the Fingerprint Bureau in Medan two years earlier.

In 1924 the first agricultural labour union, known as the Estate Workers Union (Salekat Buruh Onderneming), was organised in Java, and its extension to Sumatra and other regions proved a serious menace to the entrepreneurs.⁵⁷ The Zusuma began to exchange descriptions of undesirable persons with the DPV, the AVROS, the JSWB (the Java Sugar Employers Bond, Java Suiker Werkgevers Bond) in Surabaya, and the Association of Land, Mining and Industry on the west coast of Sumatra in Padang. Among some 40,000 labourers registered at the Bureau in Semarang in 1929, about 900 were recognised as being 'undesirable'. 58

In the early 1930s the ZWSS and the ADEK jointly set up the Fingerprint Bureau in Batavia and joined forces to exchange information with the Zusuma (under liquidation), the JSWB, and other companies in Sumatra. At that time a fusion of the ZWSS with the ADEK was being considered. Because the VEDA supplied free labourers to enterprises in east Sumatra and the ADEK only provided contract labourers, there was less call for ADEK services. The fusion was not realised, and the ADEK was dissolved in a law of 1936.

This law instituted several changes. Labour recruitment was left to the VEDA and ZWSS. To counter an unfavourable image, the name of 'inland depot' was changed to 'house of temporary stay', or 'doorganghuis'. In addition, the Central Bureau for Fingerprinting of the Department of Justice also took part in information exchange.⁵⁹ The VEDA, the ZWSS, the JSWB, other companies, and this government office exchanged intelligence and listed undesirable people. Contrary to expectations, most people in this category were people who had deserted from a company contract or had repeatedly escaped from a workshop; they were not political activists. 60

⁵⁷ Stoler, A.L., *op. cit.*, pp.53-54. Hoedt, T.G.E., *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109.

⁵⁹ Regerings Almanak, 1821-1942, Landsdrukkerij, Batavia.

⁶⁰ Of 708 undesirable persons (1933), there were 311 (desertion and escape from the workshop), 74 (vagrancy), 66 (unsuitability for work), 52 (laziness and brutality), 43 (murder), 29 (burglary), 18

To address the overpopulation problem in Java, the Dutch colonial government started the 'colonisation' project on an experimental scale in 1905. In this project Javanese peasants moved to Lampung (south Sumatra) with the aid of the government. The authorities drew up two colonisation plans. One plan promoted migration of peasant families from Java to Sumatra for the purpose of opening up jungle and growing rice. In the other plan the agricultural companies in the Outer Islands were to provide labourers, originally peasants in Java, with a small tract of land to grow rice and other food crops in their spare time. About 80% of the first plan was concentrated in Lampung until 1937. After independence the Indonesian government accelerated this plan and extended it on a large scale, sending peasants from Java to Lampung, Palembang, and Bengkulu (south Sumatra) beginning in 1950.⁶¹ Several agricultural companies in Lampung and Palembang recruited labourers through Javanese local officials and provided the labourers with a small garden according to the government plan.⁶² In a sense, the government colonisation plan supplemented labour recruitment.

(6) The Organisations' Personnel

Most employees in these organisations were local people. In 1945 the VEDA was comprised of a European representative, three other European staff members, 31 Javanese employees (including chauffeurs and gardeners), and four Javanese transport leaders. In 1937, when the VEDA opened an office in Medan to meet increased demand, 252 Javanese were working in all Javanese branches, and 17 natives at the new office in Medan.⁶³

In 1934 the ZWSS had 13 staff members in the recruitment department, the director, the deputy, a bookkeeper, a typist, three copyists, a head foreman or *mandur*, two foremen, two gardeners, and a guard. At that time the ZWSS only owned a harbour depot in Batavia and an inland depot in Bandung; the inland depots in Jogyakarta, Solo, Kutoarjo, Semarang, and Wonosobo were leased. The depot masters, who were agents

(revolutionary action), etc.

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Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen, 1933.

⁶¹ MacNicoll, Geoffrey, Internal migration in Indonesia: Descriptive notes, *Indonesia*, no. 5, 1968, pp.61-63.

⁶² Hoedt, T.G.E., op. cit., pp. 110, 123.

⁶³ Jaarverslagen van de Vrije Emigratie van DPV en AVROS (VEDA), 1935, 1937.

of the ZWSS, were mostly Javanese. Two yeas later the ZWSS began to train a few young Javanese to become masters.⁶⁴ Thus, the visible staff were almost all Javanese.

When it was established in 1928, the VEDA situated its head office in Semarang, with branches in Purwokerto, Purworejo, and Madiun, and sub-branches everywhere in Java. The following year two more branches were opened in Meester Cornelis (Batavia) and Surabaya, and 56 sub-branches throughout Java. These branches and sub-branches repeatedly closed and reopened with fluctuations in business. Through the activities of private agencies, the DPV and the VEDA, the port city of Semarang developed as a centre of labour recruitment in Java. A national census indicates that the majority of the emigrants came from central Java. It is important not to underestimate the relationship between the recruitment networks around Semarang and the large migration from central Java.

The ZWSS located 13 depots in Batavia, Bandung, Pekalongan, Wonosobo, Kutoarjo, Jogyakarta, Solo, Kediri, Kroya, Purwokerto, Gombong, Kebuman, and Surabaya. In Batavia the old depot that accommodated 310 emigrants was sold, and a new building with a capacity for 450 emigrants became available in 1938.⁶⁷ The VEDA reports shows that in those days each steamship held 100 to 500 labourers, with departures four to six times a month from a harbour in Java. The new ZWSS depot could hold nearly all the emigrants transported by steamship.

The labour recruitment organisations enabled the companies to obtain labourers at lower cost than previously. The table below shows that the labour recruitment rate went down in 1937, while demand for labour increased in the Outer Islands.

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in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen, 1937, 1938.

⁶⁴ The native names of Emos (an agent in Bandung), Tomowinjoyo (an agent in Kutoarjo), Tego (an agent in Semarang), Sumokariyo (an agent in Solo) and Kalipan (an agent in Wonosobo) are seen. Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indië en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen, 1934, 1936.

⁶⁵ Jaarverslagen van de Vrije Emigratie van DPV en AVROS (VEDA), 1928, 1929.

 ⁶⁶ The national census of 1930 indicates that many of the Javanese in Sumatra were from central Java, and about 20% (234,352) of the Javanese population in Sumatra were from Kedu Province in central Java.
 67 Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures

The Recruitment Rate through the VEDA*

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Immigrants	Via Batavia	Via Semarang	Via Surabaya **
Sinkeh (free)	29	29	
Sinkeh (contract)	30.50	30.50	
Laukeh (free)	22.50	24.10	
Laukeh (contract)	24	25.60	
Adult family member	19.90	21.95	
Semi-adult family member	9.95	10.95	

The Recruitment Rate through the ZWSS ***

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(NI	(7

Immigrants	Field labourer (member)	Field labourer (non-member)	Mine labourer (member)	Mine labourer (non- member)
Free labourer				
Single man	15.85	18.92	22.15	26.48
Single woman	16.85	20.12		
Married man	26.80	31.96	38.40	45.88
Married couple	33.80	40.36		
Contract labourer				
Single man	19.25	23	24. 25	29
Single woman	19.75	23.60		
Married man	32	38.20	40	47.80
Married couple	41.50	49.60		
Dancer or	44	53	44	53
Gamelan musician				

^{*} The rate includes the shipping expense to Belawan, a harbour in east Sumatra.

Eigen Werving van het ZWSS: Wervingstarieven voor Nederlandsch-Indië, geldig vanaf 1 Januari 1937. Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

Given the circumstances described above, labour recruitment in Java had become institutionalised as part of business globalisation. The agencies set up by the entrepreneurs of east and west Sumatra played an especially central role. Nevertheless, during the Japanese occupation the labour recruitment system that had been developed before that period disintegrated not only because of the war, but especially through the haphazard labour policy pursued by the Japanese.

^{**} Tanjung Perak, a harbour in Surabaya, was used only for the repatriates (as a pass-through, adult 21.25 guilders and semi-adult 10.60 guilders in 1937).

^{***} The rate of the ZWSS includes the expenses from villages to Tanjung Priok, a harbour in Batavia, and to Tangjung Perak, a harbour in Surabaya (including fingerprinting, physical examination, vaccination against smallpox, photo, food, railway, and other transportation, commissions and agent premiums, registration, administration, earnest-money, clothes, risk substitute, etc.), excluding the shipping expense. Sources: *Circulaire der VEDA*, no. 50, Medan, 22 Januari 1937, L1461 [KIT/Amsterdam].

3. Labour Recruitment during the Occupation, and Reform after the War

(1) Labour Recruitment in the Early Stages

After the Dutch surrender, several ordinances were promulgated in the Netherlands Indies under martial law. The Industrial Cooperation Ordinance was designed to control private business as well as employment and labour distribution. The Civil Service Ordinance required all civilians between 16 and 25 to register for public service, which facilitated regulation of manpower by the Japanese military administration. 68 As a result, the systematic recruitment from Java to the Outer Islands by the recruitment organisations ceased.

From the Japanese invasion of Indonesia until late 1943, the closure of 'enemy estates' created rather serious unemployment in Java. To counter this, the Residents initiated relief efforts.⁶⁹ For example, the Relief Centre for Unemployment in Jogyakarta offered the services of some 4,000 labourers mainly to the Japanese army between May and November 1943. Following the example of Dutch labour policy, the Japanese authorities in Jakarta decided to restart Javanese migration to Sumatra. They were not ready to operate a systematic migration, however.

In the early stages of the occupation, there was much demand for workers to restore facilities destroyed by Dutch scorched-earth tactics. 71 Many Japanese enterprises that had been selected as 'developers of southern areas' by the authorities started to do business in the occupied areas. Japanese companies competed with each other to receive orders from the military government. The companies were selected based on the fact that they had had experience engaging in similar business, either in the district allotted them or elsewhere. Consequently, only major firms such as national enterprises, subsidiaries of zaibatsu, or financial combines and other large enterprises received the orders.⁷²

In this period local people had the opportunity to work for the military as well as for

⁶⁸ Lasker, B., *Human Bondage in Southeast Asia*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1950, p. 313. ⁶⁹ Sato, Shigeru, *op. cit.*, 1994, p.156.

⁷⁰ IC (Indische Collectie) 005751, Collectie De Weerd, 'Angatan dari Jogjakarta Shitugyo Kyusaisho oentoek keloear Syuu dari boelan 5-'03 sampei 11-'03', [NIOD (Nederlandse Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie)/Amsterdam].

⁷¹ Sato, Shigeru, *op. cit.* p. 155.

Hikita, Yasuyuki, Japanese companies' inroads into Indonesia under Japanese military domination, Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde (KITLV), deel 152, 4e aflevering, 1996, pp. 660-662.

private businesses controlled by military and civil administrations in the occupied areas. The military administration of Java recruited labourers through native administrators and through advertisements in newspapers, radio, and posters. In the areas controlled by the Navy - South Borneo, Celebes, the Sundas, the Moluccas, New Guinea, the Bismarcks, and Guam - the naval civil administration took charge of labour mobilisation. At first the Japanese recruited labour from among local people, former estate coolies originally from Java, and convicts. In Great Sangihe Island and Minahasa (Celebes), the Japanese officials and companies that took over the agricultural plantations released all the labourers and offered them employment at higher wages. Then the companies sent their agents to various locations in the Sangihe Islands and Minahasa to recruit contract labourers.

The labour market changed around the middle of 1943, when the Japanese were put on the defensive. The mobilisation of *romushas*, or labourers (a name used by the Japanese to replace the term 'coolie'), increased enormously in Java because they were needed for projects related to the war. These included agricultural construction projects as well as airfields, railways, shore emplacements, air-raid shelters, and a greatly increased programme of munitions production.⁷⁵ Beginning with November 1944, more than 2.6 million *romushas* (including other categories such as *heiho*, or auxiliary soldiers, *peta*, or voluntary defence forces, and skilled workers) were mobilised in Java. Over 85% were employed by the military administration; the others were used by the Army and the Navy.

Most labourers were committed to the increased production of the agricultural programme of the military administration. ⁷⁶ In 1940 agricultural estates in Java reached a total of 450,000 hectares, nearly equal to the total holdings of the ALS (General Agricultural Syndicate, *Algemeen Landbouw Syndicate*) in the colonial period. ⁷⁷ The authorities planned to reduce sugar plantations from 90,675 hectares to 38,326,000 hectares, rubber plantations from 245,000 hectares to 225,000 hectares, tea plantations from 105,000 hectares to 65,000 hectares, coffee plantations from 80,000 hectares to

⁷³ Sato Shegeru, op. cit., p. 161.

⁷⁴ IC 061195, Nefis AI2/14096/G., int. rep. 1252, 14 May 1945, pp. 13-14, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

⁷⁵ Kurasawa, Aiko, *op. cit.*, 1992, p.181.

⁷⁶ Sato, Shigeru, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁷⁷ Ledenlijst van het Algemeen Landbouw Syndicaat en het Zuid-en West Sumatra Syndicaat (1938), pp.144-145, [KITLV/Leiden].

60,000 hectares. These commercial crops were to be replaced by food and other essential crops like rice, maize, jute, acacia, cinchona, and cocoa.⁷⁸

In Sumatra, which the 25th Army controlled, the military administration was intended to be self-sufficient so it encouraged food crops. But the plan also called for rubber production to be maintained at the pre-war level. Nevertheless, rubber tapping was stopped in June 1943. The former estate coolies were forced to grow rice and other food crops, and were often taken to help with construction of military bases and airstrips.⁷⁹ Commercial agriculture was becoming less of a priority for the military administration, being replaced by the need to construct a railway between Pakanbaru and Muara (central Sumatra) and create an oil refinery in Palembang.

(2) The Labour Recruitment Organisations during the Occupation

In July 1943 the 16th Army 'Osamu' that controlled Java came to an agreement with the Navy that controlled the Indonesian archipelago (except for Sumatra) about labour recruitment. They agreed that the Navy would pay 15 guilders per labourer to the 16th Army for recruitment. The agreement also specified recruitment conditions, such as housing, medical treatment, and remittances in conformity with the Recruiting Ordinance and the Coolie Ordinance of the former Dutch regime. 80 The naval civil administration established a labour recruitment organisation, the Central Labour Association of the Navy (Kaigun Rōmu Chūō Kyōkai) with a branch office in Surabaya (east Java) in which the naval civil administrators, naval civilian employees, and assistant clerks from private trading firms dealt with labour issues.⁸¹ The agreement between the Navy and the 16th Army implies that competition for Javanese labourers had already begun; it is quite likely that the companies and officials in the Navy areas had dispatched agents to Java before the agreement. Setting the cost of recruitment at 15 guilders echoes the fact that the ZWSS priced the cost of recruitment in the late 1930s at the rate needed to transport a single man from his village to a harbour in Java. Thus, the companies in the areas under naval control were empowered to recruit labour in Java.

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⁷⁸ Satō, Shigeru, *op. cit.* pp. 157, 176.

⁷⁹ Iwatake, Teruhiko, *Nanpo gunseika no keizaishisaku: Marai, Sumatora, Jawa no kiroku*, 1981, pp.229, 233.

⁸⁰ Gotō, Kenichi, op. cit., 1989, p.77.

⁸¹ Waseda Daigaku Ōkuma kinen shakaikagakukenkyūjo, *Indonesia ni okeru Nihon gunsei no kenkyū*, Waseda Daigaku Shuppankai, 1959, p. 309.

After the first conference of the Central Advisory Council, which included 43 Indonesian leaders, in October 1943, the Labour Association (*Rōmu Kyōkai*) was established for the administrative office of each province in Java by March 1944. In the province of Semarang (central Java) this labour recruitment organisation was established in October 1943. Though the province had already sent off 3,200 labourers, some 13,000 labourers were transported from Java between October 1943 and March 1944. One witness stated that the inhabitants in Semarang were persuaded to go to Surabaya, and on arrival at Surabaya they were impressed to go to Manokwari (New Guinea). The witness stated that about 1,000 coolies from Semarang were sent to Manokwari in August 1943. That summer many Javanese labourers were sent to Borneo, where the labour force was in great demand to work the 'newly discovered' rich mines of coal and nickel (in reality, these were the former Dutch mines) and to exploit the forests. ⁸⁴

In late 1943 transport of labourers from Java began on a large scale. One report shows that from July 1943 to August 1945, 294,100 *romushas* had been sent to Sumatra (120,000), north Borneo (31,700), south Borneo (48,700), Celebes and the Sundas (32,400), Ambon (5,500), Timor, and Halmahera (5,800), New Guinea (12,700), Malaya (31,000), Thailand and Burma (6,100), and Indochina (200).

The agency reports for each province, however, only list a small number of labourers leaving Java for the first few months of the fiscal year 1944. In this period the number of labourers sent from Java was only 548 for all 12 provinces, although labour recruitment was thought to have been more active following establishment of the agencies over Java and Madura. Of the 548, the Central Labour Association of the Navy received 19 artisans and 280 *romushas* after requesting 20 artisans and 500 *romushas* from Jogyakarta's agency. The rest, 249 labourers, were sent to Sumatra in April and May 1944 via the agency of Jakarta. (See Table 3.)

How could nearly 300,000 Javanese labourers have been sent from Java then? It is assumed that in addition to the Japanese labour recruitment organisations of the Army and Navy there were several other ways the labourers were impressed. In Surabaya

83 IC 060992, Nefis AI2/7914/G, int. rep. 408, 28 October 1944, p.3, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

⁸² Jawa Shinbun-sha, *Jawa Nenkan*, 1944, p. 199.

⁸⁴ IC 055018, 'Finance: labour-related issues', [NIOD/Amsterdam].

⁸⁵ IC 005709, Collectie de Weerd, 'Date concerning romusha', January/February 1946, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

there was a labour collection centre. In one case labourers were first transported from Surabaya to Jakarta and then shipped to Singapore, Malaya, and other islands. Some of them were sent abroad directly from Surabaya. 86 One informant stated that a group of 3,000 coolies were housed in godowns in Surabaya from 25 October to 10 November 1943, when they sailed for Manokwari.⁸⁷ In Kuningan (west Java) some 1,500 local people were recruited under the pretext of two weeks of work in Cirebon; they were secretly taken to Tanjung Priok harbour in Jakarta at night and shipped to Malaya.⁸⁸ There is one instance in which labourers who had applied as *heihos* (auxiliary soldiers) were forced to go to north Borneo as romushas. 89 For the oil refinery in Palembang (south Sumatra), which was the most important oil base for the Japanese military government, the authorities employed local people and romushas from Java that had been allotted by the military administration. But they were not sufficient to do the work, so those in charge of the labour section visited Java and brought Javanese labourers as 'voluntary corps' to south Sumatra. 90 One group of the labourers usually circulated among the islands, suggesting there was a constant manpower shortage everywhere. Another informant stated that labour recruitment had been quite systematically carried out by Chinese and Javanese contractors. 91

Javanese agency reports state that the military administration was responsible for mobilising most of the labourers within a province. The labourers sent outside the province (some 30,000 between April and June 1944) were committed to major construction projects such as the Bayah coal mine and Sakti-Bayah railway in Banten, the airfields in Banten and Grissee, and the shipyards in Surabaya and Juwana. Each agency from every province in Java dealt with labour recruitment in that region. It was probably difficult to persuade people to go to distant places, and much more difficult to convince them to go overseas, because word of the *romushas* fate had gradually spread among Javanese villagers. In September 1943 the head of Janglapa village in Bogor Province impressed 15 villagers to go to Cikotok in Banten for railway construction. In

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⁸⁶ IC 060964, Nefis AI2/3540/G, int. rep., 25 May 1944, p. 3, IC 060973, Nefis AI2/7655/G, int. rep. 184, 18 October 1944, p. 4, IC 060992, Nefis AI2/7914/G, int. rep. 408, 28 October, 1944, p. 3, IC 060996, Nefis AI2/8046/G, int. rep., 4 November 1944, p. 10, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

⁸⁷ IC 061052, Nefis AI2/9693/G., int. rep., 27 December 1944, pp.5, 7, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

⁸⁸ Gotō, Kenichi, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

⁸⁹ Kurasawa, Aiko, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191. (By her interview)

⁹⁰ Gotō, Kenichi, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁹¹ IC 060878, Nefis AI2/4390/G., int. rep., 3 July 1944, p. 4, IC 060964, Nefis AI2/3540/G., int. rep., 25 May 1944, p.3, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

addition, a gold mine was opened in the colonial period in Cikotok, and managed by the Mitsui Mining Company, a subsidiary of *Mitsui zaibatsu*, during the occupation. The villagers received three guilders in advance, and then had their thumbprints taken. Later most of them ran away, hiding in the forest - only three were sent to Cikotok. ⁹²

Local administrators were given important posts in the agencies, and the Javanese staff generally worked under Japanese supervision. The Javanese staff was mainly composed of children from the lower rungs of the traditional Javanese aristocracy who had been educated in Dutch primary or secondary schools. The real work had been carried out not on the provincial level but at the lower administrative levels. Therefore, responsibility fell on the local Javanese officials who were directly engaged in labour recruitment. In the labour recruitment the Japanese took advantage of the vertical relationships of the traditional society as well as those developed in the course of the colonial period.

(3) The Situation of the Clients

There were many groups that requested the agencies to arrange for labourers: the military corps, administrative offices, the police, a forestry office, a radio station, a *pasar* (or market), a plantation, a mine, a factory, and a retail shop. In the agency report of February 1945 from Priangan Province, the accounting division of the military administration in Bandung asked for 2,000 labourers (it received 513); the head office of the railway asked for 5,700 labourers (it received 2,570); the *Osamu* asked for 10,497; the Corps asked for 800 labourers (it received 100); and the provincial police asked for 800 labourers to be used as voluntary labour corps (it received 800). Requests from private firms included: the *Kawata* agricultural estate, which asked for 2,800 and received 1,620 labourers; the Ishihara Industrial Corporation, which was managing the Sawal mine that produced porcelain clay and stone in Priangan, which asked for 300 and received 446 labourers; and the *Raden Kusumasembada* wood fuel company (which was the name of a *pangreh praja*, or native administrative official), which asked for 300 and received the same number of labourers. ⁹⁴ In Cirebon Province a total of 1,748

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⁹² IC 036485-486, 037293, Malay Stukken, 'Klachten en ongerustigheid van de gehele bevolking inzake het koeliewezen', 17 September 1943, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

⁹³ Kurasawa, Aiko, *op.cit.*, pp. 220-221.

⁹⁴ IC 005758-005759, Collectie de Weerd, 'Banjaknja roomsha jang dikerahkan dalam boelan Nigatsu 2605' (Priangan), 23 March 1945, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

labourers had been requested by 22 rice factory owners, mostly Chinese, from April to June 1944, and 788 labourers were sent to the factories. 95

The labourers were paid low salaries, but when the labour mobilisation reached an impasse, the military administration introduced sukarela, or unpaid labour service, under the guise of building an independent Indonesia. In Bogor Province a total of 1,165,447 labourers had been mobilised in the labour service corps for the three months between May and July 1943. 6 In Klaten in Surakarta 4,761 labourers had been recruited to construct an airfield and had been forced to work under conditions of heerendienst, or corvee, which was a type of obligatory labour common in the traditional village community during colonial times.⁹⁷

Before the occupation the assets of the Nomura East Indies Farming Company were mainly in the rubber plantations of Borneo. During the war Nomura, as one of the leading enterprises, operated in the commercial sector in Java as well. It managed a power sailing vessel firm in Banyumas, a company dealing in smaller ships in Jakarta, Surabaya, Bojonegoro, and Madura, the quartz sand trade in Bojonegoro, a tannin factory in Bandung, rubber dinghies in Cirebon, and a cloth factory in Priangan and Cirebon. In addition, Nomura managed the former European estates, including 41 Dutch estates, 13 English estates, 6 French estates, three Belgian estates and one Swiss estate in Jakarta, Bogor, Priangan, and Cirebon. 98

One of these was Pasir-Bitung, a former Dutch estate in Priangan. The agency in Jakarta offered 682 labourers to this estate in October 1944, which consisted of 207 bedeng romushas, or actual contract labourers, and 175 dependents, as well as 300 kampong romushas, or residents who can work on a temporary basis. The work corps allotted to the estate included many elderly people. Of 123 male bedeng romushas, 30% (37 labourers) were 40 or over, and 12 of the men were between 46 and 60 years old. Among 200 male kampong romushas, 74 men were 40 or over, and 38 men were between 46 and 60. Of the women, 15 of 75 bedeng romushas and 26 of 100 kampong

⁶ IC 005728-005729, Collectie de Weerd, 'Daftar romusha jang dikirim ke dalam Syuu' (Bogor), August 1944, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

⁹⁵ IC 005778, Collectie de Weerd, 'Daftar romusha jang dikirim ke dalam Syuu' (Chirebon), [NIOD/Amsterdam].

⁹⁷ IC 005773, Collectie de Weerd, 'Daftar romusha jang dikirim ke dalam Syuu' (Surakarta), [NIOD/Amsterdam].

^{&#}x27;List of works, factories, and estates with the names of Japanese who administered them', March 1946, pp. 22-23, Nefis Archives, bijlage 3, docnr. 2398, [het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken/The Hague].

romushas were 40 or over. Considering the average life span in those years, the work corps was of little use from the management's point of view, even if the ages recorded for the workers may not have been completely accurate. In addition, nine children (11 to 13) were registered as *bedeng romusha*. ⁹⁹ The Japanese occupation mobilised the local people mercilessly, from children to old people. The armed forces and key projects were probably given priority over the young and robust workers. Doubtless, Japanese wartime businesses lacked in strong manpower resources, both in number and quality.

Japanese companies and officials in sparsely populated islands had a more serious problem trying to obtain labour. The naval civil administrators visited Nila Island in the Moluccas to recruit labour in March 1944, but the inhabitants escaped to the jungle, and the officials managed to take only five men. On a second visit in May 1944, the officials tried to obtain more labourers, but were unsuccessful because of Allied attacks on their motor boat. This type of incident was probably common on the occupied islands. In Sungai Kolak on Bintan Island (Riau Islands), under the jurisdiction of Singaporean authorities, where the Furukawa Mining Company, a subsidiary of a Japanese *zaibatsu*, ran a bauxite mine, the labourers had been transported from the tin mines in Bangka, Billiton, and Singkep. ¹⁰¹

In 1945 the Seventh Area Army (headquartered in Singapore), since its unification of Malaya, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo in March 1944, adopted the principle of self-sufficiency for labour and other commodities in each area. One informant noted, however, that a Japanese man and three Javanese agents from Tarakan Island (northeast Borneo) visited Balikpapan (southeast Borneo) and Surabaya to recruit labour. Saying they were offering education to recruits, they transported 500 to 600 labourers to Tarakan Island by May 1945. Despite the stated principles of the military administration, labour recruitment was carried out separately.

The Japanese occupied a vast area and eliminated the old colonial boundaries, but there was no organised labour migration. The networks between Java and other islands as well as those between the port cities and inland Java had not been strong, which resulted in inefficient transport of food, fuels, and remittances.

⁹⁹ IC 005735-005745, Collectie de Weerd, 'Daftar romusha keboen Pasir-Bitoeng', 25 October 1944, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

¹⁰⁰ IC 060914, Nefis AI2/5768/G., int. rep. 219, 226, 19 August 1944, pp. 4-5, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

¹⁰¹ IC 061237, Nefis AI2/18679/G., int. rep., 7 September 1945, p. 7, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

¹⁰² IC 061207, Nefis AI2/14853/G., int. rep. 1931/T, 4 June 1945, pp.1, 5, [NIOD/Amsterdam].

(4) Re-organisation in the War of Independence

The Japanese surrender left many starving *romushas* everywhere in Southeast Asia. The total number of Indonesians left to fend for themselves was 77,000; 52,000 in the former Dutch territory and 25,000 in the other regions: Singapore, Penang, Malaya, Thailand, Indochina, North Borneo, and others. A Dutch relief institution, the NEBUDORI (Netherlands Bureau of Documentation and Repatriating of Indonesian, Nederlandsche Bureau voor Documentatie en Repatrieeing van Indonesiers), was established in November 1945 in Singapore. This organisation started a repatriation program and helped 52,000 Indonesians return to Java between May 1946 and April 1947. Although the Dutch government did not recognise the Republic of Indonesia, both governments worked together on repatriation. 103

While the relief institution helped romushas, heihos, and others return to their villages, the VEDA and the ZWSS decided to join their forces to restart a labour recruitment drive in 1947. In east Sumatra, when a pro-Dutch local Malay government was established in the state of east Sumatra (Negara Sumatra Timur) in December 1947, it enabled recovery of 173 estates by the former Western owners by February 1948. 105 The VEDA began to recruit labour in Java for the companies in east Sumatra in late 1948. Eighteen *laukeh* recruiters were dispatched from east Sumatra to Banyumas (central Java), and they succeeded in recruiting 19 Javanese families in November 1948. 106 They then distributed recruitment propaganda in Semarang and Banyumas. 107 After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, the Western organisations came under the supervision of the Indonesian government. Although the VEDA was no longer allowed to recruit labour in Java independently, it gradually resumed its activities with the increased need for labour. In 1952 the VEDA recruited 8,178 families and 55 single men for the plantations in Aceh and east Sumatra. 108

The ZWSS, however, encountered difficulties from the outset in resuming the

¹⁰³ Kurasawa, Aiko, op. cit., p. 240.

From a short report: bestuursvergadering AVROS, dd. 24 Mei 1949, Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

¹⁰⁵ Stoler, A. L., op. cit., p. 113.

¹⁰⁶ From resume nr. 38, dd. 16 November 1939, Bespreking DB Syndicaat en Onder-voorzitters Bonden, Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

¹⁰⁷ Verslag van het Agentschap te Medan, 1950, Inv. nr. 5121, het Hoofdkantoor van de N. H. M., N. V. [ARA/The Hague]. 108 *ibid.*, 1952.

recruitment networks. Moreover, by late 1949 there was no longer any the mutual cooperation between the VEDA and the ZWSS because each concentrated on different types of labour. The lack of cooperation from local officials in Java, together with the army's use of inland depots and the difficulties of transporting the labour, caused the commission to raise the cost to 150 to 200 guilders for each labourer. Minister of Labour Wilopo asked the planters' associations not to force Indonesians to immigrate to the Outer Islands; moreover, the Ministry of Social Affairs did not favour private organisations' recruitment of labour in Java. The ZWSS was then forced to request labourers from the Minister of Labour in Jogyakarta and wait for candidates to be sent to inland depots by the governors assigned by the Minister. The ZWSS was finally compelled to cease its labour recruitment efforts in 1951.

In the summer of 1950, 700,000 plantation labourers in Java and Sumatra, led by a communist oriented labour union, the SARBUPRI (Union of Indonesian Plantation Labourers, *Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia*), went on strike. The planters' associations preferred to 'import' non-political labourers from Java rather than use unionised labourers in Sumatra. After the Japanese surrender, the former Indonesian clerks filled administrative posts in the estates and mines. Most of them had contacts with political and union movements. The recruiting activities of the VEDA gradually diminished as well: its recruitment reached its peak in 1952 and ended in 1958, when Dutch enterprises were nationalised by the Indonesian government. One reason for this was that the entrepreneurs were more concerned with restricting radical union activities than with recruiting labour in the 1950s. The same summation of the same summation is the same summation of the same summation in the 1950s.

In the efforts to restrict radical union activities and labour migration for driving agricultural programmes, there was no conflict of interest between the entrepreneurs and the Indonesian government, for one aim of the government was to control labour recruitment. The Javanese migration of contract labour to other Indonesian islands was

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¹⁰⁹ Zuid-en West Sumatra Syndicaat: Aan de leiden van het ZWSS, E/TT, No. A2852/L8, dd. 31 October 1949, Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

From: resume Nr. 4, dd. 7 Maart 1950, Bespreking DB Syndicaat ALS enz. en Onder-voorzitters Bonden, Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

From: Notulen gecombineerde leden vergadering ALS enz. en CPV, dd. 19 Juni 1950, Circulaire A1113/L. 24 en CPV 527/L/4, dd. 21 Juni 1950, Inv. nr. 205, Archief Federatie Cultuurondernemingen [ARA/The Hague].

¹¹² Stoler, A.L., op. cit., pp. 123, 127.

¹¹³ The plantation workers did not play an important role in the independence movement.

The VEDA began to compile statistics on the strikes after 1953. See *Verslag van het Agentschap te Medan*, 1939, 1946-59.

made the responsibility of the Placement Office (*Jawatan Penempatan Tenaga*) of Jogyakarta. In the formative period of the Republic the government had to rely on Western organisations to some extent. The agencies established by the Indonesian government did recruit contract labourers in the 1950s¹¹⁵ but not a large scale. It was not until the 1960s that the government began to play a central role in the migration of contract labourers: it was at that point, when the government owned the plantations and the mines that it became an interested client. (See table 2.)

Conclusion

We have described the rise and fall of the labour recruitment organisations as agencies and the role of the enterprises as clients. At the end of the twentieth century, when the demand for labour increased with the spread of commercial agriculture and the exploitation of mines in Indonesia and Malaya, Western entrepreneurs depended at first on Chinese immigrant networks to provide the labourers. Later, to counter the increased Chinese influence, the entrepreneurs in the Netherlands Indies and (British) Malaya looked for new options to recruit labour, and they turned to Java and India. In the Netherlands Indies, the European traders and commission merchants in Sumatra (where the labour was needed) and Java (the source of the labour supply) added labour recruitment to their activities. These private agencies flourished in the 1910s.

Encouraged by the ordinances of the colonial government, the entrepreneurs established labour recruitment organisations, which gradually superseded the recruitment business of the private agencies in the 1920s. The organisations changed their names and operations to conform to government labour policies, economic fluctuations, and public opinion, but the entrepreneurs continued to lead the labour recruitment. In the 1930s various multinational entrepreneurs joined forces to facilitate systematic labour migration and control labour movements.

During the Japanese occupation the labour recruitment system became chaotic. Although the Japanese military administration planned labour migration from Java, in the end it was compelled to adopt a policy of regional self-sufficiency for labour and

Erwiza, Miners, managers and the state: A socio-political history of the Ombilin coal-mines, West Sumatra, 1892-1996, Ph.D. thesis, Amsterdam University, 1999, p. 162.

other commodities because the war made regular transport very undependable. Most of the available labour had been mobilised within Java and within the region. Despite this, official and unofficial labour recruitment remained active in the port cities of Java, resulting in the transport of close to 300,000 Javanese labourers overseas to work for only a few years. After the Pacific War ended, the labourers remained abroad until they were repatriated with the aid of the Allied powers. In parallel, the labour recruitment system was restored in its prewar context. The Western enterprises, which were placed under the supervision of the Indonesian government, were suddenly confronted by radical union movements and were forced to relinquish control of the labour recruitment. The Indonesian government finally took control of Dutch enterprises as well as the labour recruitment, and it established a large-scale labour migration programme beginning with the 1960s.

Table 1 The number of labourers transported through the recruiting institutions

	ADEK	ADEK	VEDA	Zusuma	ZWSS	Arrivals	Arrivals	Total
	(member)	(outside				(east	(other	Arrivals
		member)				Sumatra)	regions in	
1909						4,114	the N.E.I.)	6,547
1910						19,517	9,086	28,603
1910						16,179	5,640	28,603
1911						26,259	3,040	,
1912						20,239	9,676	26,259 32,537
1914 1915						13,845	6,403	20,248
	10.005					14,892	7,600	22,492
1916	18,095			2 220		14,844	10,732	25,576
1917	42,439			2,339		45,666	16,655	62,321
1918	38,186	5.50		3,369		42,745	19,972	62,717
1919	38,165	558		5,462		42,500	25,110	67,610
1920	30,769	2,214		5,541		34,580	21,130	55,710
1921	19,046	4,515		?		21,847	14,479	36,326
1922	5,981	4,907		1,057		6,937	6,095	13,032
1923	7,862	4,843		1,524		10,856	10,683	21,539
1924	17,360	9,121		2,948		21,514	16,532	38,046
1925	35,627	12,026	13,899	3,703		42,528	21,372	63,900
1926	42,327	13,637	17,604	8,332		50,432	32,772	83,204
1927	33,602	10,949	15,693	11,758		45,103	31,523	76,626
1928	31,854	10,511	20,317	11,459		32,497	26,466	58,963
1929	44,878	8,786	38,064	16,048		47,018	30,644	77,662
1930	16,484	3,597	28,739			16,677	12,673	29,350
1931	498	783	2,234			439	2,566	3,005
1932			2,344			92	1,027	1,119
1933			9,806		3,465	3,332	2,175	5,507
1934			7,109		5,503	2,848	2,105	4,953
1935			19,754		4,225	2,076	949	3,025
1936			28,048		5,660	3,354	868	4,222
1937			77,579		20,002	42,416	23,338	65,754
1938		_	29,577		8,380	15,016	8,318	23,334
1939					?	17,242	8,105	25,347
1940					10,168	ĺ	ĺ	

Source: Boomgaard, P. and Gooszen, A.J., Changing economy in Indonesia: A selection of statistical source material from the early 19th century up to 1940, vol. 11, Population trends 1795-1942, p. 54.

Jaarverslagen van het Algemeen Delisch Emigratie Kantoor, 1919-1931, Inv. nr. 338, de archieven van de N. V. Deli Maatschappij [ARA/The Hague].

Jaarverslagen van de Vrije Emigratie van DPV en AVROS (VEDA), 1928-1938, Inv. nr. 341, de archieven van de N. V. Deli Maatschappij [ARA (Algemeen Rijksarchief)/The Hague], L2053 [KIT (Koninkrijk Instituut voor de Tropen)/Amsterdam].

Hoedt, T.G.H., Indische bergcultuurondernemingen voornamelijk in Zuid-Sumatra: Gegevens en beschouwingen, 1930, p. 107.

Verslag ALS-ZWSS-De Centrale Vereeniging tot beheer van Proefstations voor de Overjarige Cultures in Nederlandsch-Indie en van de onder deze Organisaties ressorteerende Vereenigingen en Instellingen, 1933-1940, L2126 [KIT/Amsterdam].

Table 2 The number of labourers transported (after the war)

	VEDA	VEDA	VEDA	Javanese	contract
	(men)	(women)	(total)	labourers	
1948/49	1,558	1,378	2,936		
1950	2,732	2,889	5,621		
1951	4,933	3,388	8,321		10.600
1952	8,230	6,194	14,424		13,600
1953	1,790	1,194	2,984		3,400
1954	1,129	1,058	2,187		2,900
1955	3,998	2,172	6,170		6,400
1956	3,068	1,836	4,904		5,000
1957	793	549	1,342		1,700
1958					3,400
1959					

Source: *Verslag van het Agentschap te Medan over her jaar 1939, 1946-1959*, Inv. nr. 5121, Het Hoofdkantoor van de Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij N. V. [ARA/The Hague].

MacNicoll, G., Internal migration in Indonesia: Descriptive notes, *Indonesia* no. 5, 1968, p. 71. (By *Jawatan Penempatan Tenaga*/the Ministry of Labour)

Table 3 Romushas transported beyond the provinces

West Java

Priangan Province

	Client (destination)	Requested number	Transported number	Remarks
2/4/1944	Gordah (Airfield) (Serang/Banten)	25	8	Carpenter
4/4/1944	Nihon Shokai Japan Trading Firm (Jakarta)	23	23	
13/6/1944	Rikuyu sokyoku The head office of Land Transportation (Bantan)	700	444	
11/6/1944	Pelatih Romusha Romusha training (Jakarta)	20	10	
Total		768	485	

Within the province (from April to June, 1944)

Requested number 36,453/transported number 32,983

Jakarta Province

	Client (destination)	Requested	Transported	Remarks
		number	number	
15/4/1944	Gordah (Serang/Banten)	1,000	604	

^{*} It is not clear whether the Javanese contract labourers the Indonesian government reported included the Javanese labourers recruited with the help of the VEDA.

Outside Java and Madura

	Client (destination)	Requested number	Transported number	Remarks
10/4/1944	Sonanto (Sumatra)	35	35	
9/5/1944	Palembang (Sumatra)	214	214	
Total		249	249	

Within the province (from April to June, 1944)
Requested number 10,290/transported number 8,895

Bogor Province

	Client (destination)	Requested	Transported	Remarks
		number	number	
10/4/1944	Serang	1,000	398	Seine Doboku?
	_			(construction)
22/4/1944	Serang		379	
Total		1,000	777	

Within the province (from April to June, 1944)
Requested number 3,580/transported number 3,974

Central Java

Jogyakarta

	Client (destination)	Requested number	Transported number	Remarks
1/4/1944	Zosenkyoku The Shipbuilding Office (Surabaya)	5	5	Chauffeur
9/4/1944	Se 2138 Corps (Surabaya)	1,000	373	Romusha
10/4/1944	8991 Corps (Jakarta)	60	61	Artisan
28/4/1944	The Construction Office (Serang/Banten)		733	Romusha
5/5/1944	Bajah Mine/Sumitomo (Banten)	50	32	Artisan
6/5/1944	Zokutaku?/The Navy	100	57	Pumuda
7/6/1944	Neuryosho?/The Navy (Surabaya)	50	8	Chauffeur
14/7/1944	Kaigun-chuo-romukyokai The recruitment agency of the Navy (Surabaya)	20	19	Artisan
10/8/1944	Zosenkyoku The Shipbuilding Office (Surabaya)	1,230	287	Romusha
22/81944	Kaigun-chuo-romukyokai The recruitment agency of the Navy (Surabaya)	500	280	Romusha
2/9/1944	Rinji-shisetu-tai Temporary Facilities Corps (Bajah/Banten)	500	199	Romusha
Total		3,515	2,054	

Within the province (from April to September, 1944) Requested number 1,885/transported number 1,534

Surakarta

	Client (destination)	Requested number	Transported number	Remarks
6/4/1944	Bajah Mine/Sumitomo (Banten)		308	From request in March
3/5/1944	Shikojo (Airport?) (Serang)	1,000	284	
3/5/1944	Cilacap Shipbuilding Yard	30	22	
2/6/1944	Kobayashi Gumi Kobayashi Construction Group (Gresik)	25	13	
13/6/1944	Harima Zosenjo Harima Shipbuilding Yard	300	137	
Total		1,355	764	

Within the province (from April to June, 1944) Requested number 29,290/transported number 10,665

Kedu Province

	Client (destination)	Requested number	Transported number	Remarks
7/4/1944	Bajah Mine/Sumitomo (Banten)	1,000	839	
8/4/1944	Bajah Mine/Sumitomo (Banten)	1,000	970	
1/5/1944	Seibu Doboku-kyoku The Western Office of Construction (Banten)	1,000	883	
31/5/1944	Bajah Mine/Sumitomo (Banten)	1,500	854	
1/6/1944	Surabaya Ken Butai	1,000	1097	
Total		5,500	4,643	

Semarang Province

	Client (destination)	Requested	Transported	Remarks
		number	number	
5/4/1944	Jakarta	100	100	Carpenter
12/4/1944	Surabaya	1,000	285	
15/4/1944	Jakarta	300	200	Carpenter
15/4/1944	Jakarta	50	50	Welder
17/4/1944	Bajah (Banten)	1,000	245	
19/4/1944	Serang (Banten)	1,000	569	Construction
24/5/1944	Seketi (Banten)	250	250	
28/5/1944	Grissee	1,000	1,000	
29/5/1944	Jakarta	1.000	1,000	
305/1944	Juana (Pati)	500	500	
31/5/1944	Grissee	1,000	1,000	
30/5/1944	Seketi (Banten)	800	800	
2/6/1944	Jakarta	204	204	
5/6/1944	Jakarta	750	750	
6/6/1944	Bajah (Banten)	613	613	
Total	. (0 4 1) 1 1044)	9,467	7,566	

Within the province (from April to June, 1944) Requested number 4,199/transported number 3,921

East Java

Besuki Province

	Client (destination)	Requested	Transported	Remarks
		number	number	
15/4/1944	Surabaya	300	310	
25/5/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)	500	414	
20/6/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)	1,000	273	
29/6/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)		286	
Total		1,800	1,283	

Bojonegoro Province

	Client (destination)	Requested number	Transported number	Remarks
6/4/1944	Surabaya	480	96	
24/4/1944	Bajah Mine/Sumitomo	1,000	351	
	(Banten)			
27/4/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)		227	
6/5/1944	Banten	700	231	
26/5/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)		466	
26/5/1944	Bajah (Banten)	1,000	68	
30/5/1944	Bajah (Banten)		70	
31/5/1944	Bajah (Banten)		199	
4/6/1944	Bajah (Banten)		69	
15/6/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)	1,000	298	
16/61944	Gresik (Surabaya)	500	126	
18/6/1944	Cepu (Pati)/public oil factory	500		
Total		5,180	2,201	

Within the province (from April to June, 1944) Requested number 4,060/transported number 2,689

Kediri Province

	Client (destination)	Requested	Transported	Remarks
		number	number	
15/4/1944	Surabaya	300	257	Carpenter
16/4/1944	Serang (Banten)	1,000	973	
22/4/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)	1,000	1,007	
22/4/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)	200	102	Carpenter
22/5/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)	1,000	797	
24/5/1944	Gresik (Surabaya)	100	75	Carpenter
26/5/1944	Serang (Banten)	50	32	Carpenter
23/5/1944	Surabaya/the Navy	100	98	Probationary
				carpenter
Total		3.750	3,341	

Madura Province

	Client (destination)	Requested number	Transported number	Remarks
5/4/1944	Construction (Serang/Banten)	1,000	954	
10/4/1944	Tanjung Priok <i>Kaiji Sokyoku</i> The head office of Maritime Affairs (Jakarta)	1,000	674	
25/4/1944	Kaigun Onyubu The Transportation Office of the Navy? (Surabaya)	300	303	
15/5/1944 17/5/1944	Obayashi Gumi Obayashi Construction Group (Gresik/Surabaya)	1,000	978	
27/6/1944	Osamu 15854 Corps	500	492	
20/6/1944	Obayashi Gumi Obayashi Construction Group (Gresik/Surabaya)	2,000	450	
22/6/1944	Ibid.		400	
23/6/1944	Ibid.		78	
24/6/1944	Ibid.		301	
25/6/1944	Ibid.		428	
Total		5,800	5,058	

Within the province (from April to June, 1944) Requested number 5,800/transported number 5,058

Malang Province

	Client (destination)	Requested	Transported	Remarks
		number	number	
31/5/1944	Obayashi Gumi	1,000	556	
	Obayashi Construction group			
	Gresik (Surabaya)			

Within the province (from April to June, 1944) Requested number 18,543/transported number 13,189

Sources: *the reports of Romu Kyokai*, Inv. nr. 005722-005797, K.A. de Weerd Collection (1942-1946), [NIOD (Nederlands Iistutuut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie)/Amsterdam].

List of works, factories, and estates with the names of Japanese who administered them. March 1946 NEFIS (Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service) Archief, bijlage 3, docnr. 2398 [het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken/The Hague].